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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the limitation of participation of developing countries 
in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Under the DSB, 
there are many cases that present the limiting of developing countries on some significant 
ways. This thesis discusses the most significant limiting factors reported and practiced by 
developing countries in the DSB. Developing countries have a lack of financial and legal 
resources and ability to impose the DSB rulings on procedural of the DSU. Also, there are a 
number of significant procedural reforms that the DSU dispute settlement system must 
consider. This thesis discusses these legal and financial obstacles for developing countries 
under the DSB. This thesis mentions the most significant potential solutions for tackling the 
constraints of developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
Those solutions try to make the WTO system more workable for developing countries in 
settling disputes. In addition, it tries to demonstrate the significance of reforming the DSU. 
Also, it tries to improve developing country use of the WTO DSB. Therefore, it recommends 
that the proposals appearing in this thesis should be used in actual practice by establishing 
them in the DSB.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
1.1 Introduction  
 
Globalization is a significant factor that increases trade and economic development, and 
appears to be the new global force meaning that the global economy is considered to be the 
main element that affects all countries around the world. International trade is considered to 
be one of the major factors for the development and growth of any country’s economy. In 
international trade, an economy is not controlled by only one state or country; rather, the 
economies of all countries are interconnected, leading international trade to be considered the 
most important factor for all countries.  
 
In order to found, develop and coordinate international trade, a conference on economic 
matters was held in 1944, in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Following the conference, 
work on tariff reductions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
completed in 1947. During the GATT tariff negotiation rounds, specifically the Uruguay 
round of negotiations for a reduction in tariffs and other barriers to international trade, the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in order to deal with international 
economic issues
1
. On 1st January 1995, the GATT members adopted the WTO agreement, 
thereby becoming WTO Members; the agreement is binding for all members
2
.  
 
                                                 
 
1
 The World Trade Organization: The WTO, available from: http://www.wto.org/index.htm [viewed March 2, 
2015]. 
2
 Ibid. 
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The WTO agreement established a new international organisation. This organisation has a 
legal personality, legal capacity, privileges, immunities and a stronger system for resolving 
disputes for all members
3. The WTO’s significant subsidiary body is the Dispute Settlement 
Body (‘DSB’), which has established a system for dispute settlement. The dispute settlement 
system is considered a fundamental and central institution of the WTO
4
. Its purpose is the 
resolution of trade disputes between WTO Members and it is governed by the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures, known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘DSU’), which 
establishes the procedure for dispute settlement
5 . The WTO’s DSB and its DSU are 
considered to be one of the WTO’s strongest functions as a result of its aim to settle disputes 
that might arise between Members regarding their rights and obligations under the WTO 
agreement
6
. However, the DSU may now be in need of reform. Concerns have been raised 
that a number of constraints limit the participation of developing countries in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings in comparison to developed countries.  
 
The purpose of this research is to discuss in detail certain concerns that limit the participation 
of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. To this end, this research 
will investigate the current practice of WTO Members. The research will also determine 
those factors limiting this participation that have been suggested by eastern and western 
literature. Moreover, it will highlight and evaluate the possible solutions that would address 
the constraints that limit developing countries’ participation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. 
                                                 
 
3
 The World Trade Organization 2015: Dispute Settlement, Rules of conduct for the understanding on rules and 
procedures governing the settlement of disputes, available from: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rc_e.htm [viewed March 2, 2015]. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The developing and developed countries’ participation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings is one of the main subjects for people who are working on trade issues for both 
developing and developed governments
7
. Since the start of the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings, those proceedings have become a main method used to settle any disputes 
arising between WTO Members, whether those members are developing or developed 
countries. However, developing countries have a number of constraints that limit their 
participation in dispute settlement proceedings. Since those constraints were first raised, 
researchers have conducted studies examining how it impacted the performance of the 
WTO’s DSU to settle the disputes as well as how the disputes and settlement proceedings 
impacted developing countries’ participation in the WTO system. This was also the part of 
the pursuit of developing countries’ claimants by their proposal for greater innovation, and 
the improvement and the development of WTO DSU, such as Cuba
8
, Paraguay
9
, Haiti
10
, 
Jordan
11
 and the African Group’s proposals12.  
 
In this context, this study will consider the most important obstacles that hinder the 
developing countries in dispute settlement proceedings and how the strategies of developing 
countries deal with these constraints such as lack of financial and legal resources, litigation 
                                                 
 
7
 Footer, M. E. (2001).‘Developing Country Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute Settlement’. Journal of 
World Trade, 35(1), pp 55-98. 
8
 Proposal by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, 
Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/19, at 2 (Oct. 9, 2002). 
9
 See, Communication from Paraguay, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/16, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2002). 
10
 Communication from Haiti, Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, 
TN/DS/W/37, at 3,4(Jan. 22, 2003). 
11
 See, Communication from Jordan, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/43, at 2 
(Jan. 28, 2003). 
12
 See, the African Group in proposal made during negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/15, at 2 (Sept. 25, 2002). 
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costs, retaliation, enforcement of DSU rulings, duration of the DSB process and 
compensation. The study will be an examination of the DSU and whether it has achieved the 
objective to settle the disputes fairly. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
In the light of the above problems, this research strives to answer the following questions:  
1. What are the constraints that have been faced by the developing countries in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings?  
a) Is the cost of the WTO system for settling disputes considered to be too high a 
cost for the developing countries?  
b) Is the DSB rulings considered to be a constraint that limiting the participation 
of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings? 
c) Are the ‘retaliation rules’ of the WTO dispute settlement system considered to 
be ‘virtually meaningless’?  
d) Is it true that the outcomes of the WTO DSB have no benefits to enforce them 
and its power is limited, and that this contributes to limiting the participation of 
developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings?  
2) Is it true that the accession of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings imposes a greater burden on them?  
3) What are the specific provisions of the WTO legal framework and agreements that 
constitute legal barriers to developing countries?  
4) Is the legal framework of the WTO’s DSB biased against developing countries?  
5) Which provisions of the WTO agreement and of the DSB framework are causing 
concerns for developing countries?  
15 
 
 
1.4 Research Objectives  
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the participation of developing countries in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In so doing, the study will seek:  
1) To investigate the extent to which developing countries are required by the WTO 
DSU to settle their disputes in line with the strategic framework of the WTO;  
2) To identify the extent of participation of developing countries in dispute settlement 
proceedings;  
3) To ascertain those factors that impede the participation of developing countries in 
those proceedings;  
4) To see if the WTO’s agreements and its organizational structure have an impact on 
participation of developing countries in those proceedings;  
5) To highlight any other finding that is of interest and contributes towards the subject 
of the participation of developing countries in those proceedings;  
6) To provide a scientific framework for supporting the participation of developing 
countries in those proceedings;  
7) To make concrete recommendations to ensure greater participation of developing 
countries in those proceedings.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study  
 
The findings of this research will add to the knowledge and understanding of the participation 
of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and the ability of the WTO 
system to deal with them. The significance of this research is tied into the importance of the 
subject matter covered and the context in which it is applied. This study will address the 
following elements:  
16 
 
 
1) Allow the identification of the concept and framework of the WTO that takes into 
account the nature of work and the environment to deal with developing countries;  
2) Support both the WTO and the developing countries to create a good system to settle 
disputes;  
3) Generate greater awareness within the organization on the importance of having a 
proper and practical framework as a method to organizational effectiveness; 
4) Provide useful knowledge on factors that might impact and contribute to the 
successful participation of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings;  
5) Shed light on the participation of developing countries in the WTO as one of the 
important contemporary concepts;  
6) Identify, clarify, and discuss the problems faced by developing countries that affect 
their participation in the WTO; and  
7) Find solutions, by legal provisions or otherwise, for the problems that developing 
countries face in the WTO.  
 
1.6 Theoretical framework of the study  
 
The objective of the study is basically two-pronged. First, it is to examine the extent of the 
developing countries’ participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and second, to 
see how various factors limit the developing countries’ participation in those proceedings. It 
gathers data on the extent of the developing countries’ participation in the proceedings, and 
amongst the dimensions to be investigated are:  
1) Completeness of WTO systems;  
2) Establishing the direction of the WTO to deal with developing countries;  
17 
 
 
3) The implementation of tasks in the WTO dispute settlement process;  
4) Improving developing countries’ participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings; and 
5) Avoiding the constraints that limit the developing countries’ participation in the 
DSB.  
 
1.7 Research Methodology  
 
The methodology in this thesis is twofold. First, it is based on the existing literature; books, 
scientific journals and WTO official legal documentation and publications relating to the 
specialized subject area of participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, including 
the participation of developing countries in such proceedings. Second, this knowledge is 
applied to real life cases for a greater comprehension of how the rules are actually affecting 
the members of the WTO. The thesis will explore how developing and less developed 
countries fared in the era of the WTO dispute mechanism. Also, this thesis will examine the 
WTO Members’ proposals for evidence of perceptions regarding developing countries’ 
participation in the WTO dispute settlement system. The WTO Members’ proposals have 
been submitted to the WTO during the formal review process of the current WTO dispute 
settlement system, which aims to identify the difficulties and reform the system. Exploring 
these proposals is a valuable source of the positions of developing countries regarding the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Knowing these positions has the advantage of building the 
picture and providing rich information explaining what is actually happening in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. This is especially important in testing the research questions, not 
only theoretically but also practically, and is a vital factor in discovering the relationship 
between theory and practice. 
18 
 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This research is the first step of a comprehensive study of developing countries’ participation 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. It is important to see the extent of the organizational 
factors that influence that participation. It is hoped that the output of this study will be 
beneficial to all parties concerned while at the same time contributing to knowledge 
enhancement within the academic world.  
19 
 
 
Chapter 2: Historical Review of International Trade Laws 
2.1 International Trade Organization 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and into the twentieth, many countries 
limited the competitiveness of foreign goods in order to foster native industries by using the 
tariff. A tariff is a tax on imported goods that raises their price, thus making similar 
domestically produced goods more economically attractive. Tariffs were a significant source 
of income for many governments before they had revenue from income and sales taxes. 
However, the need for reduced tariffs was advocated by many, beginning in the nineteenth 
and throughout the twentieth century. Many countries opened up their national markets to 
foreign goods by reducing tariffs in return for similar liberalisation by others, because “the 
key to sustaining increased free trade is to maintain balanced benefits in this process, a 
concept called reciprocity-each government gives similar levels of concessions in order to 
balance the benefits from the agreements made”13. The increase of international free trade has 
been encouraged principally with the goal of solidifying peace and distributing economic 
development across “national boundaries by means of multinational negotiations and 
agreements”14, in short, “it deals with attempts to liberalize markets”15 in the world. 
 
                                                 
 
13
 Buterbaugh, K. & Fulton, R., 2007, The WTO primer: Tracing Trade’s Visible Hand through Case Studies, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. p.15. 
14
 Ibid. p.15. 
15
 Ibid. p.15. 
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This chapter considers the development of international trade law. It begins with the creation 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a review of the development of 
the GATT. It then presents a brief overview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
environment that produced the WTO. It will also examine a number of the WTO articles that 
concern accession to the WTO, and therefore participation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. Consequently, this part is divided into: Article XI: accession of ‘original 
members’, Article XIV: Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit, the WTO Accession 
Process, Current membership, Observer governments, States and customs territories, 
Developing-country Members, Groups and alliances within the WTO and Observers. Also, 
this chapter will include a brief review of the development and functions of the GATT and 
WTO dispute settlement system. Moreover, it will analyse the position and Special and 
Differential treatment for developing countries in the WTO.  
 
2.1.2 The Environment Produced the GATT   
 
Since the end of World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has 
been part of the reformulation of the international environment that was fashioned under U.S. 
management. Moreover, the plan was to append two more multinational agreements. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created as a result of these 
other two agreements, considered as the Bretton Woods organizations. While not 
“specifically linked to the other two in the end, the mechanism that was to become the GATT 
certainly was conceived at the time as an equal partner”16. 
 
                                                 
 
16
 Ibid. p.15. 
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The United States then accounted for half of the world’s total economic activity17. It was 
considered that America believed in free trade because of its need to keep European markets 
open to its goods, especially its agricultural goods, “an interest that persists in U.S. policy to 
this day”18. 
 
The trade environment was governed by direct policy. In the United States, the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement Act of 1934 (RTA) gave the executive branch the right to increase or 
decrease tariffs by as much as 50 per cent
19
. In fact, this act created an interdepartmental 
Committee on Trade Agreements (CTA) that managed a strategy of both “bilateral reciprocal 
agreements and multilateral trade agreements” 20 . This committee 21  was considered the 
foundation of U.S. policy on trade
22
, which created more flexible trade agreements and 
expanded into the “realm of free trade technicians”23. The CTA extended its agreements to 
apply to all trading states “that did not discriminate against American products in each area of 
agreement”24. Therefore, the United States created multinational trade treaties with some 
forty-eight nations
25
. 
 
2.1.3 The International Trade Organization 
  
In 1944, the Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, conference on economic matters considered a 
major proposal to found an international organization to develop and organize international 
                                                 
 
17
 Ibid. p.15. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid.p.19. 
20
 Ibid.p.19. 
21
 The committee had not been active for twenty years. 
22
 Buterbaugh & Fulton 2007. 
23
 Ibid. p.19. 
24
 Ibid. p.19. 
25
 Ibid.p.19. 
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trade, while the particulars of such an organization were left for later
26
. In 1946, the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) was created through several successive trade 
negotiations, which were organized within the framework of the UN Economic and Social 
Council
27
. The trade negotiations of ITO were held in a series of stages: in Geneva in 1947; at 
Lake Success, New York, in 1947; and in Havana in 1948
28
. In the Geneva negotiations, 
three goals were established: (1) to draft an ITO Charter, (2) to prepare schedules of tariff 
reductions, and (3) to prepare a multilateral treaty containing general principles of trade 
called ‘the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (GATT)29. In 1947, the work on the 
tariff reductions and the GATT were completed, while the final work on a charter for the ITO 
was postponed until 1948
30
. However, the ITO Charter was not completed because of the lack 
of significant support from the United States
31
. In 1950, the United States under President 
Truman proclaimed that it would no longer seek congressional approval for the ITO. The ITO 
was therefore dead
32
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
26
 Matsushita, M. Schoenbaum, T. & Mavroidis, P., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). 
27
 Alotaibi, N,. (2011), The WTO (DSU) and Developing Countries: problems and possible solutions, LL.M. 
dissertation, University of Essex.p.4. 
28
 Matsushita et al.2003. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Alotaibi 2011.p.4. 
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2.2 Review of the GATT  
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
2.2.2 The GATT Becomes an International Organization  
 
In the absence, or in other words the failure, of the ITO to be adopted, the GATT gradually 
began to fill up the void even though the GATT was intended as an interim body. The GATT 
was considered the primary document for international trade contact. On October 27, 1947, it 
had been signed as a brief measure, which would take effect on January 1, 1948. The ITO’s 
Interim Commission became the GATT Secretariat. Therefore, it became an international 
organization, based in Geneva, and it took as its ‘Charter’ the GATT agreements and 
understandings
33
. 
 
2.2.2.1 GATT Principles  
 
The original documents of the GATT did not establish an organizational framework but did 
include the GATT principles and procedures
34
. From 1951 to 1960, the GATT was “a small 
organizational bureaucracy” 35  without any power to “enforce tariff and nontariff barrier 
commitments within the document” 36 . The GATT’s ‘contracting parties’ dealt with the 
processes of decision-making. The signatories themselves governed this structure because 
there was no formal process for a country to become a member
37
. In 1995, the GATT 
                                                 
 
33
 Matsushita et al.2003. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Buterbaugh. & Fulton 2007. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
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agreements became part of an international organization with a formal membership procedure 
only through the establishment of the WTO treaty
38
. 
 
The GATT had accepted broad based principles of fair and free trade, as the founders had 
expected
39
. The specific broad goals were tariff reduction and exclusion of discriminatory 
treatment in trade
40
. The GATT agreement included two important points. First, the 
agreement was to guide the contracting parties
41
. Second, the agreement included a series of 
specific rules to lower particular tariffs
42
. The core principles of the GATT agreements were 
four: (1) “nondiscrimination or the most favored nation principle”, (2) “tariff reductions and 
binding”, (3) “national treatment”, and (4) “prohibition of protective measures other than 
tariffs”43.  
 
2.2.2.2 The GATT Tariff Negotiating Rounds  
 
The GATT held eight ‘rounds’ of multilateral trade negotiations to reduce tariffs and other 
barriers to international trade. These rounds were “held periodically and all were 
successful”44. Multilateral negotiating rounds have been named after the person “associated 
with initiating the round or the place in which negotiations began”45. The “names and dates of 
the GATT rounds are: Geneva 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1950, Geneva 1956, Dillon 
1960-1961, Kennedy 1962-1967, Tokyo 1973-1979, Uruguay 1986-1994” 46 . The early 
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rounds of the GATT negotiations were just to reduce tariffs, whereas the stated objective of 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round was “primarily to reduce non-tariff barriers” it ultimately 
“culminated in the creation of an immense new body of international law relating to trade”47. 
Consequently, on 15 April 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was established as a fully-fledged international organization via the Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT
48
. 
 
2.2.3 The GATT Accession 
 
2.2.3.1 Provisional Application 
 
The GATT was applied provisionally for almost 50 years, until the WTO came into force. In 
the GATT
49
, the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA)
50
 was applied as a “temporary 
measure until the formation of the ITO”51. As this did not happen, the GATT members, 
known as contracting parties, had continued to adopt and apply trade rules on a provisional 
basis.   
 
2.2.3.2 Accession under Article XXXII - The Original Members 
 
Twenty-three countries signed the GATT when the negotiations were completed and the 
Protocol of Provisional Application was “applied provisionally until the ITO charter was 
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complete”52. These nations (several of which are developing nations), this thesis will examine 
the participation of developing nations in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, are 
considered the original contracting parties of the GATT. Table 2.1, below, indicates the dates 
in which the original members applied the GATT provisionally.  
  
Table 2.1: Original Membership 
 
Country Year 
Australia 1947 
Belgium 1947 
Canada 1947 
France 1947 
Luxembourg 1947 
Netherlands 1947 
UK 1947 
US 1947 
Brazil 1948 
China 1948 
Cuba 1948 
Czechoslovakia 1948 
India 1948 
Lebanon 1948 
Myanmar 1948 
New Zealand 1948 
Norway 1948 
Pakistan 1948 
South Africa 1948 
Sri Lanka 1948 
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Syria 1948 
Zimbabwe  1948 
 
The original text of the GATT and the PPA were annexed as the Final Act. The status of the 
22 countries was stated under Article XXXII of the PPA, as follows:         
‘The contracting parties to this Agreement shall be understood to mean those 
governments, which are applying the provisions of this Agreement under Articles 
XXVI or XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application’53. 
 
Moreover, paragraph 4 of the PPA stated that ‘the Protocol was open for signature by any 
government signatory to the Final Act, until June 1948 at the latest’54. In October 1947, eight 
of the 23 countries applied the GATT provisionally; they were Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK and the US
55
. In January 1948, 14 more countries 
applied the agreement, which extended the membership under the provision; they were 
Brazil, China
56
, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, India, Lebanon, Myanmar (formerly Burma), New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), Syria and Zimbabwe 
(formerly South Rhodesia). The only country missing from the list was Chile, an original 
signatory to the GATT
57
. Therefore, these countries were the original contracting parties of 
the GATT.   
 
                                                 
 
53
  Agreement 1947, at Article XXXII. 
54
  WTO (1995), Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, vols. 1 and 2. Geneva: WTO. p.1018. 
55
 Basra 2008. 
56
 Chile was not submitting an application provisionally at the same time, like other counterparts, however it 
was not accession under Article XXXII.    
57
 China, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, Syria later withdrew their provisional applications. Please note that South 
Rhodesia in 1947 had not received independence from the UK; however it had achieved full autonomy in its 
commercial relations. In November 1965, the British Government declared that “the purported declaration of 
independence was illegal”. See, Basra 2008. In fact, it has been observed that in the GATT, the status of a 
contracting party has never ceased nor been suspended. On 18 April 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe, 
formally South Rhodesia, became independent. Although it had not become a contracting party under Article 
XXVI: 5(c) nor Article XXXIII. See, WTO, 1995. Guide to GATT Law and Practice. pp. 1013-1014. 
28 
 
 
On 7 September 1949, these 22 countries made a decision on the Final Act. They agreed that 
“if the Final Act had not been signed by 30th June 1948 then they shall not be considered . . .  
contracting part[ies] as detailed under Article XXXII”58. Therefore, “If any such government 
wished to accede to the Agreement then they would have to do so under the accession 
provision of Article XXXIII”59. Later, these 22 countries set out the trajectory of accession 
procedures under the GATT. 
  
2.2.3.3 Accession under Article XXXIII 
 
One hundred twenty-eight members, including many developing countries, acceded to GATT 
1974 under Article XXXIII. Article XXXIII states that:  
A government not party to this agreement, or a government acting on behalf of a 
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, 
may accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on 
terms to be agreed between such government and the contracting parties. 
Decisions of the contracting parties under this paragraph shall be taken by two-
thirds majority
60
. 
 
Article XXXIII came to be enforced “with the initial establishment of the GATT system”61, 
and was considered as the formal provision for accession under the GATT. Table 2.2, below, 
indicates the dates in which the members accessed under Article XXXIII. 
 
Table 2.2: Members Acceding under Article XXXIII  
 
Country  Year Country Year 
Chile 1948 Poland   1967 
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Denmark 1949 Iceland 1968 
Dominican Republic 1949 Egypt 1970 
Finland 1949 Zaire 1971 
Greece 1949 Romania 1971 
Haiti 1949 Bangadesh 1972 
Italy 1949 Hungary 1973 
Liberia 1949 Philippines 1979 
Nicaragua 1949 Colombia 1981 
Sweden 1949 Thailand 1982 
Austria  1951 Mexico 1986 
Germany  1951 Morocco 1987 
Peru  1951 Boilivia 1990 
Turkey  1591 Costa Rica 1990 
Uruguay  1953 Ei Salvador 1990 
Japan  1955 Tunisia 1990 
Portugal 1962 Venezuela 1990 
Spain 1963 Guatemala 1991 
Switzerland 1966 Czech Republic 1993 
Yuoslavia 1966 Slovak Republic 1993 
Korea 1967 Paraguay 1994 
Argentina 1967 Honduras 1994 
Ireland 1967 Slovenia 1994 
 
The first country acceding under Article XXXIII was Chile, which “acceded under the 
Protocol for the Accession of Signatories to the Final Act of October 1947”62. Officially, 
Chile was awarded automatic accession because it was one of the original 23 countries 
“invited by the US to engage in multilateral trade negotiations”63.  
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In 1949, one of the major subjects of the Annecy Round was the issue of accession. 
Consequently, “the ‘Procedures Governing Negotiations for Accession’, which had the 
purpose of governing accession outside tariff conferences, was established as was the Model 
Protocol of Accession”64. Moreover, the contracting parties agreed to the Annecy Protocol of 
Terms of Accession, which allowed the accession of Denmark, the Dominican Republic, 
Finland, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Nicaragua, Sweden and Uruguay
65
.  
 
2.2.3.4 Provisional Accession 
 
The provisional accession to the GATT was possible under Article XXXIII. This provision 
allowed countries to join the GATT until completion of “Procedures for definitive 
accession”66. Under Article XXXIII, countries had no right to “vote in the GATT”67 but they 
could “participate in tariff negotiations”68. Whereas the provisional accession was not part of 
the original GATT accession procedures, it was considered a method that increased “trade 
liberalisation to expand and become more beneficial” 69  and “ensured the expansion of 
participation in the GATT”70. 
 
Switzerland was the first country that officially used a provisional application. In 1956, the 
first formal provisional application was submitted with respect to Switzerland, which became 
the first county enter “tariff negotiations on a provisional basis”71, as recommended by the 
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Swiss Working Party Report, which “could later be up-graded to permanent contracting party 
status” 72 . Many developing counties were given access under Article XXXIII, such as 
Colombia
73
, Tunisia, Argentina, Egypt, and the Philippines. Provisional accession under 
Article XXXIII changed the formal way of accession to the GATT. The provisional accession 
postponed official accession for countries. For example, Switzerland had accession 
provisionally in 1958 while its official “accession did not take place until August 1966”74.  
 
The Provisional Accession allowed accession for nine countries. After Colombia, no other 
countries were allowed provisional accession. However, while the provisional accession of 
the WTO was established, the provisional accession of GATT was formally omitted. Table 
2.3, below, indicates the dates in which the members acceded under Provisional Accession. 
  
Table 2.3: Provisional Accession 
 
Country Date of Provisional Accession Date of Formal Accession 
Switzerland November      1958 August          1966 
Yugoslavia May               1959 August          1966 
Tunisia November      1959 March           1990 
Argentina November      1960 October         1967 
Egypt November      1962 April             1968 
Iceland March            1964 April             1968 
Philippines August            1973 December      1979 
Colombia July                1975 October         1981 
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2.2.3.5 Non-Market Economies 
 
The GATT accepted the accession of non-market economies
75
, which was possible due to the 
PPA
76
, even though the GATT was a market-based institution for market economies
77
. Also, 
the GATT included Article XVII, which was one of the three articles dealing with the subject 
of state trading “included in the ‘Suggested Charter'”78. Article XVII “obligated state trading 
enterprises to abide by the general principles of non-discriminatory behaviour and was 
primarily drafted to regulate the market behaviour of state owned monopolies and state 
trading countries” 79 . Nevertheless, the article was unclear and quite “flexible in its 
application, which meant that it could later be used in relation to state trading countries”80. 
Therefore, Lanoszka stated in his “discussion of accession of non-market economies”81, that  
Since the GATT did not stipulate any membership criteria, the terms of accession 
were agreed between the contracting parties and a candidate state, the provisions 
of Article XVII could be used to admit non-market economies into the GATT 
system. And since the GATT related only to trade in goods, the main concerns of 
the negotiators were border measures. Such concerns could be accommodated 
without placing the demands on acceding countries to reform domestic 
economies
82
. 
 
Therefore, Czechoslovakia, “which was involved in the pre-negotiation stages of the GATT 
and Havana Charter” 83 , “was able to join the GATT and become one of the original 
contracting parties”84.  
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In 1957, the GATT became more focused on the matter of state trading contracting parties 
when Poland requested to join. It took Poland almost 10 years to accede. Consequently, the 
complicated accession process and lack of a customs tariff were making it difficult to “make 
reciprocal exchanges of trade benefits” 85 . Therefore, Poland had to agree to additional 
provisions, which were contained in its accession protocol, to access the GATT
86
.  
 
In 1971, the accession of Romania was similar to that of Poland
87
. However, in 1973, 
Hungary’s accession was different because “it had introduced a customs tariff and was 
relaxing state control on foreign commercial relations”88. The PPA and Article XVII largely 
created flexibility to accommodate the accession of non-market economies at the GATT. 
However, “accession experiences of non-market economies varied by the virtue of their state 
trading practices and often resulted in accession coming at a greater cost”89.   
 
2.2.3.6 Accession under Article XXVI: 5(c) 
 
This article allowed many ex-colonies (all developing countries) to accede automatically. 
Article XXVI: 5(c) states that 
‘If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a contracting party, has 
Accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct of 
its external commercial relations and of other matters provided for in this 
Agreement, such territory shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the 
responsible contracting party establishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed to 
be a contracting party’90. 
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Therefore, this article accepted any state that had been a colony. That could be done if the 
“colonialist countries were willing to sponsor an application by its ex-colony” 91 . The 
accession would be “granted on an automatic basis based on the terms and conditions 
previously accepted by the metropolitan government on behalf of the territory in question”92. 
Therefore, the metropolitan state had to negotiate the tariff schedules on behalf of its colonial 
country and those terms would apply to the newly independent state. Table 2.4, below, 
indicates the dates in which the members accessed under Article XXVI: 5(c). 
 
Table 2.4: GATT Accession under Article XXVI: 5(c)
 93
 
 
Country Date of 
Independenc
e or 
Autonomy 
Commercial 
Relations 
Date of 
admission as 
countractin
g party 
Country Date of 
Independenc
e or 
Autonomy 
Commercial 
Relations 
Date of 
admission as 
countractin
g party 
Indonesia  27/12/1949 24/2/1950 Mauritius  12/3/1968 2/9/1970 
Ghana  6/3/1957 17/10/1957 Singapore  6/8/1965 20/8/1973 
Malaysia  31/8/1957 24/10/1957 Suriname  25/11/1975 25/2/1978 
Nigeria  1/10/1960 18/11/1960 Zambia  24/101964 10/2/1982 
Sierra 
Leone 
27/4/1961 19/5/1961 Belize 21/9/1981 7/10/1983 
Tanzania  9/12/1961 9/12/1961 Maldives 26/7/1965 19/4/1983 
Trinidad 
and Tobago  
31/8/1962 23/10/1962 Hong Kong 23/4/1986 23/4/1986 
Uganda  9/10/1962 23/10/1962 Antigua and 
Barbuda  
1/11/1981 30/3/1987 
Benin  1/8/1960 12/9/1963 Botswana 30/9/1966 28/8/1987 
Burkina 
Faso  
5/8/1960 3/5/1963 Lesotho  4/10/1966 8/1/1988 
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Cameroon  1/1/1960 3/5/1963 Macau 11/1/1991 11/1/1991 
Central 
African 
Republic  
14/8/1960 3/5/1963 Mozambique 25/6/1975 27/2/1992 
Chad 11/8/1960 12/7/1963 Namibia 21/3/1990 15/9/1992 
Congo  15/8/1960 3/5/1963 Dominica 3/11/1978 20/4/1993 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
7/8/1960 31/12/1963 Mali 20/6/1960 11/1/1993 
Cyprus 16/8/1960 15/7/1963 Swaziland 6/9/1968 8/2/1993 
Gabon  17/8/1960 3/5/1963 St Lucia  22/2/1979 13/4/1993 
Jamaica  6/8/1962 31/12/1963 St Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
27/10/1979 18/5/1993 
Kuwait 19/6/1961 5/2/1963 
 
Fiji 9/10/1970 16/11/1993 
Madagascar
  
25/6/1960 30/9/1963 Brunei 
Darussalam 
31/12/1983 9/12/1993 
Mauritania  28/11/1960 30/9/1963 Bahrain 18/8/1971 13/12/1993 
Niger  3/8/1960 31/12/1963 Angola 11/11/1975 8/4/1994 
Senegal  20/6/1960 27/9/1963 Djibouti 27/7/1977 16/12/1994 
Kenya  12/12/1963 5/2/1964 Grenada 7/2/1974 9/2/1994 
Malawi  6/7/1964 28/8/1964 Guinea-
Bissau 
10/9/1974 17/3/1994 
Malta  21/9/1964 17/11/1964 Republic of 
Guinea  
2/101958 8/12/1994 
Togo 24/4/1960 20/3/1964 Liechtenstei
n 
29/3/1994 29/3/1994 
Burundi 1/7/1962 13/3/1965 Papua New 
Guinea 
16/9/1975 16/12/1994 
Gambia  18/2/1965 22/2/1965 Qatar 3/9/1971 7/4/1994 
Guyana  26/5/1966 5/7/1966 St Kitts and 
Nevis 
19/9/1983 24/3/1994 
Rwanada  1/7/1962 1/1/1966 Solomon 
Islands 
7/7/1978 28/12/1994 
Barbados 30/11/1966 15/2/1967 United Arab 
Emirates 
1/12/1971 10/2/1994 
 
 
There were some countries that still had a number of colonies, such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France and the UK. So, the general agreement stated that the metropolitan states, 
36 
 
 
that “managed the trade relations of their colonial countries” 94  and signed the general 
agreement, had an international responsibility for their external territories. Therefore, Article 
XXVI:5(a) pronounces that 
Each government accepting this Agreement does so in respect to its metropolitan 
territory and of the other territories for which it has international responsibility 
for, except such separate customs territories as it shall notify to the Executive 
Secretary to the Contracting Parties at the time of its own acceptance
95
. 
 
Indeed, the reason for inserting Article XXVI:5 into the general agreement was to allow the 
possible accession of Burma, Ceylon and South Rhodesia (now known as Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka and Zimbabwe, respectively) as original contracting parties. At that time, these 
countries were not independent states but they wanted to join the general agreement in their 
own right. The GATT examined the possible accession of these three countries
96
 by setting 
up an ad hoc sub-committee in 1947. Whereas Sri Lanka and Myanmar were to join the 
GATT by the process of acquiring independence, as a full contracting party, Zimbabwe had 
“acquired full autonomy to govern its own external trade relations”97 but was not seeking full 
political independence. It joined with this special position. Therefore, the sub-committee had 
recommended that these countries have full autonomy to govern their own external trade 
relations
98
 and that they should participate as contracting parties, fulfilling all obligations 
under the GATT. 
 
The sub-committee also recommended significant changes to the accession provisions, which 
determined how accession to the GATT could be gained. Article XXVI:5 was rooted in the 
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recommendations of the sub-committee. Paragraph 5, part A refers to “the continuing 
relationship between imperial and colonial states”99. Part C states there was to be a “new 
relationship that would exist between former imperial states and ex-colonial states”100. 
 
In general, Article XXVI:5(a) could permit a contracting party to accept an application of the 
general agreement for their own territory and also to an ad hoc acceptance of their “colonies 
and overseas territories”101. Also, the GATT applies to the official list of contracting parties 
as well as the informal contracting parties consisting of the ad hoc states
102
. The original 
contracting parties, which had colonial links, had the ability to maintain their trade 
arrangements as well as to receive trade benefits “from their colonial countries out of 
institutional arrangements”103, while Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT provided “arrangements 
for the continuation of the institutional arrangements between ex-colonial and imperial states 
once they had gained independence”104. 
 
Many countries took advantage of this clause when they obtained political independence. 
This clause had permitted ex-colonial nations an exception from Article XXXIII that meant 
they could “by-pass the formal GATT accession process but still become contracting 
parties”105 which “allowed them to succeed to the GATT rather than accede”106 by de facto 
status
107
.  
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2.2.3.7 Accession during the Uruguay Round 
 
During the Uruguay Round between 1986 and 1994, 26 countries acceded under Article 
XXVI: 5(c). These countries joined the GATT as a result of the importance of the Uruguay 
Round as well as the fact that the accession provisions were creating changes to the 
multilateral trade system
108
. The most important change was for ex-colonial countries, whose 
accession under Article XXVI:5(c) was no longer considered to be appropriate. Therefore, 
“Accession was guaranteed to be automatic and this encouraged ex-colonial countries to seek 
GATT membership before the anticipated change in rules”109. 
 
In fact, the Uruguay Round did not just affect the ex-colonial countries but also some other 
developing countries that were joining the GATT under Article XXXIII, enhancing the 
participation of developing countries in the world trading system. Ten countries joined the 
GATT before the WTO was established. Table 2.5, below, indicates the dates in which the 
members acceded under Article XXVI:5(c). 
 
Table 2.5: Completed Accessions during the Uruguay Round under Article XXVI:5(c). 
 
Country Year 
Namibia 1992 
Dominica 1993 
Mali 1993 
Swaziland 1993 
St Lucia 1993 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 1993 
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Fiji 1993 
Brunei Darussalam 1993 
Bahrain 1993 
Angola 1994 
Djibouti 1994 
Grenada 1994 
Guinea-Bissau 1994 
Republic of Guinea 1994 
Liechtenstein 1994 
Papua New Guinea 1994 
Qatar 1994 
St Kitts and Nevis 1994 
Solomon Islands 1994 
United Arab Emirates 1994 
 
While some countries succeeded in applying to join the GATT under Article XXXIII during 
the Uruguay Round, other countries (mostly developing countries) did not succeed in 
completing the accession process until the WTO was established. Consequently, “their 
accession applications were converted into applications for accession under Article XII, the 
new WTO accession protocol”110. Algeria and the Ukraine managed “to join the WTO under 
the new provisions”111. Table 2.6, below, indicates the dates in which the members accessed 
under Article XXXII. Table 2.7 indicates the date of application in which the members 
accessed the GATT during the Uruguay Round.  
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Table 2.6: Completed Accessions during the Uruguay Round under Article XXXII 
 
Country Year 
Mexico 1986 
Morocco 1987 
Bolivia 1990 
Costa Rica 1990 
El Salvador 1990 
Tunisia 1990 
Venezuela 1990 
Guatemala 1991 
Czech Republic 1993 
Slovak Republic 1993 
Paraguay 1994 
Honduras 1994 
Slovenia 1994 
 
 
Table 2.7: Applications under Article XXXIII during the Uruguay Round  
  
Country Date of Application to 
Join GATT via Article 
XXXIII 
Albania 11/1992 
Algeria 7/1987 
Armenia 12/1993 
Bulgaria 9/1986 
China 7/1986 
Chinese Taipei 1/1992 
Croatia 9/1993 
Ecuador 9/1992 
Estonia 3/1994 
Georgia 7/1996 
Jordan 1/1994 
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Latvia 11/1993 
Lithuania 1/1994 
Moldova 11/1993 
Mongolia 7/1991 
Nepal 6/1986 
Panama 8/1991 
Saudi Arabia 6/1993 
Ukraine 11/1993 
 
The Uruguay Round accession statutes were different from those of any previous GATT 
round. One of the differences was the cost of entry. Mexico was the first notable case. 
Obviously, countries that joined the GATT under Article XXXIII and XXVI:5 (c) during the 
Uruguay Round found accession less cumbersome. 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter briefly presented information about the GATT as well as accession under the 
GATT articles. Also, it showed the environment that produced the GATT. Part 2 presented a 
review of the GATT and gave details of the GATT principles as well as the GATT tariff 
negotiating rounds. The GATT accession was described in this section. There were a number 
of GATT articles for accession of members into the GATT. This section highlighted and 
evaluated accession of members and considered the practical and key factors for joining and 
entering into the GATT, in particular for developing countries. The purpose of this section is 
to study and comment on the participation of certain members of the GATT. So the GATT 
accession was divided into seven subtitles: Provisional Application, Accession under Article 
XXXII-The Original Members, Accession under Article XXXIII, Provisional Accession, 
Non-Market Economies, Accession under Article XXVI:5(c) and Accession during the 
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Uruguay Round. It showed the timing of accession procedures that had an impact upon the 
acceding countries. Its observations are significant to understanding how accession to the 
GATT changed during the period leading up to the WTO. It is also important to see what 
countries were GATT members. The next part will show an overview of the WTO and 
demonstrate the link between the GATT and WTO. It will also clearly identify the 
significant provisions of the WTO for accession to membership. 
  
2.3 Overview of the WTO 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
2.3.1.1 The Creation of the World Trade Organization  
 
The establishment of World Trade Organization (WTO) came gradually from various needs 
and suggestions. In negotiations during the Uruguay Round, negotiators and observers 
recognized that significant agreements would be needed to make “better institutional 
mechanisms and a better system for resolving disputes”112. Therefore, one of the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations was about the ‘Functioning of the GATT System’ (FOGS)113. In the 
Uruguay Round, one of its negotiators suggested founding a new World Trade Organization. 
Therefore, the main “idea of a new world trade organization was taken up in the ‘FOGS 
negotiation’ of the Uruguay Round”114. The final draft act of the Uruguay Round “included a 
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proposal for a new ‘Multilateral Trade Organization’ (MTO)”115 and “the name was later 
changed to the World Trade Organization”116. 
 
The final draft act of the Uruguay Round included agreements on the “arrangements for 
subjects that were covered by new WTO Agreement”117. On 15 April 1994, these agreements 
passed, so the WTO was opened for signatures at Marrakesh while “the negotiators decided 
that the WTO would come into being on 1 January 1995”118. All agreements annexed to the 
WTO Agreement became binding on some Members as a single body of law
119
.  
 
So, the birth of the WTO was in 1995. This organisation, in the context of the contemporary 
international political economy, was the result of the Uruguay Round but also a result of 
almost twelve years of negotiations. Officially, the Uruguay Round was considered to be 
completed in 1990 but because of the disagreements between the EU and the United States it 
was extended four more years. However, the GATT was on the brink of failure that would 
affect not just the “extension and reform of the GATT, but perhaps even to the GATT 
itself”120. Eventually, all members present “devoted so much time, effort, and political capital 
to the negotiations”121.  
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It has been thought that the Uruguay Round was making a new system for international trade 
through the creation of the WTO. It expanded the coverage of the GATT in many ways such 
as “services, intellectual property, and domestic policies of states affecting investment and 
agriculture”122. The most important result is that it formalized the WTO to help “oversee and 
administer the GATT system”123. As result of this, the WTO “was given the power to settle 
disputes between parties to the agreement” 124 . Since the WTO’s beginning, it has been 
considered that “these changes were the beginning of a truly integrated world economy with 
the WTO as its linchpin”125.  In fact, the WTO Agreement established the WTO as a new 
international organization, which means that it gave the WTO a legal personality and a legal 
capacity, as well as plenty of rights and immunities to carry out its role
126
. It is believed that 
the WTO “will continue to play a key role in the global economy of the twenty-first century 
if it keeps the support of its Members and gains public understanding”127. 
 
Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement contained the GATT 1994 agreement and additional 
agreements such as “the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Trade 
Related Investment Measures, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘Antidumping Agreement’), the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(‘Customs Valuation Agreement’), the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
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Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards”128. Annex 2 contained “the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which established the 
procedures for resolving trade disputes between WTO Members”129. Annex 3 deals with “the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism which set up a periodic review of every WTO Member’s 
compliance with WTO agreements and commitments”130. 
 
The WTO Agreement legally replaced the GATT 1947. Indeed, the fundamental role of the 
WTO is to “facilitate the implementation, administration, and operation as well as to further 
the objectives”131 of the WTO agreements. In addition to this fundamental function, it has 
three strict tasks:  
“First, it has to provide a forum for negotiations between Members as to current 
matters and any future agreements. Secondly, it must administer the system of 
dispute settlement. Thirdly, it administers the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
and must cooperate with the International Monetary Fund ‘IMF’ and the World 
Bank, as necessary”132. 
 
The WTO has two governing bodies: the first is called the Ministerial Conference and the 
second, the General Council. The Ministerial Conference is considered the supreme authority. 
It consists of representatives of all WTO Members and it meets at least once every two 
years
133
. The General Council is considered to be the chief decision-making and policy 
branch. It is also responsible for two significant subsidiary bodies: the Dispute Settlement 
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Body and the Trade Policy Review Body. The General Council is constituted by all the WTO 
Members and meets as appropriate
134
. 
 
From the perspective of enhancing developing countries’ role in the world trading system, 
this chapter reviews a number of the WTO articles that create a participating role in WTO 
proceedings possibly leading to accession under the WTO. Therefore, it will evaluate the 
articles in making the WTO system that are significant for accession countries. Thus, this part 
will be divided into: Article XI: accession of ‘original members’, Article XIV: Acceptance, 
Entry into Force and Deposit, the WTO Accession Process, Current membership, Observer 
governments, States and customs territories, Developing-country Members, Groups and 
alliances within the WTO and Observers. Also, it examines the timing of accession 
procedures for potential WTO Members.  
 
2.3.2 WTO Accession 
 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, the GATT had 128 contracting parties. These contracting 
parties were eligible to be original members of the newly formed WTO. The WTO had been 
created by 29 legal agreements. The Uruguay Round was considered as a ‘single undertaking’ 
and was open to all the countries that became GATT members under previous agreements. 
All members had to agree to the ‘single undertaking’, though original members (the GATT 
contracting parties) were considered automatic members of the WTO if they ratified the 
WTO agreement. 
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The primary path to accession for WTO Members was governed by Article XI and Article 
XIV of the WTO Agreement. Article XI governed the accession of the original members. 
Under Article XIV, a fixed period was recognized, up to two years after the WTO was 
established, for GATT contracting parties to decide on entry to the WTO. Therefore, not all 
128 contracting parties of the GATT members became members of the WTO on 1st January 
1995. Only 75 countries became members of the WTO under Article XI. However, an 
additional 53 countries
135
 joined under Article XIV in the years between January 1995 and 
January 1997. Appendix 1 indicates the WTO Membership under Article XIV. 
 
2.3.2.1 Article XI: Accession of Original Members 
 
The terms and conditions of accession under the WTO are determined by Article XI, which 
states: 
1. ‘The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and 
Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific 
Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original Members of the 
WTO’. 
2. ‘The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will 
only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent 
consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their 
administrative and institutional capabilities’136. 
 
2.3.2.2 Article XIV: Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit 
 
The terms and conditions of accession to the WTO for pre-existing GATT contracting parties 
were established by Article XIV, which states that: 
                                                 
 
135
 These countries were existing GATT contracting parties that were given extra time to ensure that adequate 
schedules of tariffs on goods and services were submitted, which met the satisfaction of key developed states. 
136
 WTO Agreement 1994, Article XI. 
48 
 
 
‘This Agreement shall be open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by 
contracting parties to GATT 1947, and the European Communities, which are 
eligible to become original Members of the WTO in accordance with Article XI 
of this Agreement. Such acceptance shall apply to this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed hereto. This Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed hereto shall enter into force on the date 
determined by Ministers in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
and shall remain open for acceptance for a period of two years following that date 
unless the Ministers decide otherwise. An acceptance following the entry into 
force of this Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date 
of such acceptance’137. 
 
2.3.3 The WTO Accession Process 
 
If a state was not previously a Contracting Party to the GATT, it can become a WTO member by 
accession under Article XII of the WTO Agreement, which states:  
1- ‘Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for 
in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this 
Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall 
apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto’. 
2 - ‘Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The 
Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by 
a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO’. 
3 - ‘Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 
provisions of that Agreement’. 
 
So, a state or customs territory that wants to become a WTO Member through accession has 
to “negotiate the terms of accession with the current Members”138. Therefore, the ticket of 
admission has to be negotiated. The “subjects of the accession negotiations are the market access 
commitments and the concessions the candidate for membership has to make”139. However, the 
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candidate state must agree to the terms of the WTO Agreement and multilateral trade 
agreements without negotiations
140
. 
 
Accession to the WTO proceeds is through four phases. The first phase is known as ‘tell us 
about yourself’. In this phase, the State or customs territory applying for membership has to 
create a report that shows all “aspects of its trade and economic policies”141 which relate to the 
duties under the WTO agreements. Then the application
142
 for accession is examined by the 
WTO working party
143
. The second phase starts when the working party sees “satisfactory 
progress with its examination of the trade and economic policies”144. This is known as the ‘work 
out with us individually what you have to offer’ phase. In this stage, the parallel bilateral 
negotiations begin between the applicant for membership and current members. The “new 
Member’s market access commitments and concessions”145 must “apply equally to ‘all WTO 
Members as a result of the MFN treatment obligation”146. 
 
The third phase of the accession process will start once the parallel bilateral market access 
negotiations between individual members and the candidate for membership have 
successfully concluded. In this stage, the ‘let’s draft membership terms’ phase, the candidate 
country accepts the terms of accession set by the working party in a report that contains “a 
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draft membership treaty (‘protocol of accession’) and lists (‘Schedules’) of the market access 
commitments and concessions of the candidate for membership” 147  and the report is 
submitted to the general council or the ministerial conference. In the fourth and final phase, 
the ‘decision’ phase, the ministerial conference or the general council must agree on the 
application for membership or determine if agreement will not be achieved, by a “two-thirds 
majority of WTO Members”148. In the positive decision, the “candidate for membership 
accedes to the WTO thirty days after it has deposited its instrument of ratification of the 
membership treaty.  
 
In general, accession negotiations are always long. For example,
149
 Algeria’s accession 
negotiations went from 1947 to 1995 and the WTO were severely criticized as a result
150
. The 
reason for delays in the accession negotiations was not only “hard bargaining on the part of 
WTO Members or political factors”151 but also because of “the tardy supply of information 
and making of the necessary policy adjustments on the part of the candidate for 
membership”152. In fact, applying the WTO agreements required important changes and time 
in the WTO Member legislation and practices. So, it could take some years to “draft, approve 
and apply the new legislation required for accession to the WTO”153. Some least-developed 
countries specifically lacked “the administrative capacity to conduct the complex negotiations 
and to develop and apply the necessary changes in national legislation and practices”154. In 
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December 2002, therefore, the General Council accepted “guidelines to facilitate the 
accession of least-developed countries to the WTO, in accordance with a mandate given at 
the Doha Session of the Ministerial Conference in November 2001”155. These “guidelines 
concern, inter alia, technical assistance and capacity-building”156. 
 
2.3.4 Current membership 
 
The WTO membership is considered quasi-universal due to the fact that the major trading 
powers and most developing countries are members of the WTO
157
. The membership of the 
WTO represents almost 92 per cent of the global population as well as 95 per cent of world 
trade. In May 2015, there were 161 members of the WTO
158
. Table 2.8 indicates the current 
WTO membership. Table 2.9 indicates Observer governments accessed under the WTO. 
 
Table 2.8: Current WTO membership
 159
: 
 
Country Join                                    
Antigua and Barbuda 1 January 1995  
Argentina 1 January 1995                  
Australia 1 January 1995  
Austria 1 January 1995  
Bahrain, Kingdom of 1 January 1995  
Bangladesh 1 January 1995         
Barbados 1 January 1995 
Belgium 1 January1995 
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Belize 1 January 1995 
Brazil 1 January 1995                      
Brunei Darussalam 1 January 1995 
Canada 1 January 1995                      
Chile 1 January 1995                     
Costa Rica 1 January 1995 
Côte d'Ivoire 1 January 1995 
Czech Republic 1 January 1995 
Denmark 1 January 1995 
Dominica 1 January 1995 
European Union (formerly European Communities) 1 January1995 
Finland 1 January1995 
France 1 January1995 
Gabon 1 January1995 
Germany 1 January1995 
Ghana 1 January1995 
Greece 1 January1995 
Guyana 1 January1995 
Honduras 1 January1995 
Hong Kong, China 1 January1995 
Hungary 1 January1995 
Iceland 1 January1995 
India 1 January1995 
Indonesia 1 January1995 
Ireland 1 January1995 
Italy 1 January1995 
Japan 1 January1995 
Kenya 1 January1995 
Korea, Republic of 1 January1995 
Kuwait, the State of 1 January1995 
Luxembourg 1 January1995 
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Macao, China 1 January1995 
Malaysia 1 January1995 
Malta 1 January1995 
Mauritius 1 January1995 
Mexico 1 January1995 
Morocco 1 January1995 
Myanmar 1 January1995 
Namibia 1 January1995 
Netherlands 1 January1995 
New Zealand 1 January1995 
Nigeria 1 January1995 
Norway 1 January1995 
Pakistan 1 January1995 
Paraguay 1 January1995 
Peru 1 January 1995 
Philippines 1 January 1995 
Portugal 1 January 1995 
Romania 1 January 1995 
Saint Lucia 1 January 1995 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1 January 1995 
Senegal                                                                1 January 1995 
South Africa 1 January 1995 
Spain 1 January 1995 
Sri Lanka 1 January 1995 
Suriname 1 January 1995 
Swaziland 1 January 1995 
Sweden 1 January 1995 
Singapore 1 January 1995 
Slovak Republic 1 January 1995 
Tanzania 1 January 1995 
Thailand 1 January 1995 
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Uganda 1 January 1995 
United Kingdom 1 January 1995 
United States of America 1 January 1995 
Uruguay 1 January 1995 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of   1 January 1995 
Zambia 1 January 1995       
Trinidad and Tobago 1 March 1995 
Zimbabwe 5 March 1995 
Dominican Republic 9 March 1995 
Jamaica 9 March 1995 
Turkey 26 March 1995 
Tunisia 29 March 1995 
Cuba 20 April 1995 
Colombia 30 April 1995 
El Salvador 7 May 1995 
Botswana 31 May 1995  
Central African Republic 31 May 1995               
Djibouti 31 May 1995            
Guinea-Bissau 31 May 1995           
Lesotho 31 May 1995             
Malawi 31 May 1995                
Maldives 31 May 1995       
Mali                         31 May 1995 
Mauritania            31 May 1995 
Togo                     31 May 1995 
Burkina Faso  3 June 1995 
Egypt 30 June 1995 
Poland             1 July 1995 
Switzerland     1 July 1995 
Guatemala     21 July 1995 
Burundi           23 July 1995 
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Sierra Leone    23 July 1995 
Cyprus            30 July 1995 
Slovenia  30 July 1995 
Mozambique                         26 August 1995 
Liechtenstein   1 September 1995 
Nicaragua       3 September 1995 
Bolivia, Plurinational State of   12 September 1995 
Guinea            25 October 1995 
Madagascar  17 November 1995  
Cameroon       13 December 1995 
 
Qatar               13 January 1996 
Fiji               14 January 1996 
Ecuador         21 January 1996 
Haiti 30 January 1996       
Saint Kitts and Nevis   21 February 1996 
Benin  22 February 1996  
Grenada  22 February 1996 
United Arab Emirates   10 April 1996 
Rwanda 22 May 1996 
Papua New Guinea 9 June 1996 
Solomon Islands 26 July 1996 
Chad 19 October 1996  
The Gambia 23 October 1996 
Angola  
23 November 
1996 
Bulgaria 1 December 1996 
Niger 
13 December 
1996 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 January 1997  
Viet Nam 11 January 2007 
Mongolia 29 January 1997 
Congo 27 March 1997 
Tonga 27 July 2007 
Panama 6 September 1997 
Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998 
Estonia 
13 November 
1999 
Latvia 10 February 1999 
Jordan 11 April 2000 
Georgia 14 June 2000 
Albania 8 September 2000 
Croatia 
30 November 
2000 
Oman 9 November 2000 
Lithuania 31 May 2001 
Moldova, Republic of 26 July 2001 
China 11 December 2001 
Chinese Taipei  1 January 2002 
Armenia 5 February 2003 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) 4 April 2003 
Nepal 23 April 2004 
Cambodia 13 October 2004 
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of 11 December 2005 
Ukraine  16 May 2008 
Cape Verde 23 July 2008   
Samoa  10 May 2012 
Montenegro 29 April 2012 
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Samoa 10 May 2012 
Russian Federation 22 August 2012 
Vanuatu 24 August 2012 
Tajikistan 2 March 2013 
Yemen 26 June 2014 
Seychelles 26 April 2015 
 
 
                             Table 2.9: Observer governments
160  
 
Country Country 
Afghanistan                                        Lao, People’s Democratic Republic 
Algeria Lebanese Republic 
Andorra Liberia, Republic of 
Azerbaijan Libya 
Bahamas Russian Federation 
Belarus Sao Tomé and Principe 
Bhutan Serbia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Seychelles 
Comoros Sudan 
Equatorial Guinea Syrian Arab Republic 
Ethiopia Tajikistan 
Holy See (Vatican) Uzbekistan 
Iran Vanuatu  
Iraq Yemen 
Kazakhstan  
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2.3.5 States and customs territories   
 
WTO Members can be states, separate customs territories possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of their external commercial relations, and/or other entities that covered by the WTO 
Agreement
161
. In the current period, there are three WTO Members that are separate customs 
territories: Hong Kong, China (commonly referred to as Hong Kong); Macau, China 
(commonly referred to as Macau); and Chinese Taipei (which joined the WTO as the separate 
customs territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu)
162
.  
 
2.3.6 Developing-country Members  
 
Three-quarters of the 161 Members of the WTO are developing countries
163
. Since the WTO 
has no definition of a ‘developing country’, the standing of ‘developing-country member’ 
was selected by the countries themselves. Therefore, a member has to state whether 
it is a ‘developing’ or a ‘developed’ country164.As a WTO member, all developing-countries 
can receive WTO technical assistance and they can also benefit from special and differential 
treatment under some of the WTO agreements
165
. 
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Developing countries are playing a significant role in the WTO, not only because of their  
WTO membership but also due to the fact that they have rising importance in the 
global economy
166
. In addition, they have been significantly increasing the size of 
their economies and they often “act as spokespersons for other developing countries”167. 
For example, China, Brazil and India without doubt are powerful, activist and significant 
countries Members in the WTO
168
.  
 
The least-developed WTO Members are designated as least-developed by the United 
Nations. On 5 May 2015, it was observed that there were 34 least-developed members among 
the developing-countries members
169
. The least developed also can benefit from additional 
special and differential treatment
170
. The least-developed countries among the WTO 
Members are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia
171
. Moreover, there 
are eight least-developed countries that have observer status because they are “in the 
process of accession to the WTO and therefore have Observer status” 172 . They are: 
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Afghanistan, Bhutan, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
and Sudan. 
 
2.3.7 Groups and alliances within the WTO 
 
WTO Members are not only classified as developed, least developed and developing country 
Members. There are other alliances, formal or informal, existing in the WTO. It has been 
observed that some of those groups were created to “defend common interests and advance 
common positions; they coordinate (or try to coordinate) positions and, when appropriate, 
speak in unison”173. These groups include “the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN),
 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group (ACP)”174. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)175 and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
176
, which “constitute[e] significant efforts at 
regional economic integration, have not, or have hardly ever, spoken with one voice within the 
WTO” 177 . Also, an effective alliance within the WTO is “the Cairns group of nineteen 
agricultural-produce-exporting developed and developing countries”178. 
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The new influential group of developing countries, including China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, 
Egypt, Argentina and South Africa, appeared in September 2003, in the Cancun Session
179
. 
The group has been referred to as the ‘G-20’180. It has “forcefully demanded the dismantling of 
the trade-distorting and protectionist agricultural policies of the European Communities, the 
United States and other industrialised countries”181. Moreover, in the Cancun Session, “a new 
group known as the ACP/LDC/AU alliance (an alliance made up of the ACP countries, the 
least-developed countries and the countries of the African Union)”182 became known as the 
‘representative’ of the “interests of the poorest countries”183. 
 
In addition, there were other groups that provided the ability for “discussion in small(er) groups of 
Members to agree on new initiatives, to break deadlocks and to achieve compromises”184. For 
example, “during the Uruguay Round and in the early years of the WTO” the Quad “was the group 
of the four largest trading entities, i.e. the European Communities, the United States, Japan and 
Canada”185. The Quad “was at the core of all negotiations”186. Conversely, the Quad has been 
“replaced by a new group of key WTO Members: the European Communities, the United 
States, India, Brazil and China (often referred to as the G-4 when excluding China and as the G-5 
when including China)”187. Without agreement among these key members, “progress within the 
WTO on the further liberalization and/or regulation of trade is not feasible”188. This transfer in 
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political power within the WTO reflects the rising significance of China, India and Brazil in the 
world economy
189
. 
 
2.3.8 Observers 
 
Some WTO Members are considered to be observers
190
. According to the WTO agreement, 
the observer governments have to begin accession negotiations within five years after gaining 
observer status
191
. In fact, sometimes, the decision to create observer status leads to argument 
within the WTO
192
. For example, in January 2004, the European Communities “agreed to 
back a US-sponsored request by Iraq’s Governing Council for observer status”193. Also, the 
European Communities pressured to extend this status to Iran and Syria, an initiative opposed 
by the United States
194
. On 11 February 2004, at the General Council meeting, it established 
observer status for Iran. The General Council considered that Iran’s request started accession 
negotiations
195
. This request had been supported by the European Communities, China, India, 
Indonesia and other Members but the General Council had postponed a decision on Iran’s 
request because of the opposition of United States
196
.   
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2.3.9 GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement System: Development and 
Functions 
2.3.9.1 The GATT Dispute Settlement System 
 
The GATT 1947 Agreement contained some provisions for resolving any trade disputes 
among its contracting parties
197
. The main goal of the GATT disputes settlement was to 
encourage freer international trade
198
. Therefore, any contracting party could protest 
measures that had been taken by one or more of the GATT contracting parties which were 
allegedly in breach of their GATT obligations
199
. 
 
The dispute settlement system under GATT 1947 evolved quite remarkably over nearly 50 
years on the basis of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947. Over the years, the GATT 
dispute settlement system principles and practices evolved “codified in decisions and 
understandings of the contracting parties” 200 . However, the process was not either 
“judicialized” or “legalized”. The initial stage of the GATT disputes settlement was the 
diplomatic phase and the process was referred to as “conciliation”201.  
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In GATT dispute settlement, the parties to the dispute could appoint three or five panelists. 
The panel’s decision had to be referred to the contracting parties. Under the GATT 1947 
dispute settlement system, if the panel’s decision was accepted by the contracting parties, 
then it would be binding on them. Therefore, any decision needed a positive consensus before 
it could be adopted
 202
. 
 
However, the “Positive Consensus” was considered as the most significant weak point in the 
GATT 1947 dispute settlement system
203
. In order to refer a dispute to a panel, there needed 
to be also a positive consensus in the GATT Council
204
. The positive consensus meant that 
there had to be no objection from any contracting party to the decision
205
. Therefore, the 
parties to the dispute fully controlled the dispute settlement process
206
. In addition, a positive 
consensus was required for the adoption of the panel report, and “the authorization of 
countermeasures against a non-implementing respondent”207. However, the respondent party 
was able to block the establishment of a panel and the adoption of the panel report either by a 
positive consensus rule or by refusing to assent to the report
208
. Therefore, the losing parties 
could take an advantage “by using the consensus rule to stop the establishment of a panel and 
to guard against unfavourable panel reports”209. 
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The other flaw in the GATT dispute settlement was that it had no fixed timetables for 
resolving disputes. The GATT dispute settlement system did not say much about disputes and 
the ways to settle them
210
. The contracting parties had to rely on Article XXII
211
. In fact, 
Article XXII organised the consultation process and “loosely asked Contracting Parties to 
defer ‘sympathetic consideration’ to others’ requests”, but it did not set rules or time limits212. 
 
The GATT dispute settlement system was criticised as an inappropriate system because 
disputes could only be resolved through negotiations
213
. Therefore, the GATT 1947 
contracting parties, both developing and developed countries, felt that due to the inherent 
problems in the GATT dispute settlement system which needed improving and strengthening. 
Therefore, one of the main points discussed in the Uruguay Round negotiations was the 
readiness of the contracting parties to implement some preliminary improvements to the 
GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures
214
. Eventually, one of these negotiations was 
the creation of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
2.3.9.2 The WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 
The new dispute settlement system aimed to introduce a significant change in the way of 
settling the GATT 1947 disputes. Specifically, the “positive consensus” rule was reversed 
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and the litigation process became more rules-based. These were the two principal changes 
which made the system more “predictable and less susceptible to power politics”215. 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system was introduced in January 1995, and disputes brought to 
the WTO covered a wide range of economic activities
216
. The WTO Members established the 
current dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations and highlighted the importance of compliance by all Members with their 
obligations under the WTO Agreement
217
. The system was based on the principle that a 
stronger, more binding system to settle disputes would help to ensure that the WTO’s 
carefully negotiated trading rules are respected and enforced
218
. Also, the system is referred 
to as the “WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global economy”219. Today, the 
backbone and the fundamental support of the multilateral trading regime is the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
 
The current WTO dispute settlement system is referred to as the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) which includes the Dispute Settlement Panels (DSP) and the Appellate Body (AB). 
The first phase of the DSB is the “Consultations” phase which could be regarded as a 
political process within the WTO, while the DSP and AB are judicial-type institutions
220
. The 
DSB is embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, commonly referred to as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (abbreviated as 
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“DSU”). The DSU provides rules and procedures for the dispute settlement system. It is the 
result of the evolution of rules, procedures and practices developed over almost 50 years 
under the GATT 1947 building on the principles for the management of Articles XXII and 
XXIII of GATT 1947
221
. 
 
In the WTO DSU, a trade dispute arises when any of the WTO Members adopts a trade 
policy measure allegedly violating their WTO obligations, and one or more other Members 
takes action against this
222
. In essence, disputes in the WTO are essentially about broken 
promises. WTO Members have agreed that “if they believe fellow-members are violating 
trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action 
unilaterally”223. That means “abiding by the agreed procedures, and respecting judgments”224. 
 
Also, the function of the DSU is the prevention of the detrimental effects of international 
trade conflicts and alleviation of the imbalances between stronger and weaker nations through 
having their disputes settled pursuant to DSU
225
. Therefore, since the DSU entered into force, 
it has been a practical significant system as the WTO Members often use the WTO system to 
settle their disputes
226
. 
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Moreover, the function of the DSU
227
 is providing security and predictability for the 
multilateral trading system, as businesses involved in international trade in goods and 
services need predictability and stability in the government rules, regulations and laws 
relating to their trade activity. Thus, offering a fast, effective, dependable and rule-oriented 
system to resolve disputes under the provisions of the WTO Agreement is the function of the 
DSU. Strengthening the rule of law of the dispute settlement system eventually makes the 
trading system more secure as well as predictable
228
. Further, the dispute settlement system 
facilitates a fast resolution of the matter through an independent ruling which must be applied 
promptly, or else the possible trade sanctions will be applied for the non-implementing 
Member
229
. 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system has been often praised as one of the significant 
innovations of the Uruguay Round
230
. Compared to the previous system, the DSU provides 
more procedures for the various stages including specific time-frames for dispute 
settlement
231
.  
 
The DSU is an integrated framework for all the WTO agreements
232
. It has departed from the 
GATT by eliminating the right of individual parties “whose measure is being challenged, to 
block the establishment of panels or the adoption of a report”233. The DSB “automatically 
establishes panels and adopts panel and Appellate Body reports unless there is a consensus 
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not to do so”234. This negative consensus rule is in contrast with the practice under the GATT 
1947. The DSU also applies “to the authorization of countermeasures against a party which 
fails to implement a ruling”235. Besides, it authorises “the appellate review of panel reports 
and a formal surveillance of implementation [of rulings and recommendations] following the 
adoption of panel (and Appellate Body) reports”236. These rules also are incongruent with the 
practice under the GATT 1947. Hence, the DSU process has shifted from a “diplomatic to a 
legalized process and from a power-based to rule-based procedure”237. It has been classified 
as a judicialized method of trade dispute settlement.  
 
One of the GATT duties was resolving disputes between the parties by a friendly 
accommodation
238
. Moreover, “disputes were mainly treated as internal, to be resolved 
quickly within the organization”239. These features were approved by the DSU. Article 3.3 
states that “the prompt settlement […] is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO 
and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members”. 
Article 3.4 provides that “recommendations or rulings […] shall be aimed at achieving a 
satisfactory settlement of the matter”. As for Article 3.7, it illustrates that “the aim of the 
dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution 
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mutually acceptable […] is clearly to be preferred”. In addition, Article 17.4 states the 
following: “only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report”. These 
provisions imply an intention to focus on the actual dispute itself and “to ensure that it is 
resolved quickly and to the satisfaction of the parties”240.  
 
The function of Panels and the Appellate Body is prompt settlement and a focus on resolving 
the dispute that are the essential aspects of their work. The obvious indication of this was in 
US-Shirts and Blouses dispute, the Appellate Body stated that “panels are not required to 
decide issues that are not necessary to dispose of a particular dispute; and that the basic aim 
of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes”241. 
 
The DSU is more than just a mechanism for “the application of legislation to disputing 
parties”242. It is also “a mechanism of governance and guidance”243. Some DSU provisions 
provide that the WTO dispute settlement system has a greater role than just resolving the 
dispute between the parties to disputes that, by its rulings “affect entities other than the main 
parties”244. For example, Article 3.2 provides that “the dispute settlement system of the WTO 
is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system”. To ensure predictability under the DSU, it has to adopt well-reasoned rulings to 
make WTO Members learn what the provisions mean and how they should be applied.  
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Article 3.2 also states that the aim of the DSU is to “preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions” 245 . 
Concerning Article 3.5, it provides that all “solutions […] shall be consistent with [covered] 
agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those 
agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements”. Article 3.6, for 
its part, requires “[m]utually agreed solutions [by disputants] shall be notified to the DSB”. 
Also, Article 21 provides rules for the multilateral surveillance of the implementation of DSB 
rulings and recommendations. Articles 3.5, 3.6 and 21 illustrate that “dispute settlement 
reports are of interest to all the WTO Members”246.  
 
Indeed, some of the WTO case laws detected that the rulings and recommendations of the 
DSU may affect a much wider community than just the parties to disputes
247
. In EC-Bananas, 
the Appellate Body approved the panel statement stressing that “increased interdependence of 
the global economy means Members have a greater stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the 
past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of rights and obligations is more likely 
than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly”248. Moreover, a panel has clearly stated that 
the WTO disciplines have an impact not only upon WTO Member governments: “it would be 
entirely wrong to consider the position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO 
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legal matrix”249. Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the 
acceptance of various disciplines under the GATT/WTO depend on “[…] the activity of 
individual economic operators in the national and global market places
250
. The purpose of 
many of these disciplines, “[…] indeed one of the primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a 
whole, is to produce certain market conditions which would allow this individual activity to 
flourish”251. 
 
At the very least, the DSU has to resolve disputes satisfactorily and promptly. It is the only 
way for WTO Members to enforce their rights and obligations under the covered agreements. 
The DSU deals with trade disputes between the WTO Members to ensure that trade flows as 
smoothly, predictably and freely as possible
252
. This is achievable by promoting fairness and 
equality among all the WTO Members
253
. 
 
2.3.10 The Position of Developing Countries in the WTO  
 
The majority of WTO Members are developing countries. They are grouped as “developing 
countries” and “least developed countries”254. In this part, the term “developing country” will 
be used in the legal sense as it is used in the WTO Agreement. However, in the WTO, there is 
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no exact definition of term “developing country” 255 . Defining a country as developing 
depends on the country declaring itself to be so
256
. Therefore, it is the WTO Members that 
can announce themselves either as “developed” or “developing” countries257. Nevertheless, 
other members can challenge the decision of a member to be a “developing” country and can 
challenge such a member for using provisions available to developing countries. Chapter 
three of this thesis addresses and discusses the term “developing country” elaborately258. 
 
Developing countries are about two thirds of the 161 WTO Members
259
. Due to their number, 
these countries play an important and increasingly active role in the WTO, and they 
increasingly view trade as a vital and significant tool in their development efforts
260
. 
Consequently, they have varied increasingly and significantly in terms of the size of their 
economies
261
. In addition, they are rising as a significant trade in the global economy, and 
“they are becoming more important in the global economy”262. This grants the developing 
countries an important position in the WTO. The evolution of developing countries’ 
participation in the trading system witnessed some changes in the WTO compared to the 
GATT system. In 1995, when the Uruguay Round was completed, “developing countries had 
                                                 
 
255
 Ibid. 
256
 See, WTO Website available at https://www.wto.org/, [Accessed: November 13, 2015]. 
257
 Henrik, H., (1999). 'Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Developing Country 
Interests', available at: http://www.econ-law.se/Papers/Remedies%20990611-1.pdf, [Accessed: November 13, 
2014]. See also, WTO Website available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm, 
[Accessed: November 17, 2015]. 
258
 The term “developing countries” is discussed further in this thesis, see chapter 3. 
259
 See, WTO Website available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm, 
[Accessed: November 17, 2015]. 
260
 Ibid. 
261
 Peters, M. & Kumar, M., (2014). ‘Introspect “special and differential treatment” given to developing 
countries under the WTO dispute settlement system’. International Arbitration Law Review. p.2. 
262
 See, WTO Website available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm, 
[Accessed: November 17, 2015]. 
74 
 
 
assumed a much higher level of commitments within the system than ever before”263. This 
trend can be attributed to the fact that some of the developing countries had rapid growth and 
succeeded in varying their economies
264
. This made them better equipped to be more 
participative in the WTO trading system and enhanced their interests in the WTO 
negotiations. 
 
Due to the fact that the majority of WTO Members are developing countries, the major focus 
of the WTO is to make sure that these developing countries are able to benefit from joining in 
international trade and from the multilateral trading system. Therefore, the Agreement 
establishing the WTO recognized that “there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries, and especially least developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development”265. Accordingly, the WTO deals with the special needs of developing countries 
in the DSU
266
. The DSU contains several provisions that seek to improve the possibilities for 
developing countries to take advantage of the WTO system
267
. Thus, under the current DSU 
rules, there are some special provisions which developing countries can benefit from.  
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2.3.11 Special and Differential Treatment Provisions for the Developing 
Countries 
 
The DSU included some provisions concerned with developing countries’ special needs. 
These provisions are referred to as Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) provisions and 
are recognised as the “integral point of WTO agreements”268. They give developing countries 
special rights in all stages of the DSB process
 269
.  
 
The Uruguay Round emphasised the basic conceptual premises related to Special and 
Differential Treatment which are: 
(i) Developing countries are intrinsically disadvantaged in their participation in 
International Trade. 
(ii) Any Multilateral Agreement must take this into account when specifying a 
developing country’s rights and obligations. 
(iii) Trade policies that maximise sustainable development in one country may 
not necessarily do so in another.  
(iv) It is in the interest of developed countries to assist developing countries in 
integration into the multilateral trading system
270
.  
 
These underlying conceptual premises led to the framework of the S&D provisions. 
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Therefore, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round can be divided into two main focus areas
271
. 
The first area focuses on the developed countries’ need to take positive action to enhance 
their participation in the WTO that falls into the following three categories: 
(i) safeguarding the interests of developing countries; 
(ii) increasing trade opportunities; and 
(iii) providing technical assistance to developing countries
272
 
 
The second area focuses on giving developing countries additional flexibility in their 
schedule of commitment to WTO obligations that fall into the following three categories:  
(a) flexibility commitments; 
(b) transitional time periods and; 
(c) differential and more favourable treatment of the least-developed countries 
(LDCs)
273
 
 
Therefore, DSU contains the substantive rules governing special and differential treatment for 
developing and least-developed country Members. It recognizes the special situation of 
developing and least-developed country Members by dedicating additional privileged 
procedures and legal assistance to them
274
. Moreover, it encourages WTO Members to give 
special consideration to the situation of developing and least-developed country Members. 
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Whereas some of these provisions are applied very often, others have not yet had much 
practical relevance. Furthermore, a number of these rules are not very specific or definite
275
. 
 
There are some provisions entailing that the WTO Members should address and safeguard the 
interests of the developing members such as 4.10, 8.10, 12.10, 12.11, 21.2, 21.7, 21.8, 24.1, 
24.2 and 27.2
276
. The operational side of these articles has been reviewed and analysed by 
some developing countries that offered many proposals with respect to each of these 
provisions in order to make them more effective
277
. The main issue which the developing 
members highlighted in their proposals is that S&D provisions may not be appropriate for 
developing members
278
. Besides, these provisions have turned out to be of limited value to 
developing countries and declarative rather than operative
279
. Therefore, the developing 
members have been suggesting ways of improving and reforming these provisions.  
 
Regarding the consultation stage of the DSB, Article 4.10 of the DSU provides that during 
consultations, “Members should give special attention to developing country Members’ 
particular problems and interests”. Indeed, the consultation stage of the DSB is mandatory 
and it supposed to grant the disputing parties an opportunity to discuss their views, giving this 
chance particularly to the defending party that needs to explain its measure subjected to the 
dispute. However, the DSU does not indicate as to how this provision is implemented
280
. The 
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African group’s proposed reform suggested that where there is no exact definition of the term 
“should give special attention”, it should be mandatory for a complaining developed Member 
seeking a panel’s establishment “to explain in the panel request […] how it had taken or paid 
special attention to the particular problems and interests of the responding developing 
country”281. In addition, when a developed Member is a defending party, “it should be made 
mandatory for it to explain in its submissions to the panel as to how it had addressed or paid 
special attention to the particular problems and interests of the complaining developing 
country”282. While it is adjudicating the matter, the panel “should give ruling on this matter as 
well”283. Moreover, this article may imply that if a developing country is part of a dispute, 
both disputing parties may agree to extend the regular periods of consultation. If the parties 
cannot agree that the consultations have concluded at the end of the consultation period, the 
DSB chairperson can extend the time-period for consultations that in accordance with Article 
12.10 of the DSU
284
. 
 
In addition, the S&D provisions are available for a developing country at the panel stage. 
First, the DSU provides special treatment provisions for developing countries that are 
presented by Article 8.10. This Article provides that when a dispute is between a developing 
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country Member and a developed country Member, the panel shall, if the developing country 
Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing country Member. This 
may be considered in the favour of developing countries. Yet, the panelist, who belongs to a 
developing country Member, should be characterised by neutrality and refrain from being 
biased in favour of the developing country. 
 
Further, Article 12.10 is about extending the consultation period especially for the benefit of 
the developing countries; it states that “the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after 
consultation with the parties, whether to extend the relevant period and, if so, for how long”. 
Also, the second part of this article directs the panel to give, when the developing country 
Member is the respondent, “sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare 
and present its argumentation”. However, the article does not give any guideline either to the 
DSB Chairman or to the panel concerning the length of the additional time to be given. 
Therefore, this article causes operation disorder in the dispute settlement procedure for the 
developing country Members
285
. Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, in their joint 
communication concerning removing the ambiguity from article 12.10, proposed that it 
should allow a “fixed extension of not less than 15 days, in cases of urgency” and “not less 
than 30 days in normal circumstances”286. However, this should not affect the overall time 
period for the panel to complete the dispute settlement procedure. Indeed, this provision has 
already been applied by one panel upon the responding developing country Member’s request 
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for an additional period of ten days for it to prepare its first written submission to the panel, 
despite the complainant’s objection287. 
 
Moreover, Article 12.11 provides that when a developing country is a party to a dispute, the 
panel report must clearly indicate the form in which the special and differential treatment of 
the DSU has been taken into account. This article implies the necessity of transparency in 
showing “how effective these rules have been in a given case” and “how they have actually 
been applied”288. 
 
In addition, the special and differential treatment for developing country Members has been 
applied at the implementation stage of the DSB. Article 21.2 provides that, at the stage of 
implementation, “[p]articular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of 
developing country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute 
settlement”289. This Article is not entirely clear. Therefore, the India proposal suggested 
clarifying this Article by replacing the word “should” with “shall” to make this provision 
mandatory
 290
. In addition, the provision must be made mandatory, for the panel and AB to 
interpret it as an overarching provision in all disputes, involving a developing country 
Member. 
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Moreover, in the implementation stage of the DSB, Articles 21.7 and 12.8 organize the 
supervision of the implementation. Article 21.7 provides that the DSB shall consider what 
further and appropriate action it might take in addition to surveillance and status reports, if a 
developing country Member has raised the matter. Articles 21.8 states that in a case brought 
by a developing country Member, the DSB has to consider appropriate action not only 
regarding the trade coverage of the challenged measures, “but also their impact on the 
economy of developing country Members concerned”291. Nonetheless, this article does not 
force any other party to the dispute to accept the obligation. Therefore, it is suggested that, a 
successful implementation of this provision requires adding the following sentence: “the 
parties to the dispute shall enter into such a process, in good faith, in accordance with the 
provisions of art.5”292. 
 
Additionally, the DSU sets out a particular rule applicable to least-developed country 
Members. The DSU seeks to “emphasise on due restraint being exercised in bringing a 
dispute settlement proceeding against an LDC as well as in seeking compensation or 
suspending concession in a proceeding brought against an LDC”293. According to Article 
24.1, particular consideration must be given, at all stages of the dispute settlement 
procedures, to the special situation of the least-developed country Member that is involved in 
a dispute. Moreover, Members must “exercise due restraint in bringing disputes against a 
least-developed country Member and in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to 
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suspend obligations against a least-developed country Member that has ‘lost’ a dispute”294. 
As for Article 24.2, it provides that the Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB must 
offer their good offices, conciliation and mediation when this is requested by a least-
developed country Member. This article in fact aims at assisting the parties to settle the 
dispute before the establishment of a panel, and, for this aim, the Director-General or the 
Chairman of the DSB may consult any source either considers appropriate. 
 
From the beginning, the reasons for S&D have covered different positions of the needs of 
developing countries in the DSB. The purpose of S&D is to give developing countries a 
greater priority in the DSB process, thereby allowing them to give priority to their own needs. 
The existing S&D provisions were reviewed. The issues that have been considered are: 
whether some of the non-mandatory provisions should be made mandatory, the way of 
making them more effective and the help to be offered to developing countries to use them 
more effectively. However, there was little evidence of the implementation of these 
provisions. Making the S&D provisions legally binding would make them more effective. 
The basic aim should be placing developing countries in the position that allows them to 
effectively defend their rights in the DSB system. The S&D treatment in the field of WTO 
dispute settlement should take primarily the form of privileged access to developing country 
Members. 
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2.3.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a brief review about the WTO and the environment that produced the 
WTO. Also, it includes a number of the WTO articles that creates a participating role in 
WTO proceedings possibly leading to accession under the WTO. Therefore, it highlighted 
and evaluated articles that indeed are key factors for countries entering into the WTO. The 
WTO accession was important to mention in this part. So, the aim of accession is to make 
clear the accession under the WTO Articles, which considered the practical and key factors 
for joining and entering into the WTO. This chapter presented brief information about the 
development of the WTO as well as accession under the WTO article. So, this chapter tried to 
evaluate the articles that are important in making the WTO accession system. Consequently, 
this part was divided into: Article XI: accession of ‘original members’, Article XIV: 
Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit, the WTO Accession Process, Current 
membership, Observer governments, States and customs territories, Developing-country 
Members, Groups and alliances within the WTO and Observers. Also, this chapter has 
brought into view the timing of accession procedures for potential WTO. The chapter, in 
addition, includes a brief review of the development and functions of the GATT and WTO 
dispute settlement system and analyses the position and Special and Differential treatment for 
Developing Countries in the WTO. Therefore, the next chapter will try to classify the 
meaning of “a developing country” which can benefit from the Special and Differential 
treatment of the WTO and examine this classification according to the WTO. 
  
84 
 
 
Chapter 3: What is a “Developing Country”? 
3.1 Introduction  
 
There are various concessions granted to developing countries under the GATT/WTO, 
particularly in their dispute settlement systems. Therefore, the meaning of ‘developing 
country’ has to be classified clearly by the GATT/WTO body. So, status as a developing 
country is given to those countries that qualify for it, but not to countries that seek the status 
only so they can benefit from it. Therefore, it is a most significant issue to classify, demarcate 
and identify the meaning of ‘developing country’ in theory by considering the opinions of 
scholars of laws, politics and economics and in practice by considering the operation of 
organizations such as GATT or/and WTO.  
 
This chapter tries to establish the meaning of “developing country” under the GATT as well 
as under the WTO. Also, it will examine the classification of ‘developing country’ by the 
World Bank, United Nations and United Nation Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) that as result to appear developing countries in clear principles, which they may 
consider to be methods for classifying the developing countries. However, all the principles 
of developing countries, which appear in this thesis, do not consider a method as the main 
principle for classifying the developing countries, but they might take in account of important 
ways for classify developing countries. So, the WTO may be interested in accepting them for 
the purpose of classifying countries. 
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3.2 Developing country under the GATT Agreement   
 
The GATT 1994 was not trying to classify or explain the meaning of ‘developing country’ 
whereas the GATT 1947 did provide an explanation of ‘developing country’295. Article XVIII 
of GATT 1947 grants certain privileges to least developed and developing countries. 
Developing countries were referred to in the statement:  
The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives of this 
Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of their economies, 
particularly of those contracting parties the economies of which can only support 
low standards of living and are in the early stages of development
296
.  
 
Whereas the statement is written in indistinct terms, an attempt was created to further 
illuminate its meaning in an interpretative note to the provision. It states that:  
1. When they consider whether the economy of a contracting party ‘can only 
support low standards of living’, the Contracting Parties shall take into 
consideration the normal position of that economy and shall not base their 
determination on exceptional circumstances such as those which may result from 
the temporary existence of exceptionally favourable conditions for the staple 
export product or products of such contracting party.  
2. The phrase ‘in the early stages of development’ is not meant to apply only to 
contracting parties which have just started their economic development, but also 
to contracting parties the economies of which are undergoing a process of 
industrialization to correct an excessive dependence on primary production
297
.  
 
In addition, the meaning of the term ‘developing country’ was explained in the GATT 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as “a country whose GNP per capita 
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has reached $1,000 per annum based on the most recent data from the World Bank on GNP 
per capita”298.  
 
In the 1947 GATT, Portugal lost its attempt in a committee to define what ‘developing 
countries’ meant299. The GATT committee avoided defining the term and left it to developing 
countries ‘to self declare’. Also, it remains up to contracting parties, the organization’s 
members, to decide on whether or not a country is a developing country
300
. The GATT was 
trying to solve the issue of identifying ‘developing countries’ under the ‘self declare’ method, 
but that was not enough. The term required a simpler and clearer definition and an 
identifiable set of criteria based on a country’s involvement in the world trade context. So, 
the integration of developing countries into the GATT or in the multilateral trading system is 
most significant for their economic development and for global trade expansion
301
. Therefore, 
the next part will discuss the categorization of developing countries under the WTO. 
 
3.3 Developing country under the WTO Agreement   
 
Developing countries make up the majority of the WTO membership. Under the WTO, they 
are known as ‘developing countries’ and ‘least developed countries’. Unfortunately, the 
WTO does not state specific definitions of the terms ‘developing countries’ and ‘least 
developed countries’. During the period from 1980 to 2000, it has been observed that the 
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share of developing countries in international trade was approximately unchanged: 27.4 per 
cent in 1980 and 28.8 per cent in 1999
302
.   
 
The WTO states that “[t]here are no WTO definitions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries” 303 . Members announce for themselves whether they are ‘developed’ or 
‘developing’ countries. However, other “members can challenge the decision of a member to 
make use of provisions available to developing countries”304. It may be supposed that the 
WTO has not created any criteria because the members could not agree on a definition and 
the organization does not want to be criticised by scholars of law, economic or even politics. 
Also, the WTO might be far away from making distinctions between developing and 
developed countries, because that could led to some states might be deterred from joining the 
WTO if it had rigid definitions of ‘developing country’ as well as that would lead to a 
disadvantage for some countries that want to benefit from the WTO provisions.  
 
In November 1999, the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle, Washington, created a 
step forward in the identification process for developing countries via the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law
305
. In general, member countries being classified as developed countries, 
economies in transition, or least developed countries
306
. The Advisory Centre classifies 
developing countries by their share of world trade and per capita income for the last three 
years based on the data of World Bank statistics. Therefore, developing countries are 
separated into three categories: “1) Category A: more than 1.5 per cent of world trade or High 
                                                 
 
302
 Ibid. 
303
 See, World Trade Organization 2013, WTO |Development. Who are the developing countries in the WTO?. 
Available from: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm  [viewed, February 17, 2013]. 
304
Ibid. 
305
 Matsushita et al. 2003; see also Jiang 2002. 
306
 Ibid. 
88 
 
 
Income; (2) Category B: more than 0.15 per cent but less than 1.5 per cent of world trade; and 
(3) Category C: less than 0.15 per cent of world trade”307. While there is no classification for 
least developed countries, it may be assumed that they might have just a little or none of the 
world’s trade. The Advisory Centre’s criteria might be considered best suited for identifying 
developing countries. This may be because the Advisory Centre is detached from the WTO 
and has its own legal personality
308
.  
 
The draft agreement that established the World Trade Organization states that  
There is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development
309
.  
  
In addition, there are many provisions in the WTO agreement granting developing countries 
‘special and differential treatment’; it is also significant for them to achieve the goal of 
securing special and differential treatment
310
. The term ‘developing countries’ is not 
clearly defined under the WTO agreements nor the GATT regime; the classification is 
given on “an ad hoc basis and primarily through self-selection” 311 . ‘Least-developed’ 
countries were not mentioned by the WTO Agreement but their definition has been based on 
how the United Nations identified them
312
.  
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Indeed, one might demand an answer to the question ‘what countries are developing 
countries?’ particularly under the GATT/WTO 313 . The vagueness of the notion of 
‘developing countries’ was argued in the WTO in negotiations about the accession of China, 
which is considered a developing country
314
. It was suggested that the term ‘developing 
countries’ required clear criteria to describe and identify the status315. It is thought that the 
reasons for vagueness of the term ‘developing countries’ might be because the term is used 
for different aims in many international contexts and there is a lack of international consensus 
on the term
316
. The purpose of the following paragraphs is to illustrate how ‘developing 
countries’ is classified by some significant organizations, which may lead the WTO to 
include these definitions for the purpose of classifying countries specifically as developing 
countries.         
 
3.4 World Bank 
 
As noted above, there is not a clear meaning to the term ‘developing countries’, even though 
the term is commonly used. Indeed, the World Bank, considered to be one of the most 
significant bodies in this field, is trying to establish a classification for ‘developing 
countries’. It uses a special classification system to differentiate between countries based on 
income
317
. On 1 July every year, the World Bank classification
318
 separates countries into 
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three income groups based on gross national income (GNI) per capita, by using ranges of 
income. These groups are 1) low income, countries with GNI per capita of US$ 1,025 or less 
per capita in 2000
319
; 2) middle-income, countries with between US$ 1,026 and US$ 12,475 
per capita. This group is further sub-divided into lower middle income, countries with GNI 
per capita between US$ 1,026 and US$ 4,035; and upper middle income, countries with GNI 
per capita between US$ 4,036 and US$ 12,475
320
. The final classification is 3) high income, 
countries
321
 with GNI per capita
322
US$ 12,476 or more
323
. 
 
It has been argued that the classification system of the World Bank has some 
inconsistency
324
. In other words, it may not be possible to classify countries clearly because, 
as the World Bank has stated,
325
  
the use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in 
the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have 
reached a preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does 
not necessarily reflect development status
326
.  
 
So, the classification system of the World Bank does not necessary define developing and/or 
developed countries. In the World Bank classification, all low-income and middle-income 
economies are occasionally referred to as developing economies, while there are many 
countries in the Middle East that have high per-capita incomes as a result of their oil and 
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other resources that are not really industrialized. They are still considered to be developing 
countries. For example, Saudi Arabia and Singapore have high per-capita incomes. In 2014, 
the per-capita in Saudi Arabia is 25,961.8 US dollars and the in Singapore is 55,182.5
327
 US 
dollars, but they are still considered as developing countries by some international 
organizations
328
. Also, there are some countries that are considered middle-income 
economies, such as Russia and Eastern European economies, which have several of the 
characteristics of industrialized countries
329
. 
 
In general, when the system is updated every year, it can make the situation of the developing 
countries change every year. However, this system did not apply to the WTO and the position 
of the developing countries is still the same as it was many years ago. One of the weaknesses 
of the World Bank system is that it may be refused by any country as well as any 
international organization
330
. The WTO may be interested in using the system of the World 
Bank to classify countries. However, it is significant to examine other methods for classifying 
countries, specifically developing countries. The United Nations and United Nations 
Statistics Division will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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3.5 United Nations and United Nations Statistics Division  
 
The United Nations states that there is no established convention for the designation of 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common 
practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in Northern America, Australia and 
New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered ‘developed’ regions or areas. In 
international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as a 
developed region, countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing 
countries, and countries of Eastern Europe and of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(code 172) in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions
331
. 
 
The United Nations Statistics Division states, in standard country or area codes for statistical 
use, that developing regions are Africa, the Americas, excluding the US and Canada, Asia, 
excluding Japan, and Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand. Developed regions are 
North America, Europe, Japan and Australia and New Zealand
332
.It also states that the 
designations ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ are “intended for statistical convenience and do 
not necessarily express a judgement about the stage reached by a particular country or area in 
the development process”333. 
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Comparing the United Nations and the United Nations Statistics Division, it is easily 
observed that the United Nations was trying to list the developed countries without being 
fully interested in developing countries, while the United Nations Statistics Division lists the 
developing countries first, and then lists developed countries. In the United Nations and in the 
United Nations Statistics Division, all European countries are commonly considered 
developed regions or areas
334
, but in the international trade statistics, Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either 
developed or developing regions
335
.  
 
Indeed, the United Nation has no established principle for the designation of countries. It 
states that “[t]here is no established convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries or areas in the United Nations system”336. The United Nations used 
the term “common practice” when trying to classify countries, while ‘international trade 
statistics’ was also used as a method to organize countries. Yet, there is not any method for 
organizing countries when it states “. . . countries of eastern Europe and of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in Europe are not included under either developed or 
developing regions”337. So, these countries are not developed or developing. What they are, 
then? However, generally, the United Nations and United Nations Statistics Division systems 
categorized countries and name them more clearly than other organizations, such as the 
World Bank. However, while it may seem brilliant to use the United Nations system in the 
WTO, the next paragraph will present some significant comments and a brief discussion that 
might reveal a better way to define the term ‘developing countries’.   
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3.6 Analysis of the Concept of Developing Countries 
 
In April 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
338
 classified all nations of the former 
Soviet Union (USSR) in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) and Mongolia as well as all nations of Eastern Europe including Central 
European countries which still belong to the UN institutional ‘Eastern Europe Group’339 as 
countries not classified as either developed or developing regions. They were classified as 
‘countries in transition’340. The IMF has developed a flexible system for classifying nations. 
The system divides the world into advanced economies and emerging markets. Under the 
classification, the developing nation economies are defined based on “(1) per capita income 
level, (2) export diversification, and (3) degree of integration into the global financial 
system”341. 
 
Moreover, any nation with a low or medium standard of living may be considered a 
developing country
342
. Also, any nation may be considered, or categorized, as a developing 
                                                 
 
338
 The HDI has been developed by the UN to determine the level of human development for any countries 
when the data is available and correct. The Human Development index is a measure of economic development 
and economic welfare. The Human Development Index examines three important criteria of economic 
development (life expectancy, education and income levels). See, Human Development Index (HDI) website, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi [viewed 13 March 2015]; The IMF 
describes itself as an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure 
financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, 
and reduce poverty around the world. Please see IMF website: International Monetary Fund, 2013, IMF-
International Monetary Fund Home Page. Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm [viewed 
February 17, 2013]. 
339
See, Eastern Europe Group, 2011, What Is EEG? Available from: http://www.eastern-europe 
group.com/index.php/134-what-is-eeg [viewed February 17, 2013]. 
340
 See, IMF website: International Monetary Fund, 2013, IMF-International Monetary Fund Home Page. 
Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm [viewed February 17, 2013]. 
341
 International Monetary Fund, 2012, World Economic Outlook-Frequently Asked Questions. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm [viewed February 17, 2013]. 
342
 There is a strong correlation between low income and high population growth. See United Nations, 2013, 
United Nations Statistics Division-Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). Available from: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm [viewed February 17, 2013]. 
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country or a newly industrialized country
343
 if it has not obtained an important degree of 
industrialization relative to its population, define as a country in development and, if it 
creates an economy that is more advanced than other developing countries but it has not yet 
demonstrated fully the signs of a developed country
344
. In general, the concept of 
development may be based on the measure of a nation’s statistical indexes, for example, 
gross domestic product per capita, rate of literacy, life expectancy, etc. 
 
It thought that the term ‘developing countries’ may be used when discussing the intent of 
those who utilize these terms.  In fact, some international organisations have started to use the 
term ‘less economically developed country’ (LEDCs) for developing countries as well as for 
the poorest subset of developing countries in order to moderate the euphemistic aspect of the 
term ‘developing’. There are some other terms used for developing countries such as 
‘underdeveloped nations’, ‘non-industrialized nations’, ‘less developed countries’ (LDCs), 
and ‘Third World nations’, while higher level countries may be called ‘developed countries’, 
‘industrialized nations’, ‘most economically developed countries’ (MEDCs), and ‘First 
World nations’345. 
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 See Investopedia (2013), Definition of Newly Industrialized Country. Available from: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/newly-industrialized-country.asp#axzz2BBxvXFgo [viewed February 17, 
2013]. 
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 Also, the developing countries may be considered to be nations that allow all of their population to enjoy a 
free and healthy life in a safe environment. It has been suggested that gross national happiness, measuring the 
actual satisfaction of a population, is more important than how money oriented a country is for classification 
purposes. See United Nations, 2013, United Nations Statistics Division-Standard Country and Area Codes 
Classifications (M49). Available from: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm [viewed February 
17, 2013]. The UN Human Development Index (HDI) measures “poverty, literacy, education, life expectancy, 
and other factors. It is a standard means of measuring well-being, especially child welfare. … The nearer it is to 
1, the higher the level of human development. Countries and regions have classified into three categories: Low 
human development: <0,499 Medium human development: from 0,500 to 0,799 High human development:> 
0,800”. See, International Human Development Indicators, 2011, Indices & Data|Human Development Index 
(HDI)| United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Available from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/  
[viewed February 17, 2013]. 
345
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In general, there are some criticisms of term ‘developing countries’346. In fact, the term may 
mean the inferiority of a ‘developing country’, which might be adverse to the nation when 
contrasted to a ‘developed country’. The developed countries have higher-class economies 
and expect the ‘developing country’ to follow them, as a ‘model economy’, in order to 
become a ‘developed country’. Normally, the term may be considered as a term suggesting 
the mobility of the economy, while it sometimes appears as a method that does not show 
increasing economic development of any countries. In this case, the term may be considered 
as a euphemism. However, it may stand for homogeneity among countries that have similar 
economies. In contrast, the term ‘developed country’ will not be the correct term because it 
implies a lack of continuing economic development and/or growth in developed countries, 
which is not correct at all. 
 
In fact, economic development may require a modern infrastructure for the nation, not natural 
resource extraction or agriculture. Indeed, the economic systems of several developed 
countries are based on high material standards of living, continuous, self-sustaining economic 
growth in the tertiary sector of the economy and quaternary sector of the economy. However, 
there are exceptions for some developed countries such as Australia, Canada, and Norway 
because their primary industries may be considered as playing the most important part in their 
national economies. Also, the USA and Western Europe have a very significant agricultural 
sector in their national economies; therefore, they play a major role in international 
agricultural markets. Natural resource extraction may also be consider as a high value added 
when it be a very profitable industry, such as oil extraction. 
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A country with an economy in transition and deep, extensive poverty may be considered a 
developing country. Such countries are importers rather than developers of innovations in 
technology and science. Least developed countries (LDCs) appear in the greatest need of 
assistance and their trade is just 0.4 per cent of world trade
347
. The GATT has adopted an 
enabling clause and established the policy of special and preferential treatment for 
developing countries
348
. The Uruguay Round has continued this policy of special and 
preferential treatment for developing countries. In the WTO, there are many agreements that 
include special provisions or exceptions, such as longer phase-in periods, for developing 
countries. For example, the agreements on textiles and agriculture apply policies long sought 
by developing countries.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The WTO has shown an interest in developing countries in many ways. It shows respect for 
developing countries in a number of the WTO articles that favour developing countries and 
are key factors for the countries entering into the WTO. However, the term ‘developing 
countries’ may not be well enough defined under the WTO agreements while the 
‘developing country’ classification is on ‘an ad hoc basis and primarily through self-
selection’. Countries can announce for themselves whether they are ‘developed’ or 
‘developing’ countries, while other members can challenge the decision of a member to make 
use of provisions available to developing countries. So, we might demand an answer to the 
question ‘what countries are developing countries?’, particularly under the WTO. 
                                                 
 
347 Country Grouping Glossary (2013), ‘Country Grouping Glossary’ Available from: 
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While there is no clear classification of the term ‘developing countries’ in the WTO, this 
chapter shows and analyses the classification of ‘developing countries’ under other 
international organisations. I believe that the WTO can benefit from and be inspired by such 
classifications, so that it creates and enhances a clear classification of ‘developing countries’ 
for its own purposes. Since the WTO deals with developing countries not only in the DSU 
but also in all WTO regulations and agreements, such a classification is necessary for the 
WTO and its Members to understand what a developing country and its circumstances are. 
Moreover, a clear classification of ‘developing countries’ is needed for the WTO to provide 
more assistance for the developing countries to better benefit from the Special and 
Differential treatment provisions when they are dealing with the WTO and all its Members, 
specifically in the DSU.  
 
The WTO system for classifying countries has been mentioned in this chapter while it will be 
better if the WTO takes a greater interest in methods of classifying countries under other 
organisations, as discussed further above in this chapter of the thesis, in order to address the 
vagueness of the term ‘developing countries’. The United Nations and United Nations 
Statistics Division systems classify and name countries more clearly than other organisations, 
such as the World Bank. Hence, I believe that it will more productive to classify and name 
developing countries in the WTO in accordance with the classification presented by the 
United Nations and United Nations Statistics Division systems. 
 
Indeed, there are some countries that are concerned about their participation in the WTO's 
DSB. The next chapter will analyse and elaborately deal with some factors that may be 
considered as the most significant constraints limiting the participation of developing 
countries in the WTO's DSB.  
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Chapter 4: Constraints limiting developing Country participation in 
WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
4.1 Lack of Financial and Legal Resources 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
There are some factors that may be considered as the most significant constraints for limiting 
the participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB). The 
aim of this chapter is to illustrate and emphasize these factors. Therefore, it will highlight and 
analyse factors that happen frequently in practice and that have been already addressed and 
reported by WTO Members. Moreover, other factors which might not occur regularly in 
practice will also be illustrated because they affect the participation of developing countries 
in the WTO dispute settlement body such as financial and legal resources, inability to impose 
rulings through retaliation rules, and enforcing decisions and compensations. 
 
The purpose of this section, specifically, is to analyse and evaluate the financial and legal 
resources. It argues that the financial and legal resources are the most significant factors as 
regards developing countries’ use of the DSB. In practice, however, developing countries 
lack financial and legal resources and this limits the participation of these countries in the 
DSB. Therefore, this section assesses the consequences of this lack of financial and legal 
resources. First of all, it highlights the internal resources of some developing countries. 
Indeed, some developing countries with a small proportion of trade may not be able to afford 
the expensive cost to pursue legitimate claims under the DSU. Secondly, the internal 
expertise of developing countries will be analysed and evaluated, since it affects the ability of 
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developing countries to recognize their rights and properly defend themselves under the 
WTO rules.  
 
Also, it will illustrate how the lack of legal expertise and financial recourses may affect 
developing countries in practice in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In addition, the 
costs will be addressed in this section. WTO law and the DSU provisions require legal and 
financial resources that may entail high costs for the different stages of WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings and create a dilemma for developing countries in participating in 
those proceedings. Moreover, this chapter will examine whether the lack of financial and 
legal resources of developing countries in those proceedings are tackled by Article 27.2 of the 
DSU. Indeed, Article 27.2 was an attempt to tackle the high cost of litigation and the lack of 
legal expertise that constrain developing countries’ disputes settlement proceedings. Finally, 
the discussion will verify if the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) can address the 
constraints of the lack of expertise in WTO law and the high cost of litigation in the WTO 
dispute settlement system, which limit the participation of developing countries in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. To what extent is ACWL the best option for developing 
countries to seek legal assistance and to determine whether to carry complaints forward under 
the DSU? 
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4.1.2 Lack of Financial and Legal Resources 
4.1.2.1 Internal Resources (Internal Trade) 
4.1.2.1.1 Analysis and Evaluation of Constraints 
 
Some of the WTO’s members, such as developing countries, with little income from trade 
may find it is difficult to pursuing legitimate claims under the DSB. In the European Union or 
the United States, one million dollars is a small proportion of the available budget. It may 
“only be a few seconds worth of exports”349. On the other hand, one million dollars would be 
a dizzying amount of money for small developing countries such as Burundi, Gambia and 
Guinea-Bissau. It would match an average of 1.45% of annual exports for Gambia
350
 or “put 
in relationship to national income, between 0.17% and 0.42% of gross domestic product 
(GDP)”351. Table 4.1, below, indicates the relative importance of 1 million USD of exports 
for some developing countries. In fact, the WTO does not “take into account the inherent 
variation in exports across the WTO’s membership”352. Under the WTO dispute settlement 
system, the dispute worth a million dollars is considered the same as the dispute worth one 
billion dollars. So, it considers that the WTO system may not neutral to traded size. Small 
trading nations might be forced to not use the legal system every time they need to. There is 
data analysis that has tried to investigate “how dependent each country is on small export 
quantities, and, in this indirect way, to investigate its sensitivity to high litigation costs 
(including the cost of maintaining internal personnel experienced with the DSU’s 
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 Nordstrom, H. & Shaffer, G. (2008). “Access to justice in the World Trade Organization: A case for a Small 
Claims Procedure?” World Trade Review 7, (4): 587-640.  
350
 Ibid. 
351
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complexities)”353. Table 4.1 provides the total exports of some small nation against one 
million US dollars. 
                                                 
 
353
 Ibid. 
Table 4.1: The relative importance of USD 1 million of exports (2003) 
Rang Member Share of exports (%) Share of GDP (%) 
1 Burundi 1.47 0.17 
2 Gambia 1.45 0.27 
3 Guinea Bissau 1.43 0.42 
4 Solomon Islands 1.01 0.41 
5 Rwanda 0.86 0.06 
6 Dominica 0.84 0.38 
7 Djibouti 0.80 0.16 
8 Central African Republic 0.79 0.09 
9 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.66 0.27 
10 Sierra Leone 0.63 0.09 
11 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.60 0.27 
12 Grenada 0.57 0.27 
13 Mauritania 0.28 0.09 
14 Burkina Faso 0.27 0.03 
15 Belize 0.27 0.11 
16 Saint Lucia 0.26 0.14 
17 Niger 0.24 0.04 
18 Antigua and Barbuda 0.22 0.15 
19 Haiti 0.22 0.03 
20 Lesotho 0.19 0.09 
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The litigation costs mentioned above will be an extremely high cost for some nations. 
Therefore, for some small WTO Members it will be very difficult to litigate a one million 
dollar claim. Indeed, smaller trading countries are more sensitive to costly dispute settlement 
proceedings rather than larger trading nations. As for export quantities below one million 
dollars, for example the export of Djibouti’s, Gambia’s and Rwanda’s is less than one million 
dollars. In fact, five Caribbean countries, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Barbados, Grenada, and Saint Lucia, depend on a small export quantities, and, therefore, it 
might not be worthwhile litigating at the WTO under the current procedures
355
. The trade 
data for some individual WTO Members is shown below in Table 4.2
356
. 
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21 Malawi 0.18 0.05 
22 Maldives 0.17 0.14 
23 Chad 0.15 0.04 
24 Guinea 0.15 0.03 
25 Togo 0.15 0.06 
Notes: Calculations based on data from the WTO and UNSTAT
354
. 
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Table 4.2: Trade data 
Country 
Export by 
$million 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania 433 
Armenia 539 
Bulgaria 6,368 
Croatia 4,708 
Georgia 262 
Iceland 2,308 
Republic of Kyrgyz 370 
Liechtenstein NA  
Macedonia 1,044 
Moldova 365 
East Asia and Pacific 
Brunei Darussalam 4,136 
Cambodia 2,075 
China 418,786 
Chinese Taipei 138,602 
Fiji 443 
Hong Kong 226,710 
Indonesia 59,780 
Japan 444,195 
Republic of Korea 181,653 
Macao 2,536 
Malaysia 101,510 
Mongolia 567 
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Myanmar 2,764 
Papua New Guinea 996 
Philippines 35,994 
Singapore 135,138 
Solomon Islands 122 
Thailand 75,381 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 5,639 
Maldives 113 
Nepal 651 
Pakistan 11,898 
Sri Lanka 4,528 
Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain 1,849 
Djibouti 11.2 
Egypt 7,045 
Jordan 1,894 
Kuwait 19,513 
Morocco 8,444 
Oman 2,826 
Qatar 12,415 
Saudi Arabia 86,185 
Tunisia 6,544 
United Arab Emirates 42,321 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola 9,304 
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Benin 394 
Botswana 2,016 
Burkina Faso 318 
Burundi 62.5 
Cameroon 2,608 
Republic of Central African  64.8 
Chad 97.5 
Congo 2,671 
Côte d'Ivoire 4,673 
Democratic Rep of the Congo 1,036 
Gabon 303 
Gambia 4.8 
Ghana 2,286 
Guinea 702 
Guinea-Bissau 76.2 
Kenya 2,035 
Lesotho 433 
Madagascar 471 
Malawi 488 
Mali 222 
Mauritania 505 
Mauritius 1,838 
Mozambique 1,011 
Namibia 1,280 
Niger 207 
Nigeria 23,833 
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Rwanda 50.2 
Senegal 982 
Sierra Leone 217 
Swaziland, Kingdom of 562 
Tanzania 1,203 
Togo 485 
Uganda 158 
Zambia 977 
Zimbabwe 1,753 
Latin America and the Caribbean  
Antigua and Barbuda 404 
Argentina 28,014 
Barbados 184 
Belize 200 
Bolivia 1,638 
Brazil 68,173 
Chile 19,325 
Colombia 12,774 
Costa Rica 5,762 
Cuba 988 
Dominica 37.8 
Dominican Republic 5,147 
Ecuador 5,719 
El Salvador 1,223 
Grenada 37.6 
Guatemala 2,573 
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Guyana 464 
Haiti 371 
Honduras 976 
Jamaica 1,506 
Mexico 163,494 
Nicaragua 585 
Panama 785 
Paraguay 1,110 
Peru 8,635 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 47.3 
Saint Lucia 60.5 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 36.9 
Suriname 545 
Trinidad and Tobago 4,916 
Uruguay 2,092 
Venezuela 18,963 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, there are many Members of the WTO that would be 
extremely sensitive to high litigation costs as result of the small amount of their exports
357
. In 
general the claim under the WTO dispute settlement system may cost one million dollars to 
bring
358
. So, it has been considered that practically many of the LDCs as well as small island 
economies nation may be at risk when they litigate under the WTO dispute settlement 
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 Result in Table 4.2 Show a description of the ICTSD project on the WTO dispute settlement system and 
developing countries. See, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).[Online] 
Available from: http://ictsd.org/. [Accessed: May 30, 2013]. 
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 Shaffer, G., “The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation”, World Trade 
Review, 5(2): pp.177-198 (2006), Available from: 
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system
359
. Thus, the benefits for a developing country to bring a case are less likely to exceed 
the threshold of litigation costs that make bringing a WTO case not worthwhile, especially in 
light of the uncertainty of WTO remedies. Moreover, there is no clear way to make sure any 
developing country will gain any benefit from the WTO legal system’s use360. If truth be told, 
the cost of bringing an individual WTO case is extremely high and reduces developing 
countries’ incentives to participate. While the poorer countries have scarcer resources with 
limited government budgets, and perhaps more immediate economic and social priorities, the 
WTO legal costs are higher and the future benefits may be uncertain. Therefore, they are not 
likely to continue in a longer-term legal complex process when the outcome is uncertain and 
the legal process is very costly. 
 
4.1.2.2 Internal expertise (Human Resources) 
4.1.2.2.1 Analysis and Evaluation of Constraints 
 
The lack of financial and legal resources is one of the factors that limits the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. It has been argued by the African 
Group
361
 that the WTO dispute settlement body is an “expensive and complicated” 
systemparticularly for developing countries
362
. The high cost of the WTO system
363
also was 
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mentioned by the ambassador of India, Bhatia, who stated that the WTO dispute settlement 
system is a “major deterrent” for both small and large developing countries364. Also, under 
the WTO dispute settlement system, the proceedings require human and financial resources 
to follow a case from the consultation to the appeal stage which may be a long period, close 
to three years
365
. However, there are many developing governments that lack financial and 
human resources to settle their disputes in the complicated and extended legal procedure of 
the WTO
366
. Therefore, the developing countries may not able to recognize their rights, 
properly defend themselves under the WTO rules and operate as effectively as developed 
countries
367
 as result of the scarcity of legal expertise and financial resources which are 
available to developed countries. Whereas developing countries’ complainants may show an 
interest in the system and wish to ensure satisfaction of their rights, the system is costly and 
complicated for them. Several developing countries have complained that they cannot bear 
the high costs of WTO litigation
368
. In the DSU cases, developing countries with less-
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Development, Trade, and the WTO (2002). pp.71-79. 
368
 See, the African Group Proposal, TN/DS/W/15, at 1 (Sept. 25 2002). (“The DS is complicated and overly 
expensive”). The proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
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111 
 
 
qualified experts and with little experience may not overcome developed countries with 
better-qualified experts
369
. As a result of the disproportion in resources between developing 
countries and developed countries, the ‘fight’ is not fair370. 
 
Because of the inadequacy of skilled personnel needed for developing countries to participate 
in the DSU
371 , they always have to “hire professional legal experts from developed 
countries”372, who are considered as external legal counsel. Some of developing countries are 
often use private law firms to help them. However, in recent years, the cost of hiring private 
legal counsel is high for developing countries. Lawyers
373
 “would cost the developing 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the greatest difficulties that LDCs have to cope with in their participation in the multilateral trading system is an 
extreme human resource constraint. LDCs are often under-represented or not represented in Geneva”. See also, 
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country concerned tens of thousands of dollars per case”374 to bring proceedings in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. For example, in the Cotton and Sugar Subsidies cases
375
, Brazil 
hired private law firms to assist in bringing complaints. Brazil’s paid a high cost of legal fees, 
which was over two million dollars. It worked with Sidley Austin Brown & Wood in the 
cases against the United States and EC
376
. 
 
In addition, developing countries had to pay attorney fees of more than four hundred 
thousand dollars
377
, for example in the case of ‘Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products’378 . The case of Brazil against U.S. 
(Cotton Subsidies) resulted in significantly greater legal costs. Brazil’s Cotton Trade 
Association paid a high cost of legal fees, which was over two million dollars
379
. Indeed, 
bringing an individual case in the WTO would be costlier in the internal income of a 
developing country, which leads to it being less likely to have experience in WTO litigation. 
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Indeed, the different cost of a small or large case is not clear because of the complexity
380
of 
the case and/or “how far the case goes before a settlement is reached”381. Moreover, any case 
which holds a “full three-year course with appeal and subsequent wrangles over 
implementation may cost millions”382, such as the Japan-Photographic Film case383. In an 
informal report, it has been observed that legal fee of Japan-Photographic Film case 
exceeded $10 million
384
 on both sides of the dispute
385
. It has been noted that the bill of 
lawyers cannot be predicted or estimated in advance in any dispute. In fact, sometimes it is 
dependent upon the other party’s decisions. So, the cost will increase when the other party 
decides to insist upon a panel procedure after consultation has failed, or to appeal a ruling in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings to the Appellate Body. Additionally, if the other party 
does not comply with the ruling “then the entire litigation can be for naught”386.  
 
Hiring external counsels may address the legal expertise dilemma, but cannot solve the 
problem that developing countries have limited financial resources. Many criticise private 
law firms. First of all, some private law firms may deliberately expand disputes to obtain 
more money
387
. Secondly, they do not train domestic equivalents from developing countries 
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but they train their own legal experts
388
. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, only 
government officials are allowed to present a case before a panel or appellate body
389
. This 
makes it less beneficial to the developing country to be supported by private law firms
390
. 
Indeed, it is believed that a dispute settlement system may be easier to use for richer 
countries. This undermines the confidence of developing countries in the system
391
. The lack 
of monetary means is persistent problems in developing countries
392
, which limit their 
practice in the DSU. 
 
4.1.3 Litigation costs 
4.1.3.1 Analysis and Evaluation of Constraints 
 
One of the most frequent obstacles preventing developing countries from using the WTO 
dispute settlement system is the lack of expertise and knowledge of complicated WTO law
393
. 
There are many requirements set by the DSU, as well as preparatory work, that have to take 
place before presenting a case in the WTO dispute settlement system, such as preparing 
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substantial documentation
394
 necessary as evidence, preparing commercial and economic 
data
395
 and testimony. In any case, parties may have to show economic and technical 
evidence
396
. So, parties may use quantitative economic analysis and utilize either econometric 
or non-econometric evidence in order to “strengthen their argument” 397  and to meet the 
DSB’s principles. Frequently, this might be extremely complicated and may take a long 
time
398
. Therefore, developing countries may not able to make a case in the dispute settlement 
system when they do not have adequate technical skills
399
. This may reduce their ability to 
litigate and develop their influence within the dispute settlement system
400
. 
 
The law of the WTO became more detailed, precise and binding since it was introduced on 
January 1, 1995. It includes “a package of eighteen multilateral agreements, many 
understandings and protocols, and around 26,000 pages of text”401. The texts of the WTO 
panel and Appellate Body decisions made a more complex case law and their decisions 
require difficult legal analysis. Also, reading the WTO rules is a huge task even for 
specialized academics. Under the WTO, the panel decisions may range from 100 to 500 
pages. The WTO Appellate Body and WTO panels employ a highly contextualised, case-
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based approach, based on jurisprudence where the individual case opinions average hundreds 
of pages
402
. The WTO Appellate Body requires extensive time by lawyers and “higher 
standards of proof, involving greater use of statistical trade data as opposed to legal 
presumptions,”403which adds to the high cost of legal expertise. As a consequence, the 
demand for lawyers increases. Due to the growing complexity of WTO jurisprudence, 
litigation involves “a distant forum in which legal expertise tends to be U.S. and Euro-centric, 
highly specialized, and expensive”404. 
 
There are some WTO agreements that require added conditions in the disputes. Under the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures SCM
405
 Agreement and Customs Valuation 
Agreement, there are some provisions that necessitate “experts examine or analyze evidence 
presented before the panel”406 and often request that various technical committees provide 
advisory reports on complicated subjects
407
. These provisions may help developing countries 
to address the crucial stages of pre-litigation investigation and preparatory work. However, 
the WTO agreements refer to such experts just before the matter is ready to be presented to 
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the panel. Indeed, the agreements fail to address the requirements for collection of technical 
evidence prior to the litigation that may help developing countries to be more successful in 
disputes. 
 
Other WTO rules that require detailed economic analysis
408
, which make it more costly in 
multiple stages
409
 of settling disputes, include the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Developing countries have to provide detailed 
economic analysis in any case regarding the SPS Agreement. So the provisions create 
additional costs for developing countries to satisfy these requirements. 
 
These additional costs include supporting litigation such as “the hiring of experts as testifying 
witnesses”410. However, it has been observed that the fees of private law firms may cost a 
million dollars even before the DSU process
411
. Furthermore, it has been observed that the 
fees of private law firms is from $250 to $1,000 per hour
412
. 
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The panel and the appellate body reports are usually extremely long and complex, which may 
take more time, and strong attempts may be made by official trade experts and private 
lawyers to settle the dispute
413
. In the Export Subsidies on Sugar dispute
414
, for instance, 
under the DSU procedures, the disputing counterparts Australia, Brazil and Thailand, took a 
long time to make a decision for the “definition of the amount of imported sugar from 
ACP/India which would be subject to export subsidies”415. 
 
Indeed, it has been observed that the disputing parties who have superior legal power can 
obtain positive decisions because they are better able to deal with the complexity of WTO 
rules and dispute settlement procedures. In particular, developed countries are able to deal 
with the expenses and disparity of a case under the DSU by their representative officials in 
the WTO
416
. Developed countries have many representative officials with good experience 
with the WTO rules. This would reduce the possibility for developing countries to win their 
cases brought to the DSU
417
. Thailand, for instance, is one of the developing countries that is 
considered as “an advanced developing country which is more familiar with the dispute 
settlement process”418. It has many trade officials who can prepare and evaluate economic 
cases, but it “lacks the international and trade lawyers required to present them before a panel 
                                                 
 
413
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or the appellate body”419. Moreover, it has difficulty in employing enough staff with good 
experience with multilateral trading systems, to deal with their cases in Geneva as well as in 
Bangkok. 
 
Indeed, it has been observed that while fact finding, such as data collection, economic 
analysis, and testifying witnesses and, in particular, technical evidence are significant, they 
present a challenge for WTO litigants
420
. Therefore, developing countries have to deal with 
specialized experts to address economic or scientific evidence
421
. However, developing 
countries face difficulties attempting to “hire experts for research and testimony to support 
their cases”422 as well as technical skills. Furthermore, developing countries need the internal 
capacity to “coordinate with outside legal counsel”423 when they subcontract to foreign legal 
counsel in compliance with the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. However, foreign legal 
counsel is more costly for developing countries and does not solve the problems. It has been 
observed that since developing countries may not participate as effectively in the WTO, the 
possible benefits for them may be less likely to justify the litigation costs, and they have 
fewer technical skills, it makes less sense for them to invest in WTO legal expertise and 
participate in WTO dispute settlement
424
. 
 
The high cost of the different stages of WTO dispute settlement proceedings is a dilemma for 
developing countries because they have small trade shares and government budgets. 
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Moreover, the support from developed countries’ on technical assistance to developing 
countries has been criticised as “very poor and unorganized”425. Furthermore, in the WTO 
context, developing countries have no inducement to participate in the system.  
 
4.1.4 Article 27.2  
4.1.4.1 Analysis and Evaluation of Constraints  
 
DSU Article 27.2
426
 tackles the high cost of litigation in the dispute settlement proceedings as 
well as the lack of legal expertise, which impose constraints on developing countries. Under 
Article 27(2) of the DSU, developing countries can request technical assistance from the 
WTO Secretariat. Article 27.2 of the DSU states that the WTO Secretariat has to provide 
expert ‘legal advice and assistance’ and make available a qualified legal expert from the 
WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country Member
427
. 
 
However, experts do not support developing countries before a dispute is initiated in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. It is important to provide aid before a dispute initiated in the 
proceedings. Moreover, the role of legal assistance is just giving “advice and clarification 
                                                 
 
425
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concerning WTO law and processes”428. Therefore, it is believed that the experts’ assistance 
might be for ‘ensuring the impartiality of the Secretariat’, as mentioned in the provision429. 
This means they could not operate as an advocate during the legal proceedings.  
 
Indeed, Article 27(2) may limit the efforts of Secretariat experts to assist developing 
countries because of the requirement that the assistance of Secretariat experts not 
‘compromise the neutrality of the Secretariat’. In several disputes, the expert’s latitude in 
assisting developing countries with strategic legal issues is significantly reduced by the 
impartiality requirement
430
. Therefore, some developing countries, such as Jamaica and the 
group of least developed countries, have complained about the nature of assistance. They 
suggest that  
“[w]hile in most instances the ‘expert’ was sincere and sought to provide useful 
advice, he did not provide the wide-ranging, in-depth assistance that the countries 
felt they needed. In short, he was not ‘their lawyer.’ Rather, he merely provided 
technical assistance on a narrow range of issues, frequently doing no more than 
critiquing possible arguments or defenses and providing basic advice about the 
course of WTO dispute proceedings. Thus, rather than fulfilling the more 
encompassing role of a ‘public defender’ for developing countries, the experts are 
only intended and allowed to serve as short-term, narrow-range technical 
advisors”431. 
  
Moreover, some developing countries illustrated that the legal assistance was not helpful to 
them. The legal assistance provided by the WTO has been criticized by developing countries. 
The WTO secretariat has a restricted number of staff
432
 with part-time jobs. In 1999, the 
Legal Division of the WTO had only two attorneys who could serve as legal consultants for 
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developing countries
433
. The legal assistance constitutes just a simple guidance regarding the 
WTO dispute settlement process
434
. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to deal with the 
dispute settlement system with such limited support. 
 
In sum, DSU Article 27.2
435
casts a light on the high cost of litigation and the lack of legal 
expertise, which creates constraints on developing countries’ dispute settlement proceedings. 
However, it fails to effectively address the level of high costs of litigation and lack of legal 
expertise of developing countries. 
 
4.1.5 The ACWL 
4.1.5.1 Analysis and Evaluation of Constraints 
 
Article 27.2 of the DSU could not totally tackle the high cost of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, and the lack of legal and financial resources of developing countries has been 
significant
436
 for a long time. Therefore, the WTO Members established the Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law (ACWL) on 1 December 1999 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, 
Washington
437
. The Agreement establishing the (ACWL) was signed by 29 countries and 
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entered into force on 15 July, 2001
438
. The ACWL is considered as an innovative initiative, 
an independent ‘non-governmental’ organization and the first ‘international legal aid’ 439 
centre in international law
440
. The ACWL is operated independently from the WTO 
Secretariat. The aim of this body is to provide legal advice, aid and training for developing 
countries
441
 officials on WTO (DSU) law
442
 as well as to assist developing countries in the 
preparation and presentation of their trade cases in WTO disputes
443
. 
 
Between 2001 and 2009, the ACWL provided support in several
444
 WTO disputes that 
represent over 20 per cent of all DSU proceedings
445
. Besides, it provided several views on 
issues of WTO laws and on WTO dispute settlement procedures. In addition, it offers 
“detailed training activities, based in Geneva, to delegates”446 from developing countries447. 
The ACWL offers high quality expertise for parties to WTO disputes. The ACWL has “an 
investment fund devoted to subsidizing the costs of such expertise”448. Indeed, the ACWL 
has been “used on occasions to assist developing countries in acquiring scientific, economic 
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and domestic law expertise presented” 449  to be presented when litigating disputes 450 . 
Moreover, the ACWL can contract with developing countries in a broader and more tactical 
way and play a role of ‘public defender’ for the developing countries because it functions 
separately from the WTO secretariat, but with preserving the impartiality of the WTO 
secretariat. Also, the WTO Advisory Centre can provide assistance in the ‘consultation 
phase’ of disputes as well as consulting advice in respect of potential claims451. While the 
Advisory Centre operates “in a more ad hoc manner for developing countries”452, it can 
develop a WTO expertise from which developing countries can benefit over time
453
. 
 
The ACWL has a budget to decrease “the heavy burden on the developing countries”454 to 
create “internal legal expertise”455. Ehlermann, once Chairman of the Appellate Body, stated 
at the inauguration of the ACWL that the ACWL organization “will strengthen the notion that 
the dispute settlement system of the WTO is available to the economically weak as much as it 
is available to the economically strong”456. 
 
However, the ACWL is not free
457. The fees imposed by the ACWL are “only a small part of 
the real cost of representing a developing country from the beginning to the end of the 
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appeals process”458, because of heavy subsidies mainly financed by a number of developed 
countries. The legal assistance of ACWL confers the right to use its facilities but is not 
free
459
. However, the membership fees for access to the ACWL services might still be high 
for some developing countries and less developed countries. The fees for use of the ACWL 
may affect the decisions of developing countries to bring complaints under the DSU. As a 
result of the membership fee, a developing country might wait to join the Centre until it is 
sure that it can benefit meaningfully from WTO litigation.  
 
It has been observed that there are several capacity constraints for developing countries in 
WTO dispute settlement procedures
460
 since the ACWL was established. The assistance is 
given after a dispute starts in the DSU process. If assistance were also be given before the 
disputes arose in the DSU process, this would be better for developing countries. In addition, 
the ACWL has some deficiencies. It has a small number of staff
461
, and few lawyers with 
distinguished knowledge and skills
462
. Consequently, it does not have “the capacity to handle 
all cases referred to it”463.  
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Furthermore, there are considerable concerns when any developing countries bring a case 
against another developing country
464
. The ACWL cannot support all developing countries in 
both sides of a dispute. Indeed, this conflict took place in the Sugar dispute
465
 when the 
ACWL refused to support one of the developing country parties. In this case, Brazil was 
dealing with a private law firm with monetary support from its sugar business
466
. Australia 
had its own legal experts and Thailand relied on the ACWL. In fact, the Thai government was 
taking the initiative to be presented by the ACWL while other parties were also keen to be 
represented by the ACWL
467
. However, the other party’ order was declined because Thailand 
was the first party to ask for help from the ACWL
468
. Therefore, the Thai government gained 
the benefit of the reduced cost of the litigation, the good quality of the services provided and 
the expertise of The ACWL’s director from being supported by the ACWL. 
 
Due to these deficiencies of the ACWL, there are just a few developing countries that are 
members of the ACWL
469
. These countries are Bolivia, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica
470
, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, 
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Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Vietnam
471
. 
 
In May 2005, however, it was revealed that the WTO Advisory Centre had represented eight 
developing countries (Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Thailand) in 12 WTO cases
472
. In fact, the WTO Advisory Centre is designed to represent 
and counsel developing countries to protect their rights under WTO rights. The ACWL has 
not addressed all constraints that face developing countries in accessing the WTO dispute 
settlement system, but the lack of expertise in WTO law amongst developing countries is 
now considerably less. However, the high cost of WTO dispute settlement system litigation is 
still largely unaddressed and limits the participation of developing countries in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. 
 
4.1.6 Conclusion 
 
This discussion casts light on and highlights the most significant factors regarding the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. Therefore, the lack 
of financial and legal resources was illustrated and was shown to be among the most 
significant constraints that limit the participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement body. This part analysed the internal resources of some developing countries that 
cannot afford the costs to pursue legitimate claims under the DSB. This makes it more 
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difficult for developing countries to litigate their disputes under the DSB. Furthermore, the 
internal expertise of developing countries was analysed and evaluated. Some developing 
countries may not have the ability to recognize their rights and properly defend themselves 
under the WTO because of the lack of legal expertise who can deal with WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. The WTO law and the DSU provisions demand legal and financial 
resources, which causes high costs for the different stages of WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings and causes a dilemma for developing countries in participating in the WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. DSU Article 27.2 and the ACWL tackled the lack of financial 
and legal resources of developing countries in the disputes settlement proceedings. However, 
it is observed that neither Article 27.2 nor the ACWL tackle effectively the high cost of 
litigation and the lack of legal expertise that create constraints on developing countries 
disputes settlement proceedings. 
 
In fact, it is worth to mention that none of the solutions of assistance under Article 27.2, from 
a WTO Secretariat consultant, outside legal counsel, or from the ACWL attorneys has 
addressed one of the most significant goals of a developing country to train its own cadre of 
lawyers to a level of expertise and self-sufficiency to be able to represent itself in DSU 
proceedings as well as lack of costs of the DSB legislations. Moreover, none has found a 
solution for the lack of financial and legal resources that have been happening frequently in 
practice and have been already addressed and reported by the WTO Members as factors 
limiting the participation of developing countries in the DSB. 
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4.2 Retaliation  
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a factor that may be considered as the most important constraint for limiting the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB). The aim of 
this chapter is to highlight and analyse factor that has happened frequently in practice and has 
been addressed and reported by the WTO Members. The purpose of this section is to analyse 
and evaluate the retaliation rules of the WTO. Retaliation is the most significant remedy for 
developing countries using the DSB. Indeed, the WTO agreements indicate clearly the 
objective and means of the DSU for settling a dispute between any conflicting members, to 
achieve the mutually satisfactory resolution for parties which is compatible with the WTO 
rules so that all violations case and uses of the retaliation rules are consistent with WTO 
agreements
473
.  
 
Under WTO rules, the right of retaliation entails the ‘suspension of trade concessions or 
obligations’ and countermeasures474. The retaliation rules of the DSU allow for withdrawal of 
tariff concessions offered to the violating country or countries. Also, it can result in an 
increase in tariffs for any imported goods that come from the relevant WTO Member. The 
reason behind the retaliation rules when disputes arise between WTO Members, particularly 
between smaller and larger WTO Members, is to cause economic harm for any non-
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complying WTO Member to encourage its compliance with the retaliation rules
475
. This is 
considered to be the perfect solution for making larger WTO Members comply with the DSU 
rulings.  
 
However, it has been observed that the inability to enforce rulings against larger WTO 
Members is an unavoidable disadvantage in the DSU for developing countries
476
. DSU legal 
rulings cannot pressure the developed countries with greater economic market power
477
 to 
comply with the rulings if they lose the case. As long as the rulings of the WTO DSU have no 
bailiff to enforce them, any country can simply choose to ignore judgments and even put up 
with possible sanctions. 
 
Therefore, this section analyses the WTO retaliation rules that may undermine the utility of 
the DSU for developing countries. The aim is to see whether an ability to effectively retaliate 
is considered as a key determinant for WTO Members’ participation with the DSU. First, this 
section will set out a statistical analysis of WTO Members’ use of the dispute settlement 
system, particularly as regards developing countries. Secondly, this section will examine the 
way in which developing countries’ use of WTO retaliation may be ineffective due to the 
lack of retaliatory force when have recourse to these procedures against developed countries. 
In practice, developing countries may lack the ability to impose compliance with DSU rulings 
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through the retaliation rules, and this limits the participation of these countries in the DSB. 
Therefore, this section will discuss and assess the consequences of this lack of rules. Also, 
this section will evaluate the experience of developing countries with cross retaliation. 
Developing country experiences with enforcement of the DSU rulings will be highlighted to 
find out the effect on undermining the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing 
countries. The analysis of the constraints will focus on three issues: first of all, developing 
countries, with small domestic markets, may not be able to impose sufficient economic or 
political losses upon the larger WTO Members to generate vital pressure to induce 
compliance. Secondly, the retaliation (‘suspension of concessions’) might be more 
detrimental to the developing country rather than the developed country WTO Member. 
Thirdly, the WTO rulings may not be enforceable by the developing countries, therefore 
developing countries receive little attention in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
4.2.2 Statistical of developing countries with DSU 
 
The WTO Agreement entered into force more than 20 years ago and more than 492 cases 
have been raised as of May 13, 2015. This indicates that WTO Members have developed 
great experience in using the dispute settlement system. Particularly, developing countries 
have been involved in a large number of disputes, with both developed countries and 
developing countries equally
478
. 
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Indeed, there are some arguments
479
 that the DSU has worked for developing countries very 
well.  Developing countries are major users of the dispute settlement system. Up to February 
29, 2012, 180 cases were initiated by developing countries. 106 of these cases were against 
developed countries and 74 were against the developing countries. So far, thirty-six 
developing countries have initiated complaints. Of these countries 12 countries complained 
once, 18 complained twice and 7 complained 10 times or more. Regarding developing 
countries using the DSU, the countries using the process most often were Brazil with twenty-
five (25) disputes, then Mexico with twenty-one (21) disputes and India with twenty (20) 
disputes.  
 
Between 1995 and 2012 (29 February), developing countries completed 60 complaints and 42 
legal rulings were in their favour, 12 getting mutual agreement and just six disputes were lost. 
The success rate is 88 per cent (42 out of 48)
480
. There has been full implementation of the 
rulings and recommendations in some cases. However, a caveat regarding retaliation may be 
added in some disputes. A somewhat “unexpected interpretation by the AB of the provisions 
of the WTO provisions has diminished the level of satisfaction of developing countries with 
the DSU”481. 
 
                                                 
 
479
 Ibid. 
480
 The DSU has worked better for the developed countries against developing countries. Regarding 64 cases 
pursued by the developed against developing countries, in 23 there was a mutual settlement and in the remaining 
41 disputes, the verdicts were in favour of the complainants in 39 cases. Out of these 39, in 35 cases the rulings 
and recommendations have been implemented. Hoda, A,. (2012), ‘Dispute Settlement in the WTO, Developing 
Countries and India’.  
481
 Ibid. 
133 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Experience of developing countries with retaliation and cross 
retaliation 
 
There is study evaluating the WTO dispute settlement data
482
. The data displays a high rate of 
compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings by the WTO Members
483
. The study 
analyses the first ten years of the WTO dispute settlement system and illustrates that 83 per 
cent
484
 of panel and Appellate Body reports successful adopted. The author of that study 
states that “it is the case that most reports are eventually implemented”485. There is another 
study examining the period from 1995 to March 2007, noting the “generally positive record 
of Members in complying with adverse rulings”486. It found that 90 per cent of 109 panel and 
Appellate Body reports adopted during that period found violations of WTO law, and that in 
“virtually all of these cases the WTO Member found to be in violation indicated its intention 
to bring itself into compliance and the record indicates that in most cases has already done 
so”487. Indeed, there are high compliance rates with adverse DSB rulings brought by both 
developed countries and developing countries
488
. 
 
The study demonstrates that  
“WTO dispute settlement experience to date does not suggest that responding 
Members have a manifestly worse record of compliance with DSB rulings in 
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cases where the complaining Member was a small or developing country than in 
cases where the complaining Member was another type of developing country or 
developed country”489. 
 
In fact, during 17 years, developing countries raised many disputes against developed 
countries and succeeded in getting decisions of legal violations in 88 per cent of the disputes; 
therefore they are successful in dispute settlement. Also, they have achieved implementation 
in 94 per cent of the rulings in their favour. It has been observed that developing countries 
have even been successful in cases against developing countries. It observed that the 
developing countries have increased their participation in the DSB where they were hesitant 
in using DSU
490
. 
 
However, under the DSB, seventeen disputes have led to requests for authorization of 
retaliation. The requests have been made by thirteen Members; eight of them were 
developing country Members
491
. Some of those countries which have varying market sizes 
and trade shares
492
 found “utility in at least requesting retaliation”493. Regarding the rate of 
the WTO disputes, there are only nine cases in which “the complainant pursued and gained 
retaliation rights from the DSB with retaliatory measures being imposed in only five of those 
disputes”494. In those five, developing countries “pursued their right to retaliate through to the 
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Arbitration stage”495. So, it has been suggested that developing countries “have seen merit in 
pursuing actual DSB authorisation to retaliate” 496  and have been “at least as active as 
developed countries in requesting authorisation from the DSB to retaliate”497. While the DSB 
has authorised retaliation, “retaliation has been the exception rather than the rule”498. It has 
been observed that “the overall positive record of Members in complying with adverse 
rulings is reflected in, and confirmed by, the low number of cases where Members have 
sought and received authorisation to impose retaliatory measures”499.  
 
However, there were worries via the Uruguay Round that small Members may not benefit 
from dispute settlement procedures and they were uncomfortable about the impact of quasi-
judicial dispute settlement procedures
500
. The reason behind this concern is that the small 
nations do not have the economic muscle for effectively enforcing a retaliation or cross-
retaliation in large countries, which was the last necessary tool to enforce the ruling in a 
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dispute
501
. Therefore, cross-retaliation may be considered as a beneficial tool for developed 
countries rather than developing countries. Retaliation has been sparingly used by developed 
countries, but a WTO Member may rely on moral pressure rather than apply legal measures 
to enforce compliance
502
. Also, the cross-retaliation agreements on goods, services and 
intellectual property rights raised another concern for developing countries using the DSU,
503
 
which affects their participation in the dispute settlement system.
504
. It has been observed that 
there are discrepancies in the imposition of retaliatory measures between developing and 
developed countries in some cases such as EC-Bananas III (Ecuador), US-Gambling 
(Antigua and Barbuda)
505
. Therefore, in the next part, I will discuss the developing countries’ 
recourse to retaliation as well as cross retaliation under the DSU.  
 
4.2.2.2 Recourse to Retaliation  
 
There has been no occasion in which developed countries considered retaliation or cross-
retaliation against the developing countries, because developing countries always implement 
the rulings and recommendations of the DSB
506
. Moral pressure was considered to be a 
greater factor in getting governments to implement rulings and recommendations, rather than 
coercive legal action
507
.  
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On the other hand, it has been considered that the major factor for securing implementation of 
DSB rulings and recommendations in dispute is recourse to retaliation in the DSU
508
. It has 
been observed that developing countries have had success in implementing DSB rulings and 
recommendation without recourse to retaliation
509
. However, they had authorisation to 
retaliate in five cases: Ecuador in EC-Bananas III; Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand in US-Offset Act (DS 217); Brazil in US-Upland Cotton (DS 267); Brazil in 
Canada-Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (DS 222); and Mexico in US-Offset Act (DS 234).  
 
In Bananas III, Ecuador had not gone ahead with retaliation
510
. In US Offset Act (DS217), 
Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia and Korea did not benefit from the authorisation whereas 
“three developed countries that were co-complainants viz., the EC, Japan and Australia 
did”511. In US-Upland Cotton and Canada-Aircraft Credits and Guarantees cases, Brazil did 
not use its authorisation to retaliate
512
. In US-Offset Act (DS 234), Mexico and Canada 
(Canada was a co-complainant) applied the authorised measure
513
.  
 
In other cases, developing countries took the step for being authorised to retaliate but they did 
not follow up
514
. In US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (DS 268), Argentina 
requested authorisation but did not continue, and as result of that “the US announced 
withdrawal of the WTO inconsistent measure, bringing itself into full compliance with the 
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recommendations of the DSB” 515 . In US-Gambling, Antigua and Barbuda received the 
recommendation of the arbitrators for retaliation, but did not go to the next step of applying 
for the DSB to authorise the retaliation. 
 
It has been argued that the biggest factor for implementation of rulings and recommendations 
is the moral pressure placed on governments to be seen as abiding by their international 
obligations, rather than coercive legal action
516
. However, it has been observed that in the 
EC-Bananas and US-Offset Act cases the developed country co-complainants have been 
caused pain by the retaliation
517
. 
 
In particular, Ecuador and Antigua, in the EC-Bananas III case (Ecuador) and In the US-
Gambling case (Antigua), were not able to cause any economic or political pain by retaliation 
against the US and the EC to secure compliance
518
. However, in the large developing 
countries, such as Brazil, the position could be different. Therefore, Brazil’s position can 
cause pain to the US and Canada
519
. In the two cases, Brazil obtained authorisation to go 
ahead with the retaliation. However, Brazil has baulked at proceeding against Canada
520
. 
Also, Brazil signed an interim ‘Framework Agreement’ with the US and “the latter has 
promised to provide annual payments of US $ 147.3 million for the establishment of a 
technical fund for Brazilian farmers”521 and “payments are to continue until the US reforms 
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its subsidy programme under the 2012 farm bill”522. The threat of retaliation by a large 
developing country such Brazil can work. However, moral pressure does not always work for 
developing countries: see the EC-Bananas III case, for example.  
 
It would be better to ensure compliance the DSB rulings by means of retaliation. A DSB legal 
ruling with more using retaliation rules can be an effective tool for a developing country 
seeking to reverse a legal violation by a larger country
523
. 
 
4.2.2.3 Recourse to Cross-Retaliation 
 
Under Article 22.3 of the DSU, while the retaliation would not be practicable or effective, it 
allows for using retaliation across agreements
524
.There are three cases, concerning the TRIPS 
and GATS agreements, which showed the prospect of cross retaliation against developed 
countries to ensure compliance with the recommendations of the DSB in goods and services 
areas. These cases show how the cross-retaliation rules work in practice in disputes involving 
developing countries. 
 
In EC-Bananas III, the arbitrators indicated that the extent of ‘suspension of concessions’ 
under GATT 1994 and GATS was “insufficient to reach the level of nullification and 
impairment determined by the arbitrators” 525 . However, Ecuador could apply for 
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authorisation through “TRIPS in Section 1 (copyright and related rights); Article 14 on 
protection of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations), Section 
3 (geographical indications) and Section 4 (industrial designs)”526. Also, in US-Gambling, the 
arbitrator decided that Antigua could apply to suspend obligations under the TRIPS 
agreement by authorisation from the DSB “at a level not exceeding US$21 million 
annually”527. 
 
In US-Upland Cotton, the arbitrators ruled that Brazil could impose sanctions by increasing 
tariffs on imports of goods coming from the USA, by imposing limitations on US service 
providers and by means of “lifting of intellectual property rights for US right holders in 
copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed 
information” 528 . However, they placed conditions, including that “Brazil may begin 
exercising the right relating to services by US service suppliers and US IPRs only if the 
sanctions exceed a certain threshold (estimated at US$409.7 million based on 2008 
figures)”529. 
 
4.2.2.4 Cross-Retaliation as regards Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement), there is an interesting development in practice by developing countries which 
make requests to cross-retaliate through the ‘suspension of obligations’ under the TRIPS530. 
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The first request was by Ecuador in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) and there were later requests 
by Antigua in US-Gambling and Brazil in US-Upland Cotton
531
.  
 
The suspension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement has been argued to be useful for 
developing countries in disputes against developed countries
532
. However, the main concerns 
of developing countries with traditional retaliation are that (1) the retaliation may be 
ineffective for inducing larger WTO Members to comply with the DSU rulings while the 
developing countries’ domestic markets are too small to place any effective pressure on 
developed countries to comply, and (2) the suspension of concessions may be more 
detrimental to the developing country than the non-complying WTO Member
533
. It has been 
argued that both concerns may be addressed by cross-retaliation through ‘suspending 
obligations’ under intellectual property rights534. Therefore, regarding the first concern, it has 
been argued that the intellectual property obligations under the TRIPS Agreement have 
significant political and economic value for many companies in some industrialised 
countries
535
. In particular, “developing countries have undertaken serious commitments on 
TRIPS from which large, multinational corporations based in industrialised countries stand to 
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benefit enormously”536. Therefore, it has been observed that when developing countries use 
retaliation as regards intellectual property rights that would be a significant tool to generate 
important lobbying which could induce industrialised governments to comply with their 
WTO obligations
537
. 
 
Regarding the second concern, it has been argued that “retaliation in TRIPS can be genuinely 
welfare enhancing in a way that conventional retaliation . . . is not”538. By this theory, 
intellectual property protection may tend “to serve the interests of developed countries with a 
comparative advantage in innovation” 539 . However, the suspension can provide greater 
benefits to developing countries than burdens
540
 if selected and applied correctly. 
 
So, one has to think about the extent to which cross-retaliation under intellectual property 
rights can be the perfect retaliatory in trade disputes for developing countries against 
developed countries. However, the Arbitrator in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) stated that even 
under the TRIPS, retaliation involves “distinctive legal, practical and economic difficulties 
for the retaliating Member” 541 . Moreover, Ecuador and Antigua had the right to cross-
retaliate by suspending TRIPS Agreement obligations in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) and US-
Gambling but they did not take measures
542
. In practice, there has been no evaluation of the 
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effectiveness and benefits of suspending TRIPS obligations
543
. So, the major constraints 
affecting developing countries’ participation in DSU are evaluated in the next section. 
 
4.2.2.5 Developing country experience with enforcement of DSU rulings 
 
Developing countries often are weak and lack economic and political tools to pursue the 
implementation of DSU rulings in their favour, particularly if the rulings are against a major 
economic power such as the EU or the US
544
. This problem still remains and is considered as 
the biggest concern for developing countries in the DSU. In the US-Upland Cotton dispute, 
involving Brazil and the US, this concern has obviously appeared. Hagstrom states that Brazil 
is itself unlikely to be able to force US compliance
545
 when the US refused to comply with 
the DSB’s decision. Therefore, Brazil applied for DSB authorisation for countermeasures 
under Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
546
. By suspending 
obligations under the TRIPs and GATS, it had cross retaliated against US pharmaceutical 
patents. However, it is believed that the consequence of cross-retaliation would be “so dire 
for the US-based pharmaceutical companies that the US is unlikely to tolerate it”547. On 26 
August 2008, Brazil requested for the recommencement of arbitration in the matter of 
countermeasures.  
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The DSB authorised of cross-retaliation by means of suspending TRIPs and GATS 
obligations in the EC-Bananas case
548
, where Ecuador was authorised
549
 to suspend such 
obligations as regards the EC. Ecuador tried to settle the dispute with the EC while it had the 
authority for suspension and “despite having filed for the establishment of a second panel in 
February 2007 to seek redress against EC non-compliance” 550. In the US-Gambling case551, 
Antigua was also authorised
552
 suspend TRIPS obligations as regards the US, but “Antigua as 
yet has no domestic legislation in place to indicate how it means to use the DSB authority to 
retaliate”553. 
 
In 2008, Karen Halverson Cross expected that 
‘The DSB has authorized cross-retaliation before for two small countries, but the 
DSU only provides for cross-retaliation where suspending concessions with 
respect to the sector at issue (here, all goods) is not ‘practicable or effective’. 
Given the size of Brazil’s economy, it will be more difficult for it to demonstrate 
that suspending concessions on imports of goods from the United States is not 
‘practicable or effective’554. 
 
On 19 November 2009, Brazil was authorised by the DSB to “suspend the application to the 
United States of concessions or other obligations”555. On March 2010, Brazil informed the 
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DSB that “it would ‘suspend the application to the United States of concessions or other 
obligations’ under the GATT 1994 in the form of increased import duties’, and under the 
TRIPS Agreement and/or the GATS, the form of the latter to be notified before 
implementation”556. 
 
Article 22.3 of the DSU indicates that retaliation occurs when the DSU rulings have not been 
complied by a WTO Member. However, in the US-Upland Cotton case, the DSU decided 
against authorising Brazil’s cross-retaliation that would have “given the clear impression that 
the non-compliance option is freely available to WTO member countries with strong 
economies bolstered by the power of large MNEs”557. Also “it will not allow the DSU’s 
cross-retaliation provision to be activated against such a member”558.  
 
4.2.2.6 Evaluation of the constraint 
 
 The potential shortcomings of WTO retaliation for developing countries have been 
demonstrated.
559
 The inadequacies of the WTO retaliation rules for developing countries 
should not significantly affect developing countries’ decisions to operate in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. However, the enforcement measures by ‘retaliation rules’, via the 
‘suspension of trade concessions or obligations’, of the WTO dispute settlement system 
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might be considered “virtually meaningless” 560  that may as a result of no effectively 
influence against developed countries
561
.  
 
Pascal Lamy
562
, the previous WTO Director General, has mentioned the effectiveness of the 
WTO sanctions for developing countries and he states that “the WTO system has no 
sanctions” 563 . Regarding developing countries, it has been argued that one of the most 
significant constraints limiting the participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is the structural inflexibility of the remedies presented to poor nations to 
enforce a favourable decision
564
. The LDC
565
 Group, in the context of the DSU review 
negotiations, has attributed the limit on the participation of developing countries in the WTO 
dispute settlement system to “the inadequacies and structural rigidities of the remedies 
available to poor countries” 566 . Moreover, the African Group suggested that the main 
dilemma of the WTO dispute settlement system is that “the means provided for enforcement 
of findings and recommendations [trade retaliation] are skewed against and disadvantage 
African Members”567. Therefore, there are many proposals from developing countries to 
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reform the retaliation rules, including collective retaliation,
568
 tradable retaliation rights
569
 
and the use of compensation
570
. 
 
Regarding the WTO, there were a number of Members with a reputation for non-compliance 
with the DSU. The example of the high profile dispute is cases brought against the EU 
regarding its banana import policy
571
. It has been considered that the current method for 
enforcement of a DSU ruling may generate an inducement for the United States and the EC to 
delay the duration of the dispute for several years. For example, the United States disputes 
with Costa Rica and Pakistan in the textile safeguard measures lasted for almost three 
years
572
. The United States blocked its market to access to those developing countries’ 
imports for about three years without any negative consequences for it trade
573
. 
 
 The DSU has to work more for developing countries because developing countries cannot 
effectively enforce WTO rulings, for example in 
574
  the Banana dispute
575
. Therefore, it has 
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been observed that it is a waste of money and time for developing countries to invoke the 
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures against developed country WTO Members576. So, the 
‘suspension of trade concessions’ may be more favourable to developed country Members 
more than to developing countries as a means of ensuring compliance. 
 
There is a high compliance with dispute settlement rulings by developing countries
577
. 
However, if retaliation is the only factor for compliance with adverse rulings that would lead 
to low rates of compliance particularly in those disputes where smaller or developing 
countries were complainants
578
. Whereas in sixty disputes, it was possible to retaliate, 
Members “only requested the right to retaliate in seventeen disputes”579. In the following 
parts, I will analyse constraints that lead to the limitation of participation of developing 
countries in WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
4.2.2.7 Analysis of the constraint 
4.2.2.7.1 Imposition of economic or political sanctions 
 
The DSU ‘retaliation rules’ have been criticised580. Developing countries argue that they  
may not be able impose enough economic or political loss or even “to generate the requisite 
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pressure”581 on larger WTO Members to encourage them to comply with the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings or even to comply with rulings through retaliation rules. Indeed, 
retaliation rules are dependent on the size of the domestic market of the retaliating country, or 
countries, in relation to the non-complying country
582
. There is a large difference in domestic 
markets between developing and developed WTO Members
583
. The asymmetry in market 
size was demonstrated by the retaliation of Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) against the United 
States
584
. Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) is one of the smallest WTO Members with about 
80,000 inhabitants
585
. Under the retaliation rules, Antigua and Barbuda prevented any trade 
coming from the United States
586
. The trade was approximately US $180 million per annum, 
which is less than 0.02 per cent of United States exports
587
. Therefore, it would never crash 
the United States economy and the United States could simply change such a relatively small 
volume of trade to elsewhere
588
. 
 
Similarly, Ecuador withdrew tariff concessions against the European Communities (EC)
589
. 
Ecuador’s imports were less than 0.1 per cent of total of EC exports, which would not harm 
the European Community’s economy590. Regarding to the ability of Ecuador to effectively 
retaliate, by withdrawing tariff concessions against the European Communities, the 
Arbitrators state that “Ecuador, as a small developing country, only accounts for a negligible 
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proportion of the EC's exports of these products, the suspension of concessions is unlikely to 
have any significant effect on demand for these EC exports”591. Also, the arbitrators state that 
the objective of inducing compliance might never be achieved where “a great imbalance in 
the terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking 
suspension and the other party”592.  
 
The Antigua and Ecuador cases show that WTO trade sanctions are an ineffective means of 
ensuring compliance with WTO rulings for developing countries. As some observers
593
 
highlight, retaliation through the suspension of tariff concessions “cannot offer a realistic 
option to enforce WTO obligations if performed against considerably larger economies”594. 
Also, it has been stated that the WTO “sanctioning power tends to favour large economies 
over smaller ones”595. In addition, another stated that “as a practical matter trade sanctions 
can probably only be adopted by developed country Members advanced developing 
countries”596. Similarly, in 2007 the WTO World Trade Report stated that:  
In applying retaliatory measures, large countries can cause economic harm to the 
party found not to be in compliance with its obligations . . . conversely, small 
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countries, in view of their limited size are unable to exert sufficient pressure on 
larger Members to alter their behaviour
597
.  
 
Therefore, regarding the retaliation rules, developing countries may not prefer to use the 
retaliation methods to require any large countries to comply with the DSU rules. So, 
developing countries with a weak position to use the retaliation rules may be constrained 
from participation in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
4.2.2.7.2 The opposite result  
 
The experience of developing country with WTO retaliation demonstrates that when the 
developing countries can request the WTO retaliation, compliance may not be achieved. 
While the developing countries have imposed retaliatory measures, the concern that it is 
“both ineffective for, and harmful to, the relevant developing countries”598 may remain. 
 
On several occasions, commentators and various developing countries have argued that the 
‘suspension of trade concessions’ might be harmful to developing countries rather than the 
large, non-complying WTO Members and the shortcomings in retaliation rules may 
“undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing countries” 599 . It is 
thought
600
 that developing countries may harm themselves on issues of consumer and 
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economic welfare
601
 by imposing retaliation rules and withdrawing tariff concessions for 
large developed country WTO Members. 
 
It has been stated that the suspension of concessions are against the principles of the WTO 
system
602. Also, the policy of the suspension of concessions amounts to “shooting oneself in 
the foot”603. The retaliation rules have been argued against by developing countries and some 
commentators. The argument appears that the retaliation rules may skew against developing 
countries and undermines the benefit of the WTO dispute settlement system for these 
countries
604
. The LDC Group, in the context of DSU Review negotiations, stated that the 
“lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and the potential impact of retaliatory measures 
for poor economies is well documented”605. It has similarly been stated that the reality is 
“developing-country Members cannot practically utilise this ultimate sanction”606 as “they 
would probably suffer further injury if they adopted retaliatory measures”607.  
 
Some developing countries have concerns about using the retaliation rules of the DSU. The 
truth of this concern was apparent when Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) attempted to 
retaliate against the United States and Ecuador applied for retaliation against the United 
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States and the EC
608
. Indeed, Antigua and Barbuda is a small island with a small amount of 
natural resources. It is heavily dependent on imports, 50 per cent of which are from the 
United States. Therefore, restrictions would create a “disproportionate adverse impact on 
Antigua and Barbuda by making these products and services materially more expensive to the 
citizens of the country”609. So, it has been agreed that the retaliatory restrictions on goods and 
services that come from the United States would have “a much greater negative impact on 
Antigua and Barbuda than it would on the United States”610. 
 
In Ecuador’s application for retaliation against the EC, the Arbitrator pointed out that: 
‘In situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from 
the other party, it may happen that the suspension of certain concessions or 
certain other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party seeking 
suspension of concessions than for the other party’611. 
 
It has been stated that “perhaps the biggest disadvantage of WTO sanctions is that they bite 
the country imposing the sanction”612. Therefore, it has been observed that, in practice, 
developing countries may face problems when they attempt to create countermeasures
613
 as 
the countermeasures might be an unsuccessful tool in their hands
614
.  
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Trade retaliation involving developing countries against developed (industrialised) countries 
has been classify by developing countries as that it is not available to them
615
 and it has 
proven ‘counterproductive’ as it “would mostly harm the former, not induce compliance”616. 
Therefore, it has been argued that “countermeasures are a more or less ineffective instrument 
in the hands of 'smaller' players”617 and that “there is indeed a practical problem for small 
countries and developing countries when they attempt to carry through with effective 
retaliation within the WTO system”618. 
 
 
Regarding the economic aspect, retaliation may harmful to the retaliating countries. Some 
scholars have stated that retaliating countries often results against them because retaliation 
may “increase prices for consumers and reduce general welfare in the country” 619 . The 
problems of retaliation as a mechanism to induce compliance may be more effective for 
developing countries. The retaliation may have large effects on countries that already have 
weak economies. Developing countries that decide to stop accessing foreign goods will make 
“those goods more expensive for their domestic customers”620. That will create a risk to their 
own “economic development and position in world markets”621. Indeed, the Consultative 
Board to the WTO Director-General in the Sutherland Report
622
 indicated that the belief that 
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“poorer WTO Members . . . normally cannot effectively use the weapon of retaliation’ is 
certainly justified” 623 . However, retaliation 624  can “achieve the goal of removing the 
violation”625 or at least “obtaining other equivalent trade opportunities in compensation”626.  
 
The analysis of WTO sanctions trade measures, suspending concessions or other obligations, 
is “conceived primarily as a rebalancing tool to be used”627 when the agreed-upon balance of 
benefits and obligations were altered by a challenged measure “although analysts already 
recognized a sanction potential”628. However, in the WTO the suspension may be considered 
as “conceived primarily as a sanction, while the rebalancing idea retains vestigial influence’, 
and the purpose of this sanction is to induce compliance with the rules”629. It is thought that 
the actual purpose of retaliation is to rebalance concessions and inducing compliance with the 
rules and ensure the DSB recommendations are binding
630
.  
 
The retaliation may have large effects on countries that already have weak economies when 
developing countries decide to stop accessing foreign goods that will make “those goods 
more expensive for their domestic customers”631. Also, that will create a risk regarding their 
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own “economic development and position in world markets”632. Consequently, it is thought 
that developing countries may harm themselves by imposing sanctions retaliation rather than 
large WTO Members.  
 
4.2.2.7.3 Lack of enforcing the WTO DSU decisions   
 
The link between the WTO retaliation rules and the utility of WTO dispute settlement is 
based on one of the ‘main attractions’ of the WTO dispute settlement system principle, in that 
“it explicitly envisages remedies in the event of continued non-compliance when a country 
loses a dispute settlement procedure” 633 .  It has been argued that the participation of 
developing countries in WTO dispute settlement, with an inability to effectively retaliate, is 
not equal to developed countries
634
. Regarding the utility of the WTO dispute settlement 
system for developing countries
635
, there are some studies and commentaries that argue that 
the ability to force the retaliation rules is considered as a significant element for ensuring that 
the WTO Members comply with dispute settlement rulings
636
. Also, it has been found that in 
WTO disputes, “substantial evidence that the threat of retaliation is an important influence 
determining a defendant country's ability to credibly commit to liberalisation”637. The study 
found that “the successful economic resolution to disputes is influenced by the concern for 
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retaliation”638 . Another study determined that “implementation is much more likely in a 
developed against developing country scenario than vice-versa”639. The WTO World Trade 
Report for 2007 established that “retaliation fails to deter economically powerful countries 
from committing a violation against small countries”640. 
 
Therefore, there is a little attention to developing countries’ in participation in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings because they cannot impose rulings of the WTO DSU against 
developed countries. Indeed, regarding the retaliation rules, the important factor for limiting 
developing countries’ participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is the lack of 
power of WTO DSU rulings.  The rulings of the WTO dispute settlement can be broken in 
any dispute, by any large WTO Member, “if developing countries do not have the capacity to 
retaliate credibly”641. 
  
There are also studies find that the workings of the WTO DSU have many problems
642
. In 
addition, the position of Members in complying with rulings has been illustrated by another 
study
643
. The study determined that “of 109 panel and Appellate Body reports adopted, 90 per 
cent found violations of WTO law, and that in virtually all of these cases the WTO Member 
found to be in violation” 644 . Therefore, the high rate of violations with WTO dispute 
settlement rulings may create limitations on the utility of the WTO dispute settlement system 
for developing countries because developed countries are violating WTO law. So, this could 
                                                 
 
638
 Ibid.at 4. 
639
 See Bagwell et al. 2004 at 14-15. 
640
  See, WTO, World Trade Report 2007, at 284. 
641
 Nottage, H., (2009) “Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System”. 
642
 See Bagwell et al. 2004 at 4. 
643
 Wilson, B., (2007), ‘Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings’.p.397. 
644
 Ibid. 
158 
 
 
lead to developing countries using the DSB less because they cannot enforce rulings of the 
DSU against developed countries. A study established that developed country Members 
“have a manifestly worse record of compliance with WTO dispute settlement system DSB 
rulings”645, particularly in disputes where the complaining state was a small or developing 
country rather than a complaint by a developed country
646
. So, it can be expected that the 
smaller or developing countries will have low rates of compliance with rulings even while 
considering that the retaliation is a significant factor for the compliance with rulings. When 
economically large, developed countries are defendants and when they are not willing to 
comply with unfavourable rulings, that reveals the weaknesses of the WTO retaliation rules 
and will create limitations on the utility of the WTO dispute settlement system for developing 
countries.  
 
It has been observed that developing countries may not have the freedom to decide whether 
to meet or not meet the terms of the DSB decision. They have weak economies and that 
would place the developing countries in poor position. One of the developing countries’ 
experts has clearly stated that “developing countries do not have the luxury of choosing 
whether to comply or not”647. Robert Hudec observed that “enforcement is a more complex 
process than mere retaliation”648  and he proposed that “governments comply with WTO 
dispute settlement rulings for a multitude of reasons of which retaliation is often not a key 
                                                 
 
645
 Nottage, H., (2009) “Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System”. 
646
 Malacrida, R., (2008) ‘Towards sounder and fairer WTO retaliation: Suggestions for possible additional 
procedural rules governing members' preparation and adoption of retaliatory measures’.p.20. 
647
 Ierley, D., (2002) ‘Defining the factors that influence developing country compliance with and participation 
in the WTO dispute settlement system: Another look at the dispute over bananas’. 
648
 Nottage, H., (2008), “Evaluating the Critique that WTO Retaliation Rules undermine the utility of WTO 
Dispute Settlement for Developing Countries”.  
159 
 
 
ingredient”649. Therefore, they have to accept the DSB decision to avoid retaliation from the 
large countries. However, it has observed that both developing countries and the least 
developed countries do not prefer to initiate retaliation proceedings against developed 
countries in the WTO dispute settlement system as a result of their economic and political 
weakness
650
. 
 
The difficulty of enforcing dispute settlement decisions, particularly in disputes involving 
developed countries, is one of the fundamental complaints of developing countries
651
. 
Whereas the Appellate Body rulings indicate that a WTO obligation has been violated by the 
defending party, the WTO cannot induce any offending party to remove the trade measure or 
“even pass an injunction to stop the measure from functioning”652. Indeed, the DSU enforces 
its ruling by allowing the complaining party to erect retaliatory trade barriers against the 
offending party that will lead the offending party to comply with the DSU ruling. However, 
the enforcement of the DSU through retaliation has been criticized since the retaliation 
creates exacerbates the problem by decreasing trade for both parties and can even be 
eventually counterproductive for the winning party
653
. In general, the enforcement regime 
“does not restore the [trade] balance lost, not does it encourage compliance, but rather tends 
to inflict greater injury on the complaining party” 654 . It has been considered that the 
developing countries are the most disadvantaged by reliance on retaliation as a result of their 
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smaller size and fragile economies
655
. Also, developing countries will be more adversely 
affected where retaliation is self-defeating
656
. Therefore, developing country retaliatory 
countermeasures against a developed country will tend to have a relatively smaller impact 
than developed country retaliation
657
. It has been claimed that the economies of some 
developing countries “are small and therefore measures restricting their exports even if 
imposed for short periods will cause them serious injury,”658 while the size and variety of a 
developed country’s economy are better to deal with relatively insignificant retaliation by a 
developing country. In Bananas case, as an example, the WTO obligations
659
 were violated 
by a U.S. trade measure. The U.S. easily absorbed the impact of Ecuador’s retaliation and 
“took a further 30 months to comply with the ruling after the expiry of the reasonable period 
of 15 months established by the DSB and easily withstood 27 months of retaliatory 
measures” 660 . Therefore, the DSU retaliation for enforcement rulings may provide only 
prospective remedies. However, it may create a reason to violate WTO obligations “since an 
offending Member only has to stop violating”661. So, developing countries might suffer a 
more serious harm than developed countries. Therefore, developing countries may face a 
limit on the utility of the WTO dispute settlement system. When economically large, 
developed countries are defendants and when they are not willing to comply with 
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unfavourable rulings, that reveals the weaknesses of the WTO retaliation rules and will create 
limitations on the utility of the WTO dispute settlement system for developing countries. 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses and highlights the significant factors regarding the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. The impact of retaliation was 
illustrated and was demonstrated to be among the most significant constraints that limit the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO DSB. This part analysed the retaliation and 
cross retaliation rules that discourage developing countries from pursuing legitimate claims 
under the DSB, and assessed whether an ability to effectively retaliate is a key determinant 
for WTO Members’ compliance with dispute settlement rulings. Also, it evaluated whether 
the retaliation rules undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing 
countries. It revealed the statistical evidence of WTO Members using the dispute settlement 
system, particularly when developing countries are involved.  
 
This chapter also evaluated the experience of developing countries with retaliation and cross 
retaliation. First of all, it examined the cases in which countries had recourse to retaliation, in 
particular as regards developing countries. The analysis of the constraints facing developing 
countries was based on three arguments: first of all, developing countries, with small 
domestic markets, cannot impose sufficient economic or political losses upon the larger WTO 
Members to generate vital pressure to induce compliance. Secondly, retaliation (‘suspension 
of concessions’) might be more detrimental to a developing country applying retaliation 
rather than a developed country WTO Member targeted by it. Thirdly, WTO rulings cannot 
be effectively enforced by developing countries, therefore developing countries have little 
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incentive to use WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The above analysis leads to the 
following conclusion no one has found a solution for the lack of retaliation that has happened 
frequently in practice and has been already reported by the WTO Members as factors limiting 
the participation of developing countries in the DSB. 
 
4.3 Duration of the DSB Process and Compensation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
The following section analyses and evaluates the duration of the DSB process and 
compensation method, to assess whether these features of the DSB significantly impact upon 
developing countries’ use of the DSB. First of all, the duration of the dispute resolution 
process will be highlighted and the constraint will be evaluated. Also, the DSU’s dispute 
resolution process will be described and the constraint will be analysed. It will reveal the 
DSU process in practice as well as the position of developing countries under the current 
DSU process. Therefore, the DSU process will be analysed in the different stages of WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings which delay litigation and therefore create a dilemma for 
developing countries participating in those proceedings. Secondly, compensation under the 
DSU, and the constraint this places on developing countries, will be analysed and evaluated, 
to examine the reasons why the remedy of compensation is rarely used. First of all, 
compensation has to be voluntary. The disputing parties have to agree on the solution. 
Second, compensation has to be consistent with the covered agreements. Third, compensation 
might not provide an efficient reparation of damages. This may affect developing countries in 
practice in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
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4.3.2 Duration Dispute Resolution Process 
4.3.2.1 Evaluation of the constraint 
 
The WTO created the DSB and the dispute settlement system to hear any claims between 
WTO Members on the subject of concerning their right and violations of WTO rules
662
. The 
DSB includes all the membership of the WTO. In the DSU, if any member decides to bring a 
complaint against any other members, the complaining party has to raise a dispute to the DSB 
and request consultation. Indeed, the disputing parties have to hold in the consultation phase 
for a minimum sixty days
663
. However, if the consultation stage fails to solve the disputes in 
that time, the complaining members can request a panel to hear the dispute
664
. Hence, when 
the DSB receives the request for a panel, it has to take action to begin the adjudicative 
process. The panel will take place “unless there is a consensus among the members of the 
DSB, including the interested parties, not to do so”665. 
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After the consultation stage, the DSU has two stages for the adjudicative process to settle the 
dispute and the parties can settle the dispute at any of these stages
666
. The first stage is called 
the ‘adjudication’ phase. In this stage, the three panellists have to be established by the DSB. 
These three panellists 
667
 receive evidence from both sides of the dispute and make a decision 
under the facts and law. The panel stage is designed not to take longer than six months
668
, 
while in complex disputes the timeline is exceeded by the panels
669
. In this stage, the initial 
panel decision/report is circulated to the parties and they have a chance to make suggestions 
or comments
670
 on that report. The final report is submitted to the DSB and accepted by 
reverse consensus, unless there is consensus against the report
671
 or any party announces that 
it intends to apply for appeal
672
. 
 
The second stage of the adjudicative process is the appeal. In this stage, either or both parties 
to the dispute can appeal the decision to the Appellate Body
673
. In this stage, the appeals 
process takes no longer than sixty days maximum, or ninety days in exceptional cases
674
. 
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However, in many cases the appeals process takes longer than ninety days
675
. The Appellate 
Body’s decision is considered as final in the adjudication phase676 and as a result of that, the 
Appellate Body does not have the power to “remand a case to the adjudicatory panel for 
rehearing or to make additional evidentiary findings”677. In the DSB, the Appellate Body 
report votes to adopt by the reverse consensus rule
678
. When the report of the Appellate Body 
decides that the respondent member violated the WTO agreements
679
, the respondent has to 
announce its intention to comply
680
. The DSB can provide the responding member with a 
reasonable period of time to comply with the ruling, but not longer than fifteen months
681
. 
 
The fourth stage of the dispute resolution process is the ‘compliance’ phase. In this stage, the 
responding member reports to the DSB about the action that it has taken to apply the 
ruling
682
. The respondent party can claim that it is in compliance with the DSU ruling by 
taking action to alter the challenged the WTO agreements
683
. Indeed, the complaining party 
can “request a compliance panel to evaluate the sufficiency of the respondent state’s 
actions”684 if it disagrees with the responding action in compliance. In the compliance stage, 
either party or both can appeal the compliance panel’s decision to the Appellate Body. When 
the Appellate Body finds a violation of the WTO rules, the DSB can recommend asking the 
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respondent member to comply with the Appellate Body’s decision within a reasonable period 
of time
685
. 
 
In the compliance stage, the DSU text provides for the compliance panel to monitor the 
respondent member’s compliance with the DSB decision, but without providing any 
timeframe for compliance
686
. In fact, the uncertainty of the compliance panel timeframe has 
been referred to as the “sequencing problem”687. The WTO Members have “engaged in 
multilateral negotiations to resolve the dilemma for over a decade, but without resolution”688. 
 
In fact, the compliance stage is a significant stage when it is considered as a ‘remedy stage’. 
After the compliance stage, when the respondent party is still in violation of the WTO 
agreements, the complaining party has the authority to request the DSB to authorize the 
suspension of trade benefits to the respondent member
689
. After the adjudication and 
compliance phases, the complaining party can only retaliate by suspending trade concessions 
to the respondent state
690
. The panel can authorise the form of the trade suspension, in the 
same or a different sector as the violation, but within the same agreement. Also, the panel can 
                                                 
 
685
 The compliance panel consists of three adjudication panels and they may selected by the dispute parties. 
686
 See DSU Article 21. Indeed, it is not clear when the compliance phase should be initiated; See Mavroidis, P., 
(2000),'Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place',. For example Article 22.2 of 
the DSU has recourse by the United States in European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/43 (Jan. 14, 1999).  
687
 Valles, C. M., & McGivern, B. P., (2000). The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement.The 
“Sequencing Problem”. Journal of World Trade, 34(2), 63-84. 
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 Brewster, R., (2011), The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement. 
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 See DSU Article 22. 
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 Ibid. See Lester, S., Mercurio, B., Davies, A. & Leitner, K,. (2008), World Trade Law; Text, Materials and 
Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford. They discuss the dispute over sequencing between the European 
Communities and the United States. The DSB adopts the panel’s ruling by reverse consensus. Also, it authorizes 
the complaining government to suspend trade concessions by the panel. The DSB could establish a panel to 
appear the limit extent and forms of the suspension.  
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determent the level of sanctions which nullifies or impairs the benefits of the complainant 
under the agreement.  
 
To sum up, regarding the time periods of litigation in the WTO, the average proceedings is 15 
months from “the date of establishment of the panel to the date the DSB considers the panel 
report for adoption”691. Appendix 2 indicates the time periods of litigation in the WTO. 
However, this time surpasses the general rule of the DSU’s Article 20, which states that ‘the 
period from the date of establishment of the panel by the DSB until the date the DSB 
considers the panel or appellate report for adoption shall as a general rule not exceed nine 
months’ where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months where the report is appealed’692. 
Moreover, a minimum period of two months is required to include formal consultations for 
panel proceedings
693
. Also, the respondent can appeal the initial panel decision to the 
Appellate Body, which will add three months more to the litigation process. Indeed, the DSU 
process is considered to be a lengthy process for settling disputes
694
. 
 
4.3.2.2 Analysis of the constraint 
 
Under the DSU, Article 3.3 states that ‘the prompt settlement of situations [disputes] . . . is 
essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance 
                                                 
 
691
 See Nottage, H., (2009) “Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System”. Indeed, for all 
disputes adopted by the DSB the average number of days between the establishment of the panel and the date of 
consideration of the panel report for adoption may be almost 469 days. 
692
 See DSU Article 20. 
693
 See Nottage, H., (2009) “Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System”. Pursuant to Article 
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However, pursuant to Articles 4.3 and 4.6 of the DSU, this period may be shorter, between 10 and 60 days in the 
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request, or the relevant Members agreed that the consultation has failed to settle the dispute. 
694
 See Nottage, H., (2009) “Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System”. 
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between the rights and obligations of Members’695. However, the delay in proceedings of the 
DSU is considered to be one of the major factors reducing litigation in the DSU, because 
“experience to date suggests that one problem with the WTO dispute settlement system is that 
in too many cases, it takes too long to resolve disputes”696. It has been noted, by a WTO 
Member in the context of DSU review, that time savings in the WTO dispute settlement 
procedures are desirable
697
. The delay is a major concern for WTO Members because there is 
no compensation for damages under the DSU during the dispute resolution process
698
. 
Indeed, through the DSU, WTO Members are not provided with a remedy for the “injuries 
incurred from the time of the violation to the authorization to suspend concessions”699, while 
in the domestic litigation, the damages are “traced to and calculated from the beginning of a 
violation and subject to interest”700. 
 
There are some academic discussions that the complex cases may take longer to resolve
701
. If 
the case is complex naturally, the complaint takes longer to resolve, but “complexity is not 
entirely exogenous to the litigation strategy of the parties”702. There are some cases that are 
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 See DSU Article 3.3. 
696
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702
 Brewster, R. (2011), The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement.  
169 
 
 
inherently more complex than others, although sometimes that complexity comes from the 
selection and presentation by the parties
703
. The respondent parties offer more defences and 
more documents submitted to the panel, so the case becomes a more complex dispute. 
Indeed, many respondent members have learned how to increase the complexity of a case to 
delay the time of adjudication
704
. Therefore, the respondent member benefits from the policy 
of a longer period of time of the DSU without “exposing itself to a higher damage award”705 
because of the gap providing no remedy for the damages sustained during the DSU 
proceedings. The following part analyses the DSU process in practice. 
 
4.3.2.3 The DSU Process in Practice 
 
In practice, it has been observed that the DSU process is often lengthy
706
. It is thought that 
the three separate phases of the dispute resolution make the process lengthier,
707
 since it can 
take a year and a half for a dispute to conclude
708
. The WTO itself claims that the system of 
dispute resolution is a fast system, by stating that 
“The [Uruguay Round] agreement introduced a more structured process. The 
Agreement emphasizes that prompt settlement of disputes is essential if the WTO 
is to function effectively. It sets out in considerable detail the procedures and the 
timetable to be followed in resolving disputes. If a case runs its full course to a 
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704
 See Horlick, G., & Coleman, J., (2007), The Compliance Problems of the WTO, Arizona journal of 
International Comparative Law 24(1), pp. 141-142. (“Even assuming, charitably, that all WTO Members act in 
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first ruling, it should not normally take more than one year-15 months if the case 
is appealed”709.  
 
However, there are many cases which take longer than fifteen months to complete. For 
example, the Airbus and Boeing subsidy disputes took more than five years. The United 
States and the EC both filed complaints about domestic subsidies for the aircraft industries
710
. 
Finally, they requested a panel to hear the case. The EC’s requested for a panel was in 
January 2006
711
. The United States’ request was in May 2005. However, the initial ruling was 
issued by the Airbus panel on June 30, 2010, five years later
712
. The EC declared that it is 
intention to appeal and the WTO Appellate Body stated that it expects delays in issuing its 
ruling
713
. Five years after the panel was established, in January 2011, the Boeing panel issued 
its report
714
. Both the Airbus and Boeing cases failed to meet the time limits set out in the 
DSU. 
 
Under the DSB, there are several cases that have taken over fifteen months to settle. To 
explain the clear statistical evidence of the overall extent of the delays under the DSU, Table 
4.3 provides statistics on the process time of dispute from the adoption of a panel to the 
DSB’s adoption of the report throughout three different periods: (1) the first five years of 
operation of the DSU (1995-1999), (2) the second five years (2000-2004) and (3) the third 
                                                 
 
709
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five year period (2005-2009)
715
. Also, Table 4.3 and figure 4.1 present the time process from 
establishing a panel to adopting the DSB’s report for four types of timeframes: (1) panel with 
an appeal; (2) panel without an appeal; (3) compliance with an appeal; and (4) compliance 
without an appeal.  
 
The DSB adopts the panel report after it is issued
716
, if the parties to the dispute do not 
appeal
717
. However, when the parties to the dispute apply for appeal, the DSB adopts the 
report only after the Appellate Body report is issued
718
. This procedure applies for all stages 
of the dispute resolution process
719
. The DSU rules provide that when the parties do not 
appeal
720
, the dispute should take nine months, or twelve months at the extreme, from “the 
establishment of the panel to the adoption of the report by the DSB”721. However, when the 
parties appeal from the panel report, it should not take longer than twelve months, or sixteen 
months at the extreme
722
. 
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 Data is from WorldTradeLaw.net statistics on WTO dispute resolution.,WorldTradeLaw.net-The Online 
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Table 4.3: Average Time for Completing Dispute Resolution Stage
723
 
 
Average Time Average Time  
for  
Initial Panel 
(without appeal) 
Average Time  
for  
Initial Panel  
(with appeal) 
Average Time  
for  
Compliance 
Panel (without 
appeal) 
 
Average Time  
for  
Compliance 
Panel (with 
appeal) 
 
Average Time; 
First  
Five years 
(1999-2003) 
 
14.0 Months 
(426 Days) 
13 Cases 
16.7 Months 
(510 Days) 
42 Cases 
5.1 Months 
(157 Days) 
3 Cases 
7.8 Months 
(239 Days) 
2 Cases 
Average Time; 
Second  
Five years 
(2004-2008) 
16.1 Months 
(492 Days) 
19 Cases 
19.6 Months 
(593 Days) 
32 Cases 
9.9 Months 
(303 Days) 
3 Cases 
12.1 Months 
(370 Days) 
6 Cases 
Average Time; 
Third  
Five years 
(2005-2009) 
 
17.0 Months 
(520 Days) 
9 Cases 
24.9 Months 
(759 Days) 
13 Cases 
9.5 Months 
(290 Days) 
2 Cases 
16.2 Months 
(495 Days) 
11 Cases 
 
Figure 4.1: Average Time (days) for Completing Dispute Resolution Stages
724
  
 
 
                                                 
 
723
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Regarding Table 4.3, the DSU has been failing to meet the timeline for settling the dispute. 
Also, the DSU tends to take a long time for completing a dispute for all stages of the dispute 
resolution. In all three periods, the average time from establishing a panel to adopting a panel 
report is almost over nine months. Regarding the time period 1995-1999, the average time for 
adopting a panel report was almost fourteen months. The average time in 2000-2004 was 
more than sixteen months. In the period 2005-2009, the average time was more than 
seventeen months, which is approximately twice the time assigned by the DSU. The DSU 
also tends to have delays in the appeals process. The average times for the appeal stage in the 
three stages were more than twelve months. In the 1995-1999, the average times for adopting 
an Appellate Body report was greater than sixteen months. In the period 2005-2009, the 
average time was almost twenty-five months, which is more than double the time allocated 
by the DSU. 
 
Regarding the compliance stage, there are delays in the time for adjudication for panels and 
appeals. In 1995-1999, the compliance panel report without appeal took five months on 
average and more than seven months for appeals that were adopted by the DSB. In the 2005-
2009, the process took 9.5 months from the establishment of the compliance panel to the 
adoption of the panel’s report, with no appeal and with appeals taking more than 16 months. 
 
Article 21.5 does not provide for the role of the compliance panel or even when the role of 
compliance hearing would be served or when the compliance report can be appealed to the 
Appellate Body. Therefore, under Article 21.5, respondents have learned to create delays in 
the dispute resolution process through the increased use of compliance panels. The 
application of Article 21.5 as regards the use and timing of a compliance panel is still a 
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matter of argument
725. It has been described as ‘careless’ due to it not providing the clear role 
of the compliance stage
726
. 
 
In the first five years of the DSU, the respondent member did not often request the 
compliance panel
727
. However, the requests for a compliance panel have increased over time, 
as have appeals of the compliance panel reports to the Appellate Body
728
. Using the 
compliance stage of the DSU extends the time between the violation occurring and the 
suspension of concessions
729
. Table 4.4 provides data on the disputes requesting compliance 
panels and those requesting appeals
730
. 
 
Table 4.4: Compliance Panels and Appeals
731
 
 
Average 
Time 
Compliance 
Panel 
report  
(without 
appeal) 
Compliance  
Panel 
(with appeal) 
Percentage 
Appealed 
 
Average Time 
for Compliance 
Panel 
(without 
appeal) 
Average Time 
for Compliance 
Panel (with 
appeal) 
Average 
Time;  
First Five 
years  
(1999-2003) 
3 2 40% 5.1 months (157 
days) 
7.8 months (239 
days) 
Average 
Time; 
Second Five 
years 
(2004-2008) 
3 5 63% 11.8 months 
(360 days) 
12.0 months 
(364 days) 
                                                 
 
725
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726
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727
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728
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729
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Average 
Time; 
Third Five 
years 
(2005-2009) 
2 8 80% 9.5 months (290 
days) 
16.0 months 
(487 days) 
 
 
Table 4.4 classifies data regarding the initial compliance panel requested by the relevant 
Member. This classification provides an indication as to how the member learnt the strategies 
of navigating the DSU. Also, they had experience with this system
732
. Indeed, members learn 
from previous cases, such as using the compliance panels. For example, in the EC and 
Ecuador banana dispute
733
, the DSU did not received a request for a compliance panel by the 
EC until December 15, 1998. However, it has been suggested that this delay was not because 
of the lack of litigation or because the procedure was new
734
. In that time, the DSU had 
issued eighteen panel reports and fifteen Appellate Body reports
735
. After the EC requested 
the compliance panel, the DSB established four compliance panels within a year’s time736. 
 
The other way to analyse WTO Members’ use of the compliance panels is to divide it into 
five-year time periods. This use started from the EC request for a compliance panel in the 
European Communities-Bananas (Ecuador) dispute, and as a result of that, the WTO 
Members had fully understood that the “compliance panels could be part of the dispute 
resolution process after the EC made such a request in December 1998”737. Therefore, Table 
                                                 
 
732
 See Levy, J. S., (1994),“Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”, International 
Organization 48(2), pp. 279-312. 
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 See European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas III). 
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Trade Organization 2015: Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS27, European Communities-Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, available from:  
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4.5 provides the information on using the compliance panels and the appeal process during 
the first five years (1999–2003) and second five years (2004–2009) of the DSU. 
 
Table 4.5: Compliance Panel and Appeals
738
 
 
Average 
Time  
Compliance 
Panel report 
(without appeal) 
Compliance 
Panel 
(with 
appeal) 
Percentage 
Appealed 
 
Average 
Time for  
Compliance 
Panel  
(without 
appeal) 
 
Average Time 
for Compliance 
Panel  
(with  
appeal) 
 
Average 
Time; 
First  
Five 
years 
(1999-
2003) 
3 7 70% 5.1 months 
(157 days) 
10.8 months 
(329 days) 
Average 
Time; 
Second  
Five 
years  
(2004-
2008) 
4 8 67% 10.7 months 
(325 days) 
16.0 months 
(487 days) 
 
 
Table 4.5 indicates the greater use of the compliance panels and appeals. Indeed, the average 
time to complete the compliance procedure increased. Table 4.5 demonstrates that the WTO 
Members understand that the compliance panels and appeals can be part of the DSU process 
and extend the time of that process. Consequently, the respondent can use these procedures to 
delay the process. 
 
                                                 
 
738
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Not all complaints go through the full process of the DSU. However, there are some members 
using the DSU process as an option to delay the settlement. There are some WTO Members 
that may resolve their dispute in good faith without delaying the process, but the delaying 
process might be attractive for some members. 
 
Indeed, WTO Members have learned how to delay the adjudicatory phase of the DSU even 
before the panel and Appellate Body
739
. The members have learned that they can extend the 
dispute solution process by requesting a compliance panel and appeal after the adjudicatory 
stage. The dispute resolution process takes longer, particularly when the respondent appeals 
both the initial panel report and the compliance panel report
740
. For example, the WTO 
authorized trade retaliation in the United States-Subsidies for Upland Cotton dispute
741
. In 
this dispute, the total time between the composition of the initial merits panel and the DSB’s 
authorisation of the trade sanction was six and half years
742
. 
 
4.3.2.4 Position of Developing Countries under the DSU Process  
 
The length of the DSU proceedings is one of the concerns of developing countries. Several 
developing countries have stated that the DSU proceedings are extremely lengthy without 
offering expeditious solutions
743
. Also, they have argued that the capacity of DSU for 
litigation lengthens in each stage of the process. While Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes that 
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the system has to lead to a prompt and effective settlement, it is a lengthy process. Indeed, the 
time period of the DSU process from the request for consultations to the report of the 
Appellate Body normally takes a period of about 15 months. It also includes ten months for 
the ‘reasonable period of time’ to the implementation of recommendations744. Moreover, the 
complainants may wait two years for the achievement of satisfaction against a WTO 
inconsistent measure. The complainants may also wait a long time for the respondent party to 
comply with the DSU’s decision745. 
 
The time of the WTO litigation should not limit developing countries’ participation in the 
DSU
746, however, the length of the DSU’s process has been analysed and it was found that 
“the delays do make the system less attractive to businesses and could in the long run lead to 
less and less use of the system”747. Indeed, developing countries are highly dependent on 
annual revenues for survival, but challenging a trade barrier through the WTO dispute 
settlement process, taking several years to settle a dispute, and having limited resources for 
litigating in the WTO, all leads to limitations on the participation of developing countries in 
the DSU
748
. As noted above, the average length of the DSU process exceeds the period time 
provided by the DSU, particularly during the panel stage. It has been observed that there are 
two situations that may lengthen the process. First, regarding legally and politically complex 
cases, there is a lengthening of the process when the parties to the dispute “suspend the 
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proceedings and seek to achieve a negotiated settlement”749. The second is when either the 
panel or the parties are using different official languages
750
, thus requiring more time for the 
translation of documents
751
. For instance, there are cases where both parties are Spanish-
speaking, but “the responding party has insisted on including English-speaking experts on the 
panel as a means of lengthening the proceedings by adding time for translation”752. Indeed, 
with more time and lack of remedies in the DSU, it will encourage many developing 
countries to avoid participating in the DSU
753
.  
 
Under the DSU, there is a time limit for enforcing the DSU decision
754
. Article 21 permits a 
member a ‘reasonable period of time’ for enforcing that decision755. The Article clarifies that 
the period shall not normally exceed fifteen months after the DSU adopts the decision
756
. 
During that reasonable period, the respondent will be under ‘surveillance’ by the DSU757. 
Also, Article 21 indicates that the respondent has to present the ‘status report’ at all 
procedural meetings of the DSU
758. Thus, when the fifteen months of the ‘reasonable period 
of time’ elapse and the complaint is not satisfied with the means of the implementation ruling 
by the respondent, the complainant has a right to ask another panel to examine the case
759
. 
The time period depends on the situation and consideration by the panel, so it may be longer 
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“depending upon the particular circumstances”760. However, such a long process without a 
guarantee adopted for safeguarding developing countries’ interests761 will be problematic and 
dangerous for them
762
. 
 
Fifteen months is considered to be a long time for developing countries
763
. Certainly, the 
situation is dependent on the respondent to remove the inconsistent measures
764
. In practice, 
as noted above, while the DSU was designed to be a quick process, the DSU can take more 
than three years to resolve a case
765
. Therefore, the South Centre suggested that when the 
ruling of the DSU is for developing countries against developed counties, the implementation 
ruling should be under the initial panels’ surveillance766. Also, the appeals process has to be 
reduced from 90-days to 30 days
767
, without the imposition of any further procedural 
obligation
768
. So, stronger rules have to be introduced in the DSU, and the panel and appellate 
body should make “detailed suggestions concerning the manner of implementation”769. This 
will avoid the “deliberate delay of the proceedings by respondents”770 and ensure that the 
strict timeframe is effective. 
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In practice, while the DSU was designed to be a quick process, the DSU can take several 
years to dispute a case
771
. For example, in the Bananas dispute, the European Union and 
Ecuador
772
 were expected to end the lengthy process of the DSU on 1 January 2006. In 
March 2007, Colombia requested consultations with the European Union
773
. However, the 
consultation was unsuccessful. Therefore, Colombia asked to use the good offices of the 
Director-General provided by Article 3.12 of the DSU
774
. Indeed, the reason for accepting the 
good offices of the Director-General is because it may allow for a rapid settlement of a 
dispute that had been taken a long time in proceedings at the WTO
775
. On 2 November 2007, 
after the consultations failed, the case was referred to the Director-General. The disputing 
parties expressed their “preference for a negotiated settlement rather than judicial 
proceedings”776. In July 2009, the Director-General provided a draft agreement for settling 
the dispute. On 15 December 2009, the parties, the European Union and the Latin American 
banana exporters, attained a settlement by two agreements
777
. In sum, it may be considered 
that the Latin American states escaped from the length of the DSU process. Also, they have 
created solutions to reduce the problem by using “the good offices of the Director-General” 
in the bananas case
778
. 
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The party breaching the WTO may continue to cause injury during the dispute settlement 
process, but the remedy provided under WTO procedures is only prospective. Therefore, it is 
not possible to order the payment of indemnification or compensation for injury incurred 
during the DSU procedures even if the party wins the case. There is an agreement in the 
academic area for the need to improve compensation, but these suggestions have not led to 
actions to reform the compensation problem
779
. 
 
4.3.3 Compensation 
4.3.3.1 Evaluation of the constraint 
 
It is believed that compensation is one of the main factors for developing countries entering 
into the WTO dispute settlement system. Also, it is considered as one of the significant parts 
that may support the DSU being useful for all WTO Members
780. Indeed, the DSU’s ruling 
and recommendations may include compensation for the winning party when the losing party 
does not comply with the ruling of the DSB
781
. Indeed, compensation is considered as a   
remedy for developing countries attempting to make the defending party comply with the 
DSU’s decision782. Also, compensation may be a remedy in case any Member fails to bring 
the measure into conformity
783
. However, according to Article 3.7 of the DSU, compensation 
is considered as a temporary measure to be offered when “immediate withdrawal of the 
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measure is not possible”784. If a developed country fails to withdraw a measure or does not 
provide compensation to a developing country to “make up for the loss suffered . . . from the 
continuation of the offending measure” 785 , this will lessen the number of developing 
countries entering into the WTO dispute settlement system. Also, it has been observed that 
the DSU decision without compensation would lead to less entering into the WTO dispute 
settlement system
786
. 
 
In the DSU, the first step for settling any dispute is the consultation. The complaining 
member can request consultations to settle the dispute amicably without entry into the formal 
dispute settlement procedure. If the consultation stage fails to settle a case, the disputing party 
can request the establishment of a Panel stage. The Panel considers the submissions of both 
of the parties. Its recommended remedy (if the complainant wins) is for the withdrawal of the 
measure in violation of WTO rules. Only if that measure is not withdrawn will other remedies 
be available
787
. Article 22.1 of the DSU provides that “compensation and the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations” 788  will be temporary measures available if the 
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. It has 
been observed that under Article 22 neither “compensation nor the suspension of concessions 
or other obligations” 789  illustrate how to implement a recommendation and how to 
responsibly enforce conformity with the agreements. This complicates a claim for 
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compensation
790
. Indeed, developing countries have difficulties claiming compensation under 
the DSU
791
. Since the DSU was adapted in 1995, compensation has been used rarely
792
.  
 
4.3.3.2 Analysis of the constraint 
 
Regarding the compensation remedy, there are three obstacles still facing developing 
countries. First, during the period from the start of the dispute settlement process until the 
final stage of dispute, the withdrawal of the offending measure, may take up to fifteen 
months, which is considered to be a long process
793
. There is no compensation granted to the 
winning party, even when it is a developing country
794
. Also, there is not any consideration 
for the length of time during which the inconsistent measure was in place
795
. Therefore, if 
developing countries are the complainants, there may be negative consequences and 
economic harm resulting from retention of the inconsistent measures for a long time
796
. Also, 
the export opportunities for developing country might “suffer irreparably during this time”797.  
 
Second, the export loss during the fifteen months might be significant to a developing 
country. This can be “particularly damaging for smaller developing countries which are 
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highly dependent on a limited number of export products/markets” 798 . During the DSU 
dispute procedure, developing countries could incur a significant export injury while there is 
not any rule for compensation for the injury caused, even if the WTO laws were violated
799
. 
Indeed, serious injury will be suffered by smaller developing countries that rely on a few 
exported goods, service and markets
800
.  
 
Third, the remedy for a complaining country, which might be a developing country, is to take 
action against the defending country through compensation. However, this action has been 
limited in practice
801
. Indeed, developing countries find it extremely difficult to take any 
compensation from developed countries because of “political considerations and the unequal 
economic relationship” 802 . Additionally, a developing country is always dependent on 
developed countries for growth and development of their economy
803
. Therefore, developing 
countries may not request compensation against defending developed countries
804
. It has been 
observed that the compensation may not be adequate for developing countries, because it is 
not possible to obtain retroactive compensation or punishment measures for developing 
countries for the economic losses that occurred before the DSB decision is made
805
. That 
remains true even if “the defendant corrects its action after the dispute”806. There is not any 
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guarantee for compensation for economic losses. Moreover, compensation is not considered 
as “preferred to full implementation of the decision of the DSB”807. 
 
In practice, there are very significant reasons considered for rarely using the remedy of 
compensation. This part will look at these reasons. First, compensation has to be voluntary
808
. 
The disputing parties have to agree on the solution. Second, compensation has to be regular 
with the covered agreements. Compliance with the covered agreements “implies consistency 
with the most favoured nation (MFN) principle found in article I of the GATT”809. Third, 
compensation might not provide an efficient form of reparation for damages that are 
“suffered by the complaining party”810 and does not include past effects of the measure811. 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Voluntary 
 
When the losing party does not comply with the DSU ruling during the ‘reasonable period of 
time’, it is time to enter into negotiations with the winning party for compensation 812 . 
However, the main problem with compensation as a remedy under the DSB is that according 
to Article 22 of the DSU, compensation is temporary and voluntary. Therefore, it is 
dependent on the losing party to offer compensation to the winning party and dependent on 
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the winning party accepting the compensation offer. Both of the disputing parties have to 
“agree upon using the concept of compensation and the level of the compensation”813.  
 
Compensation also has to be consistent with the WTO covered agreements
814
. In practice, 
however, it has been observed that it is very difficult to reach an agreement with a non-
complying party for compensation since there is not any method to enforce the non-
complying member’s to compensate. Also, the disputing parties have to agree to compensate 
with a specific amount
815
 that makes it more difficult. Indeed, compensation is not only for 
the winning party, but also for all the WTO Members
816
, so the benefit would be shared with 
all the WTO Members, including developed countries
817
. Also, compensation does not “mean 
an amount of money being paid; it rather involves a benefit offered by the respondent,”818 
meaning “the benefit can contain the lifting of trade barriers by the losing member which is 
equivalent to the benefit which the respondent has nullified or impaired by applying its 
measure”819. Therefore, it has been observed that freer trade principles can be supported by 
compensation
820
, but this can cause harm for some exporter countries. Under the DSU, some 
developing countries have stated that it is difficult to obtain sufficient compensation
821
. 
Regarding the voluntary nature of the compensation “the respondent can end it at the same 
moment it reforms its WTO inconsistent regime, awaiting the outcome of any further action 
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by the complainant under article 21.5 of the DSU”822. Article 22.2 of the DSU provides that 
‘[i]f no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of 
the reasonable period of time, any party . . . [The complainant] may request authorization 
from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other 
obligations under the covered agreements’823. However, developing countries may not able to 
make retaliation against developed countries. In sum up, it is very difficult to make 
agreement with no complying party to compensate. 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Trade Sanction not Monetary  
 
In general, under international law, countries breach an international obligation by adopting 
illegal measures and each is responsible for the legal consequences
824
. Under international 
law
825
, the injured countries have the right to claim reparation under several forms such as 
restitution and compensation
826
. As regards restitution, the countries are responsible for 
illegal actions
827
. Therefore, they have to put the injured party in the position it was in 
“before the wrongful act was committed”828. Also, they have to ensure that “restitution is not 
materially impossible or does not involve a burden out of proportion to the benefit deriving 
from restitution instead of compensation” 829 . Moreover, the wrongdoing party has to 
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compensate for damage
830. Indeed, compensation has to “cover any financially assessable 
damage”831. Article 21 of the DSU provides for a withdrawal of the inconsistent measures as 
a remedy for an illegal measure, which is considered as a prospective relief. Indeed, 
regarding past damages, nothing under the current WTO dispute settlement system provides 
explicitly for reparation for past damages.  
 
In addition, Article 22 of the DSU has not obviously provided for compensation of damages 
suffered. Regarding Article 22.2 of the DSU, the arrangement of the compensation seems to 
be trade sanctions rather than monetary damages as compensation
832
, unlike in most 
international legal systems. Consequently, it will only allow the ‘suspension of concessions’ 
against the offending party
833
. The winning party will not obtain monetary damages, but will 
obtain lower tariffs from the losing party
834
. However, as result of the restricted power of 
developing countries, the compensation must be monetarily beneficial rather than the 
‘suspension of concessions’835. 
 
In the DSU, the time of the DSU process is long for exporting members, particularly some 
developing countries that do not have many export bases
836
. The standard remedies of the 
DSU for requesting parties to comply with WTO obligations do not provide great incentives 
to the member(s) raising the dispute in the DSU. Indeed, remedies have not included 
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compensation for damages incurred or for financial penalties
837
. Without compensation, the 
DSU process may be less attractive for WTO Members, specifically developing countries. It 
has been observed that there are many WTO Members, particularly developing countries that 
want the WTO rules to include compensation. There are some members that have argued that 
the DSU prohibits compensation
838
. However, it has been determined that there is nothing 
that can prevent WTO Members from seeking compensation
839
. 
 
Indeed, the length of time in resolving disputes is considered to be another crucial point, 
since it may reduce the gains from dispute settlement remedies. It has been thought that the 
DSU is “far from being perfect”840, because the time period from the consultation stage until 
withdrawal of the measure could be from 1-3 years. In practice, it is obvious that a huge 
amount of lost trade may occur within the DSU process without remedy because the WTO 
remedies only apply in future. So, the dispute settlement remedies are considered as “forward 
looking” 841 , meaning remedies will not take place until the DSB’s ruling is eventually 
given
842
. Indeed, no remedy takes place for the harm and for those who are actually injured. 
Also, the remedy is not relief for the actual injury. While the offending measure is 
withdrawn, there is no remedy that will alleviate the harm done to the WTO Members. The 
remedy does not go directly to benefit the affected parties; all members will benefit
843
. The 
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WTO has to find some way to compensate for actual loss by the application of the WTO 
inconsistent measure
844
. 
 
An example of the length of the DSU process is that the Banana dispute lasted more than 43 
months, from 4 October 1995 to 19 April 1999 “when the DSB authorized the US suspension 
of concessions”845. The DSB “suspension authorization to Ecuador was on 18 May 2000, 
which made the course as long as 56 months”846. There are several problems with the DSU 
remedy. For example, in the case of EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, the European Communities did not comply with the ruling. Therefore, Ecuador had 
requested authorisation to ‘suspend concessions or other obligations’ to the EC under the 
GATS, the TRIPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. The amount of money was US $210m. 
While under the GATT, the violation was in the goods sector, Ecuador had to “request 
retaliation on other sectors under other Agreements”847.  
 
In the Banana case, the arbitrators stated that: 
“Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which involves 
a developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a 
situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension 
authorized by the DSB for the full amount of the level of nullification and 
impairment estimated by us in all of the sector and/or under all agreements 
mentioned above combined”848. 
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It has been thought that the DSU has to provide for remedies to address monetary damages as 
compensation
849
. In the Uruguay round discussions, there was a basic notion of compensation 
for causing damage
850
. Members argued about the calculation of damage
851
. Also, there are 
many member-created proposals, but one of these proposals indicated that compensation was 
preferred to retaliation in all cases. Also, it stated that there are difficulties for winning parties 
to agree on compensation as well as agreement for the payment of the damage. So, the 
members finally agreed that the compensation is considered as a temporary remedy but not a 
legal obligation. In addition, some members are concerned that compensation might be 
encouraging the losing party to not comply with the DSU recommendations and rulings. 
Compensation is not covering the actual damage. However, using compensation as a remedy 
is important for developing countries since they do not have the ability to retaliate against a 
stronger economic member
852
. So, the DSU includes compensation as an available remedy. 
 
Therefore, there are many demands by developing countries on the DSU to force developed 
countries to pay compensation to other parties
853
, to avoid cases of serious imbalance
854
. 
Under the DSU, the Korean proposal
855
 suggests that when developing countries and 
developed countries have disputes and developed countries refuse to comply with DSB 
rulings, the panel should be able to award compensation. This would increase developing 
countries’ confidence in the DSU. While the compensation is only voluntary and not 
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monetary, it could take the form of extra concessions
856
 . During the Uruguay Round, some 
developing countries highlighted the significance of compensation for them when obligations 
are breached by a developed country. Nicaragua suggested that when disputes are brought by 
a developing country, “in the recommendations of the contracting parties compensatory 
means ought to be considered if the amount of damages warrants such compensation”857. 
 
4.3.3.2.3 Consistency with Covered Agreements of the (MFN) obligation, the 
DSU and provision of the WTO 
 
Under the DSU, the other difficulty with compensation is that, in the application of 
compensatory measures, the principle of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) standard must be 
followed by all WTO Members
858
. Compensation is authorized by the DSB, however, it will 
not be implemented until recommendations and rulings of the DSB are adopted within a 
reasonable time period (60 days)
859
. Indeed, a respondent may be able to withdraw measures 
within 60 days. The respondent can decide to offer restitution by compensation, though 
compensation will not be applied retrospectively. Therefore, there is no recompense for any 
harm caused by an illegal trade measure previous to or during the dispute process. 
Compensation is considered in the form of tariff reductions. It is not a means of monetary 
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payment. Also, compensation has to be matched with the provisions of the WTO and it has to 
be “consistent with the requirement of MFN treatment”860. The MFN treatment obligation 
provides that if any nation gives certain favourable treatment to another Member, that 
favourable treatment has to be given to all other WTO Members.  
 
Therefore, when any party to the WTO goes through the full DSU procedure and receives a 
positive ruling, all of the WTO Members enjoy and benefit from that remedy. However, it has 
been thought that this remedy is unfair and it may be one of the reasons for not usually using 
compensation under the DSU
861
. It is unequal that when a party takes the long dispute 
settlement procedure but after has to share the compensation with all WTO Members
862
. The 
most favoured nation (MFN) principle creates another difficulty in practice for using 
compensation. Therefore, the complainant may be “asking for a larger degree of access to the 
market when discussing the compensation” 863  if the compensation is not only for the 
complaining party so, there is “no exclusive benefit for the complainant”864. Consequently, 
this remedy might be less “attractive to both of the disputing parties”865. 
 
According to Article 22, compensation has to be consistent with the covered agreements
866
. 
The major aim of compensation is to encourage the WTO Member to comply with the WTO 
rules. Compensation as a punitive action may cause a loss by a respondent “through the 
                                                 
 
860
 Persson, K., (2007), The Current and Future WTO Dispute Settlement System; Practical problems discussing 
Article 21.5 and Article 22 of the DSU. 
861
 Ibid. 
862
 Ibid. 
863
 Ibid.  
864
 Ibid. 
865
 Ibid. 
866
 Ibid.  
195 
 
 
removal of its preferential access to the market of a plaintiff”867. However, in some cases, a 
respondent might not withdraw an illegal trade measure while the provision of compensation 
is “permitted as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure that is 
inconsistent”868. 
 
Furthermore, Article 3.5 of the DSU
869
 provides that ‘All solutions to matters formally raised 
under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions . . . shall not nullify or impair 
benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements . . .’870. “But giving increased 
concessions to one of the Members even though compensatory, nullifies benefits to the other 
Members”871. The magnitude of compensation is “required to be equivalent to the level of 
harm (nullification or impairment) that is caused by any illegal measure”872. It must be equal 
to the harm of the complaint by nullification or impairment established by Article 3.5. Also, 
Article 3.5 provides that the disputing parties can accept the compensation and as a result of 
that all the WTO Members will share the compensation. 
 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
 
This discussion highlighted the most significant factors regarding the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. As we have seen, the duration of 
                                                 
 
867
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the DSB process and compensation are among the most significant constraints limiting the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. This makes 
developing countries less likely to litigate their disputes under the DSB. First of all, the 
duration for the dispute resolution process has been highlighted and the constraint has been 
evaluated. Also, the constraints created by the DSU’s dispute resolution process itself have 
been analysed. These processes create a dilemma for developing countries considering 
participating in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In addition, compensation under the 
DSU has been analysed and evaluated, demonstrating that there is dissatisfaction with the 
compensation offered. The reasons considered for rarely using the remedy of compensation 
were highlighted: first, the voluntary nature of compensation requires disputing parties to 
agree on the solution; second, compensation has to be in agreement with the covered 
agreements; finally, compensation does not provide an efficient reparation of damages. These 
causes affect developing countries’ practice in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
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Chapter 5: Possible solutions to some of the constraints limiting 
developing country participation in WTO’s dispute settlement 
proceedings 
5.1 Reinforcement of Financial and Legal Resources 
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to improve developing countries’ access to the DSU and to improve 
the DSU rules and make them work for developing countries by highlighting possible 
solutions to tackling some of constraints which limit developing country participation in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This chapter will discuss and evaluate these possible 
solutions. This chapter will also focus on some of the WTO Members’ attempts at solving 
some of the obstacles that face developing countries in both consultations and the DSU 
adjudication. Moreover, it will reveal that some of the proposals by WTO Members since the 
establishment of the organisation until now aimed at smoothing over the WTO dispute 
settlement system and creating an effective and successful system. Also, this chapter will 
discuss solutions for the lack of financial and legal resources. First, it will discuss funding 
developing and least developed countries to help them to support their legitimate claims 
under the DSB. Second, addressing attorneys’ fees could increase developing countries’ 
ability to participate in the dispute settlement system. Third, reform to the role of legal 
assistance, under Article 27.2, will improve developing countries’ use of the DSU, and also 
assist developing countries in addressing the issue of the high cost of the DSU. Fourth, it 
considers that the proposal to reform the ACWL may address the high cost of WTO dispute 
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settlement system litigation as well as tackle limits on the participation of developing 
countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In addition, this chapter will highlight the 
significant reinforcement for consultations and mediations. It is believed that using more 
consultations and mediation would have great benefits for developing countries and give 
them more effective ways to discuss solutions to their disputes. These methods are giving 
developing countries another chance to look for solutions. Therefore, consultations and 
mediation might be considered as a good method to resolve many obstacles which limit 
developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
5.1.2 Reinforcement of Financial Resources  
 
Under the DSU, developing countries frequently face high costs associated with the DSU 
procedure. Indeed, the least developed and developing countries have little trade and scarcer 
resources with limited government budgets to fund their disputes under the high cost of 
litigating in the DSU procedure. Therefore, developing and least developed countries have to 
receive funds to help them to bring their legitimate claims under the DSB. One particular 
funding proposal was made by Kenya, which highlighted the need to create a dispute 
settlement fund with financing from the WTO budget in order to help developing countries to 
use the DSU
873. Moreover, the African Group has applied for assistance in the form of “a 
pool of experts and lawyers in the preparation and conduct of cases, the payment of fees and 
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expenses entailed, [and a detailed] compilation by the WTO Secretariat of all applicable 
[panel and Appellate Body case] law”874.  
 
Indeed, financial help could be provided by the WTO budgets to assist poorer and developing 
countries to face the high cost in human and financial resources of the DSU process that limit 
developing country participation in the DSU. Also, the funds will help poor and developing 
countries to employ individuals and/or hire external counsels. So, the legal expertise dilemma 
and financial resources that matter for developing countries might be solved. The funds will 
also allow poor countries to train their domestic legal capacities in order to deal with the 
WTO laws. So, the dilemma of a lack of monetary means will be gone and developing 
countries will be more willing to participate in practice in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.  
 
Developing countries will also have the ability to recognize their rights, properly defend 
themselves under the WTO rules and operate effectively the same as developed countries as a 
result of having more legal and financial expertise. Therefore, developing countries can face 
the high costs of WTO litigation, particularly in a panel or appellate body of the DSB. 
Developing countries will also have highly qualified experts and as much experience as 
developed countries. They will also be able to support their legal arguments in the WTO 
dispute as a result of the increase in skills necessary to fulfil the extensive information and 
documentation requirements of the WTO, with a clearer apportionment of resources between 
developing countries and developed countries. Also, developing countries may not need to 
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hire external professional legal experts if they can use domestic legal capacities to deal with 
the WTO laws. Therefore, private law firms and the related litigation costs would be less of a 
problem for developing countries. Hence, the number of disputes brought by developing 
countries in the WTO will increase. 
 
In addition, extra funds will address the lack of expertise and knowledge of complicated 
WTO law. Furthermore, more funding will assist developing countries as regards the DSU 
requirements for preparatory work, such as preparing substantial documentation to be 
presented as evidence, preparing commercial and economic data, testimony and economic 
and technical evidence which have to take place before presenting a case in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. This will particularly assist developing countries to use quantitative 
economic analysis and utilize either econometric or non-econometric evidence in order to 
strengthen their argument and to meet the DSB’s principles which are often extremely 
complicated and take a long time to litigate. Indeed, it has been observed that the disputing 
counterparts who have superior legal power can obtain positive decisions because they are 
able to tackle the issue of the complexity of WTO rules and its dispute settlement 
procedures
875
. Therefore, developed countries are able to deal with the expenses and disparity 
of a case under the DSU by their representative officials in the WTO. Developed countries 
have many representative officials with good experience in WTO rules. However, funding 
developing countries could improve the possibility for them to win their cases brought to the 
DSU. Developing countries can also employ enough internal staff with good experience with 
multilateral trading systems to handle their case under the DSU.  
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5.1.3 Reinforcement of Legal Resources  
 
Developing countries have to pay attorneys’ fees to bring a successful challenge to a 
developed country trade barrier
876
.  Developing countries could be encouraged to participate 
in the dispute settlement system if they could reclaim these fees, which would entail “easily 
affordable payments from large developed countries who fail to settle a case or comply with a 
panel decision”877. The proposal of paying the developing countries’ attorneys’ and experts’ 
fees has been supported by a United States Trade Representative (USTR)
878
. It has been 
stated that it is necessary to “consider a one-sided remedy covering litigation costs”879. It has 
also been argued that “one possibility [to address the issue of legal resource imbalances] 
would be to implement cost rules-that is, to require that when a developed country loses a 
case against one of the least-developed ones, it is required to pay at least a portion of the 
winner’s legal costs”880. Moreover, Mexico submitted a proposal in which the awards of 
attorneys’ fees should apply in all WTO cases, “regardless of the development status of the 
parties to the dispute” 881 . Cuba proposed is cutting the high cost of WTO litigation, 
particularly for developing countries, by special and differential treatment for developing 
countries
882
. Special and differential treatment could also extend to the issue of attorneys’ 
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fees. This method of payment would be applied when the dispute arises between a developing 
and developed country, and the developed country has to pay the attorneys’ fees when the 
developing country is successful in disputes, even before a panel stage
883
.  
 
There are many rationales for WTO Members paying attorneys’ fees when developing 
countries are successful complainants under the DSU. First of all, this method creates a fair 
DSB system. Therefore, developing countries can obtain rights to demand paying back 
considerable legal expertise. It has been observed that developing countries may not able to 
pay attorneys’ and experts’ fees without obtaining payback from the developed countries 
when developing countries are successful in a dispute
884
. As mentioned already, developing 
countries cannot expect to participate and succeed in the WTO litigation procedure without 
hiring sophisticated legal counsel. Second, the current structure of the WTO incurs high 
litigation costs for developing countries and could constitute a method by which developed 
countries can impose more costs upon those developing states by using the “legal procedures 
to drag out WTO cases”885. One of the largest developing countries has stated that “we 
always try to settle a case, as it is too complicated and expensive to go to a panel”886. 
Therefore, the WTO can undertake new methods to restrain the practice of lengthening 
dispute settlement proceedings, which would include paying the attorneys’ fees for 
developing countries.  
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It is suggested that when developing countries are successful in bringing claims against a 
developed country, the developing countries should not suffer from the high financial cost 
spent on “on U.S. and European trade lawyers to enforce their WTO rights against developed 
countries”887. Therefore, the attorneys’ fees have to be addressed under the rules of the WTO 
to facilitate developing countries’ defence of their rights888. Otherwise, the right of weaker 
members will be meaningless.  
 
The amount of attorneys’ fees can be capped, just as they are often capped in many national 
courts
889
. In addition, Article 22 of the DSU has already calculated the fees for the WTO 
arbitrators. Therefore, it should include the attorneys’ fees in the legal process of the DSB.  
 
Arguably, the “fee guidelines could be agreed upon and attached as an annex to the DSU and 
amended from time to time”890. This method of supporting developing countries reduces the 
high cost of the DSU procedure but has to be set out in WTO law.  
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The United States, EC and other developed countries should accept that fee guidelines in 
WTO law to helps reduce the cost of the DSU process for developing countries. Moreover, 
large developing countries should have to assist other less developed or developing countries 
by fully or at least partially subsidising their attorneys’ fees, so would lead to the DSU does 
not create any obstacles for “incentives for developing countries to settle or abandon legal 
claims simply because they cannot afford to defend themselves”891.  
 
Therefore, the WTO Members and the DSU rules have to find ways of structuring attorneys’ 
fees to enhance the use of the DSB for settling disputes
892
. For instance, the DSU may set 
forth the fixed time period for attorneys’ fee, which may be when the developed country fails 
during the consultation period to withdraw its illegal measure. DSU rules could also specify 
that if developing countries are successful in their complaints, they can recover their attorney 
fees if the developed country refuses to withdraw an illegal trade measure. It is thought
893
 that 
the attorney’s fees can be charged to the losing party occur when a developed country refuses 
to comply with the DSU ruling, after a set time period. This could occur 30 days after the 
rulings are established by a panel or appellate body. The amount would increase by a 
percentage as long as the developed country refuses to comply with the DSB rulings. The 
DSU panel could also determine the amount of the attorney’s fees early in the dispute 
settlement process
894
. In addition, the WTO Members may agree with the retroactive 
attorney’s fees. They may determine attorney’s fees from the starting date of damage 
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accrued. Therefore, the starting date, for instance, can be the date of the illegal trade measure 
by any of the WTO Members, or it can be from “the date of filing of the complaint”895, it also 
can be “the date of the panel’s formation”896. It is believed that the retrospective attorney’s 
fees from the date of the illegal measure would be increased until the dispute is settled. 
Therefore, this would create a clear and strong reason for developed countries to not violate 
WTO agreements. Also, it is considered that this method can reduce the chance that 
developed countries create a long dispute procedure.  
 
It has been thought that if the attorney’s fees start at the date of the filing of a complaint, or 
the date of a panel’s formation, then it can create a greater incentive for the parties to settle 
the dispute without going through further litigation. Therefore, if the dispute is not settled by 
a fixed date, developed countries would be put on notice that a WTO claim will result in an 
order to pay Attorney fees. Therefore, they would have a much greater incentive to negotiate 
an amicable settlement without delaying the process. 
 
Also, the DSU could determine attorney’s fees 897  from a failure to agree during the 
consultation period. Thus, if the developed country withdraws the trade measure during the 
consultation time period then no attorneys’ fees would be due. 
 
To sum up, the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees might cover all or part of litigation costs as 
well as encouraging developing countries’ defence of their WTO rights under the DSU. 
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5.1.4 Reinforcement of Article 27.2 
 
Under the DSU, developing countries are still suffering from the high cost of bringing 
disputes to the WTO dispute settlement system even after the creation of the Advisory Centre 
on WTO law
898
. Therefore, in order to ensure developing countries greater access to the 
Dispute Settlement Body, there are proposals trying to making changes to Article 27.2, as 
regards legal assistance to developing countries
899
. There are numerous developing countries 
that have submitted several proposals for improvement of the operation of Article 27.2. These 
proposals are based on the experience of developing countries with the DSU. It is believed 
that if these proposals are implemented that will “improve the relevance and effectiveness of 
the DSU from a developing country perspective”900.  
 
Under Article 27.2, experts will not support any developing countries before a dispute is 
initiated in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. However, it is believed that it is significant 
to provide aid with the proceedings and before raising the case under those proceedings. 
Also, the expert’s assistance will be upon developing countries’ request. 
 
In addition, the role of legal assistance is considered to be giving advice and clarification 
concerning WTO law and the DSU processes, while ensuring the impartiality of the 
Secretariat, as is mentioned in the provision
901
. Hence, it is observed that Article 27.2 is just 
to meet the DSU requirements when it proscribes “the legal advisor from acting as counsel or 
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helping in writing submissions, because to do so could be a breach of the impartiality 
requirement of the secretariat”902. Therefore, the Secretariat could not operate as an advocate 
in legal proceedings for least developed and developing countries. However, the Least 
Developed Country Group was trying to make changes to Article 27.2 for legal assistance to 
developing countries. It suggested that the legal advisors should be as counsel
903
 to 
developing countries
904
. Therefore, the reform would remove these limitations and permit 
legal experts to fulfil their function as counsel. Moreover, legal assistance has to appear more 
helpful for developing countries in tackling the high cost of litigation and lack of legal 
expertise. The Secretariat’s expert has to be a lawyer for the developing countries. 
 
The most often requested improvement for Article 27.2 is raising the size of the team. At the 
present, Article 27.2 contains two part time legal advisers. The WTO secretariat has to 
employ a large number of staff with full-time jobs to help serve as legal consultants for 
developing countries. There are some WTO Members that have proposed amendments for 
Article 27.2. They have proposed that the WTO expand the Secretariat services of the Article 
27.2 by increasing the number of legal experts
905
. Venezuela strongly made this suggestion 
when it demanded that at least five advisors have to be in an independent legal division
906
. It 
is believed that the number of the WTO Secretariat must be more than twenty full time legal 
experts. With such a structure, developing counties will receive a large and autonomous legal 
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assistance during the DSU process
907
. Also, it is believed that this method will not “affect the 
impartiality of the secretariat”908. It has been proposed that under the Article 27.2, the WTO 
create a Permanent Defence Counsel
909
. The role of this counsel would be to provide legal 
and technical assistance to developing countries at any time and in any case arising under the 
DSU. It is thought that a permanent defence counsel would remedy concerns about the 
imbalanced legal and monetary capacity of developing countries, which always presents a 
dilemma in the effective participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
 
It is thought that the Counsel has to be funded from the WTO budget surpluses
910
. The 
African Group proposed that the WTO Fund should be financed from the regular WTO 
budget to “facilitate the effective utilization by developing and least-developed country 
Members of this Understanding in the settlement of disputes arising from the covered 
agreements”911. The fund may be financed from voluntary contributions from Members912. 
Therefore, regarding the assistance to developing countries for the high cost of the DSU, it is 
proposed that a WTO establish a Trust Fund to make financial support available for the use of 
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external specialists and lawyers
913
 as advocates and advisors, in addition to supporting the 
Permanent Defence Counsel. Turkey has proposed that the budget of the secretariat has to 
“improve its ability to support the position of the legal experts and to employ full-time 
advisors” 914 . Moreover, the African Group requires support in the form of experts and 
lawyers in the preparation of cases, “the payment of fees compilation by the WTO secretariat 
of all applicable law”915. Pakistan, Turkey and Venezuela have suggested reforming Article 
27.2 of the DSU
916
. They have mentioned making better use of Article 27.2 by increasing the 
Secretariat’s budget for employing more full-time consultants who have great legal 
experience
917
. It is considered that the Permanent Defence Counsel might include a large 
range of consultancy and advisory services to help developing countries in the DSU
918
. It is 
believed that reform to the operation of Article 27.2 will improve developing countries use of 
the DSU as well as assist developing countries in addressing the issue of the high cost of the 
DSU. 
 
5.1.5 Reinforcement of the ACWL 
  
The ACWL has to provide more aid for legal advice and training for developing countries’ 
officials on WTO (DSU) law, as well as assistance to developing countries in the preparation 
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and presentation of their trade cases in WTO disputes. However, the ACWL’s defects have 
been mentioned
919
. While the Advisory Centre on WTO Law provides help to developing 
countries in tackling the high cost of WTO litigation, it cannot fully support them under the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This part provides some proposals for reforming the 
ACWL. 
 
It is suggested that the ACWL has to make more offers for training activities to delegates 
from developing countries, and consequently the ACWL needs a fund devoted to subsidizing 
the costs of such training. The ACWL has a budget to decrease “the heavy burden on the 
developing countries” to create “internal legal expertise”920. 
 
While the ACWL provides help to developing countries in tackling the high cost of WTO 
litigation, it cannot support them before a dispute is initiated under WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings
921
. However, the majority of developing countries have stated that “the cost of 
litigation before the WTO panels and the appellate body is prohibitively high”922. Therefore, 
it is thought that the assistance provided by the ACWL must be also offered before the 
disputes arise in the DSU process, which will be more helpful for developing countries. 
 
As a result, the ACWL has a budget. It is thought that the ACWL has to employ a large 
number of staff with distinguished knowledge and skills to handle all cases referred to it by 
developing countries. The ACWL has to support all developing countries in both sides of a 
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dispute when any developing countries bring a case against another developing country
923
. In 
fact, the ACWL is designed to represent and counsel developing countries to protect their 
rights under WTO rules, but the ACWL has not addressed all constraints which face 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
By using the ACWL, the lack of expertise in WTO law amongst developing countries will be 
considerably less. It is thought that while the ACWL is “broadening the potential for 
developing country access to WTO dispute settlement”924, the ACWL must hire full-time 
economic experts for its staff. Also, they will aid developing countries to make excellent 
decisions about bringing claims to the WTO
925
. Therefore, the job of the ACWL experts is to 
help developing countries analyse their options
926
. For instance, the ACWL would provide 
legal advice on all WTO legal matters
927
. Full-time experts can make available assistance for 
developing countries to “analyze dispute settlement from the standpoint of economic 
costs”928.  
 
It is considered that the ACWL should provide more than legal and economic assistance for 
developing countries. It should be abreast with developing countries to support their rights 
and obligations under the WTO Agreement
929
. Therefore, the ACWL should create the 
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assistance free to the poor countries that cannot afford their right
930
 and to carry complaints 
under the DSU.  
 
It is essential to make sure that the cost of the DSB does not create any barriers to practice for 
developing countries under the DSU process. Therefore, it is observed that some of the least 
developing and developing countries will want to have the legal services at no cost
931
. It has 
been proposed that the donor countries must increase funding for a permanent Defence 
Counsel and the ACWL to create the services without cost to developing countries and poorer 
countries. These proposals are aimed at eliminating the difficulties experienced by 
developing countries in the DSU. These proposals can improve the DSU if there is a will by 
larger Members to accommodate these concerns of developing countries
932
. It is considered 
that these proposals to reform the ACWL may address the high cost of WTO dispute 
settlement system litigation as well as tackle limits to the participation of developing 
countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
5.1.6 Reinforcement of Consultations and Mediations 
5.1.6.1 Reinforcement of Consultations 
 
The DSU offers a method that could be an alternative way to settle disputes that may be 
suitable in cases that arise between WTO Members, especially between developing and 
developed countries. The DSU can support disputing parties to solve disputes amicably by 
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using consultation
933
. In practice, it has been observed that the consultations stage, an old 
diplomatic means of resolving trade disputes, has developed in the GATT and the WTO 
system
934
. The DSU successfully provides a number of provisions to encourage a 
consultation stage before entering into the panel stage.  
 
In the DSU process, all parties to the dispute must enter into consultations before continuing 
to the panel stage. The aim of the DSU in settling disputes through consultation is the 
creation of a settlement which would be satisfactory for all parties of the dispute, and which 
conforms to DSU law. Article 3.7 of the DSU states that “the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute”935. It also states that “[a] solution 
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is 
clearly to be preferred”936. The DSU provisions are considered to be in favour of developing 
countries. Therefore, developing countries’ position has legitimacy in pursuing consultation 
under Articles 4 and 12 of the DSU. Article 4.10 of the DSU appears to have a special benefit 
for developing countries where it provides that “during consultations Members should give 
special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country Members”937. 
In fact, this article has been used in the case of ‘European Communities-Trade Description of 
Scallops (EC-Scallops)’ 938 . Here, Chile requested the article be applied during DSB 
consultations, and stated that the article “had been disregarded by the Communities thus 
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discriminating against and impairing Chile’s interests in deviation from the provisions of 
Article 4.10 of the DSU
939
.  
 
Moreover, consultations under Article 12 of the DSU may be considered as favourable to 
developing countries
940
. The disputing parties may agree to create further timeframes for 
consultations, which Article 4.8 of the DSU states is “normally set at 60 days after receipt of 
request”941 or “containing shortened timeframes for perishable goods”942. Article 12 allows 
the Chairman of the DSB to have authority to discuss with parties the creation of further time 
extensions and durations. For example, in 1995, Pakistan had a dispute with the United States 
in front of the DSB. Pakistan invoked Article 12.10 of the DSU during the consultations
943
. In 
the DSB meeting, the United States applied for the panel process but this action was 
challenged by Pakistan. It stated that the disputing parties were still “engaged in the process 
of Consultations”944. Consequently, the United States complied with Pakistan’s complaint945. 
 
In addition, consultation avoids constraints that limit developing country participation in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings in at least two respects. Firstly, a consultation operates 
as originally envisioned by the DSU. Article 4 provides that parties to the dispute “shall enter 
into consultations in good faith” 946  and that they “should attempt to obtain satisfactory 
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adjustment of the matter”947. Also, Article 4.10 provides that “during consultations Members 
should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country 
Members”948. Secondly, consultation may avoid concerns of developing countries about the 
diplomatic style of international trade processes in dispute settlement. Indeed, developing 
countries always find themselves facing power politics in disputes with developed countries 
in the course of WTO processes
949
. The consultation stage avoids the need to enforce DSB 
rulings against larger developed countries. It therefore avoids significant constraints on the 
utility of the WTO dispute settlement system for developing countries. It also avoids 
developing countries wasting money and time in invoking the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures against developed country WTO Members
950
. Developing countries could thereby 
“attain more equal footing with developed countries in the consultation stage” 951 . Panel 
litigation is considered to be expensive and rigid; consultation is considered to be a good 
method to avoid these problems
952. It has been observed that the current DSU system’s 
strength is based on the consultation procedure for settling disputes
953
. Therefore, 
consultation has been developed in order to decrease the costs of dispute resolution and 
increase “the likelihood of a mutually satisfactory outcome”954. 
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There are many cases, especially involving developing countries, which have greatly 
benefited from the increased prevalence and power of consultations
955
. Indeed, the 
consultation stage may be an effective and beneficial method of dispute resolution for 
developing countries in practice. It is therefore essential to encourage this form of dispute 
resolution in order to continue its good work. There are a number of proposals from 
developing countries highlighting the need to increase the use of consultation processes in 
dispute settlement
956
. For example, Jamaica has encouraged WTO Members to respect their 
obligation to “strengthen the consultation stage” 957 . Jamaica’s proposal to improve the 
consultation stage is a very important proposal that can lead to real improvements in practice.  
This proposal suggests that the consultation stage should last as long as the developing 
countries consider that they need it. In principle, this phase should not last longer than six 
months, but that depends on the complexity of the case and the preference of the developing 
nation. As noted above, it is better to settle a dispute at this stage, particularly for developing 
countries, rather than using the lengthy panel and appeal proceedings under the DSB system. 
Therefore, this reform would be in the interest of developing countries, if it is limited to cases 
involving developing countries with their consent. 
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5.1.6.2 Reinforcement of Mediation 
 
The purpose of this part is to evaluate the proposal of developing countries to increase the use 
of mediation in all process of the DSU. Therefore, it will set out: the mediation rules; why the 
use of mediation must be increased by developing countries; and possible reforms that may 
be feasible and realistically could be adopted under that DSU to ensure that mediation works 
more effectively and is more widely used by developing countries.  
 
5.1.6.2.1 The Rules on Mediation  
 
Since mediation is described as a good way to settle disputes and increase benefits for 
developing countries, it is necessary to define the mediation method under the WTO
958
. 
Under the DSU, the mediator, which is the WTO Director-General, is an impartial third party. 
Indeed, this method is aimed at helping disputing parties settle a dispute
959
. In the mediation 
method, the mediators, considered as the third party in the conciliation process, can 
participate and contribute to discussions, negotiations and propose possible solutions that 
may or may not be accepted by the disputing parties
960
.  
 
Article 5 of the DSU provides provision in the form of good offices, conciliation, and 
mediation. Regarding Article 5.1, the mediation is voluntary (‘if the parties to the dispute so 
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agree’)961. According to Article 5.3, mediation might be requested ‘at any time by any party 
to a dispute’ and ‘begin at any time and be terminated at any time’962. The disputing parties 
can request the establishment of a panel after the request for good offices, conciliation or 
mediation first, “[sixty] days after the date of receipt of a request for consultations”963; 
second, when the procedures for good offices, conciliation, or mediation are terminated
964
; or 
third, if the disputing parties both agree “that the good offices, conciliation or mediation 
process has failed to settle the dispute”965 . The alternative good offices, conciliation or 
mediation ‘may continue while the panel process proceeds’966 if the disputing parties agree. 
 
5.1.6.2.2 Mediation Practice under the DSU  
 
In the WTO, mediation has been less used by Members,
967
 particularly developing countries. 
It observed that the requests for the assistance of third-parties in resolving trade disputes by 
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good offices, conciliation, or mediation were rare, particularly mediation
968
. Mediation was 
not requested until April 2003, in the case of Thailand/Philippines/E.U. canned tuna dispute 
of 2002
969
. The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and certain African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”) countries, permitted those countries to export canned tuna 
shipments to the EU with free of tariffs
970
. In May 2002, Thailand and the Philippines 
demanded, under the DSB, that the EU reduce its tariff
971
. On 4 September 2002, after three 
unsuccessful consultation rounds, the disputing parties requested the WTO Director-General 
Supachai to assist in resolving the dispute
972
. After months of further discussions, the 
disputing parties reached an agreement for a solution to the dispute “whereby the EU reduced 
its tariff on Philippine and Thai canned tuna exports by 50%”973. 
 
5.1.6.2.3 Increase the Use of Mediation in the DSU  
 
Several developing countries have requested more use of mediation in the DSU process
974
.  
Also, the WTO Director-General called for and urged a rise in the use of mediation
975
. In 
fact, it is observed that there is not any record of discouraging mediation by developed 
countries
976
.  
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Mediation will increase the opportunities for negotiated settlement in the DSU negotiation 
stage
977
. Also, it will lead to a “decrease in the Secretariat’s duties for cases at the panel 
stage”978, and it is considered to be a “fairly non-transparent method of resolving disputes”979. 
On that point, it has been stated that “any requirements to make it more public could have a 
chilling effect on the willingness of parties to talk openly and share information” 980 . 
Therefore, there have been some proposals for reforms to the DSU, which attempt to address 
obstacles that may “prevent or discourage developing countries from using mediation more 
frequently”981. 
 
Under the DSU, there was no requirement that anyone other than the Director-General could 
be a mediator
982
. In general, it assumes that the Director-General could be the mediator under 
Article 5. Indeed, it is observed that considering the Director-General as a mediator for 
disputes will be good for both sides of the dispute because the Director-General has good 
knowledge and expertise concerning to the WTO law
983
. Also, the Director-General has 
authority under WTO law
984
 to be a mediator. In addition, the DSU gives the Director-
General support to be a mediator, giving the Director-General “an additional layer of 
legitimacy”985 . In fact, it is considered that the Director-General would “have a greater 
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personal and professional interest in preserving and enhancing the WTO” 986 . Also, the 
Director-General encourages the resolution of disputes and looks out for the interests of the 
disputing parties. It has been stated that there are many developing countries that demand the 
mediator to be “an expert in WTO law”987. 
 
It has been argued that mediation may be a good method for developing countries because it 
“offers the opportunity to be less legalistic and more equitable”988. Also, developing countries 
would desire a mediator “who is there to help Members find solutions to the [trade] 
problem”989. However, it is considered that the DSU has to allow the disputing parties to use 
“someone other than the Director-General or another WTO employee could also serve as the 
mediator”990. According to the DSU, other mediators could act in the DSU process. Article 
5.6 states that “Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, 
conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute” 991 . 
Therefore, the mediation method will be a good method in a case involving developing 
countries and they can “request a mediator from international development organizations, like 
UNCTAD or the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”)”992. 
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5.1.6.2.4 Proposals to reforms Mediation 
 
It is argued that more mediation could help developing countries facing the problem of a lack 
of resources and the high cost of the DSU process. However, there are not many academic 
discussions on mediation as a possible method to solve the fundamental problems of 
developing countries in the DSU. However, it is thought that the mediation may be 
considered as a good method to address the lack of legal resources and high cost of the DSU 
process to developing countries
993
. 
 
The WTO has demanded proposals from WTO Members to elucidate and enhance the DSU 
provisions on these issues
994
. Therefore, many developing countries have proposed 
significant reforms to improve the DSU and to enhance the use of mediation
995
. Some 
developing countries
996
 and the EC
997
 encourage WTO Members to have recourse to 
mediation as a method for resolving disputes between members “in a mutually satisfactory 
manner and at the earliest possible stage”998.  
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In the meantime, the most powerful proposals deal with the high cost of the DSU and the 
mediation process
999
. Some proposals suggest the improvement of mediation in the DSU 
process. The proposals submitted by Paraguay
1000
, Haiti
1001
, Jordan
1002
 and the LDC 
Group
1003
 all consider that mediation could be mandatory in disputes involving developing or 
least-developed countries. It is suggested that the mandatory mediation should take place 
before the adjudicatory procedures of the DSU that could be within the negotiation stage time 
and under the requests of developing countries. In other words, this can be done when 
developing countries need such mediation to solve disputes. So, this will not create 
enforcement problems, if the mediation is still subject to DSU rules. This will save time and 
costs and help to remain good relationships among the parties to the dispute.  
 
In general, it has been observed that a mediated decision is always considered acceptable to 
the disputing parties
1004
. Also, the aim of the DSU is to settle trade disputes in a negotiated, 
mutually satisfactory manner. Article 3.7 of the DSU states that “the aim of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually 
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acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to 
be preferred”1005. However, the WTO Members cannot require a large member to settle the 
conflict at the mediation stage. Therefore, there is less use of mediation under the DSU to 
resolve the case. However, several developing countries have already called for more use of 
mediation while no developed country has asked for mediation. Because of that the mediation 
process is not working very well for WTO Members. There is just one case settled by 
mediation
1006
. Therefore, this part attempts to make mediation stage work better for both 
developing developed countries. 
 
In the meantime, mediation is recognized by members of the WTO as a preferable alternative 
to settling disputes between parties. One international trade scholar has said that “The various 
ADR methods (such as mediation, neutral expert appraisal, mini-trial) differ from 
adjudicatory procedures by the agreed intervention of a third-party which helps the parties to 
settle their dispute in a more flexible, expeditious, confidential and less costly manner”1007. 
He also says that the “voluntary, non binding and informal character of ADR proceedings 
ensures control by the parties over their dispute and focuses on elaborating ‘win-win’ 
solutions that save time and costs and strengthen personal and business relationships among 
the parties to the dispute”1008. 
 
Consequently, a method such as mediation may be considered a significant factor in the DSB 
to directly tackle the fundamental complaints and obstacles which developing countries suffer 
from in the DSB, such as when they cannot enforce panel decisions and cost of the DSU 
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process. First of all, a mediated decision is always considered acceptable to the disputing 
parties, so the enforcement of the agreement would be voluntary by parties
1009
. So, a 
mediated decision should be binding to the disputing parties when both parties of the dispute 
agree on that decision. 
  
The manner of the mediation is left to the mediator who can take into account the discretion 
of the circumstances of the dispute and any wish expressed by the parties. Such a method 
includes the power of settling the dispute. Moreover, the mediator may request all parties or 
one party to the disputes to attend joint meetings. Making suggestions to settle a case is not 
confined to the mediator only, but each party can suggest solutions. Any agreed upon 
solution, however, must be consistent with the WTO Agreements. Since a mediated decision 
must be mutually acceptable to both parties, it is much more likely that the agreement will be 
enforced voluntarily. Consequently, a mediation agreement would assist both disputing 
parties because it focuses on the fact that both parties attempt to find a way to satisfy their 
interests. 
 
This avoids the difficulty of enforcing panel decisions through retaliatory countermeasures. 
Mediation also plays a role in verifying, monitoring and guaranteeing the decision
1010
. 
Second, the most important factor in the mediation is that the mediation is not costly for 
developing countries even for small members. It assists developing countries by avoiding the 
high costs of panel and appellate litigation. The cost of mediation is always less than the DSB 
process. Therefore, it solves a deep concern for developing countries in using the DSU. 
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However, the mediation method will be available if both parties are in agreement such as  
mediation was requested from the WTO Director-General and a request was submitted by the 
Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities
1011
. 
 
Increasing the use of mediation in the DSB would support the participation of developing 
countries in the settlement of disputes because it is an equally satisfactory way of settling a 
dispute between developing and developed countries. Also, mediation does not include only 
political opposition that may create conflicts between the members. Indeed, the mediation 
method considers is a compromise between “the two extremes of the diplomatic consultations 
stage and the adjudicatory panel stage”1012. Mediation is a method that does not lead to 
opposing reactions by developed Members
1013
. In addition, mediation may support the DSU 
decision by creating solutions to disputes and “initiatives for conciliation of the dispute”1014. 
Consequently, it receives special attention from the WTO Members.  
 
It is believed that the time limit for the mediation process should be during the timeline of the 
DSB process. Therefore, if mediation is included within the consultation stage, it will not 
lengthen the DSU’s proceedings. Also, the mediation could be during the adjudicatory 
procedures. In this stage, the mediation should be during the timeframe of the DSB 
adjudicatory procedures and under the request of the disputing parties. Therefore, the 
mediation during the DSB timeframe will not increase the time of the DSB process and will 
not incur more costs human resources like lawyers for developing countries. 
                                                 
 
1011
 Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities, WT/GC/66, 16 October 
2002. 
1012
 Pham 2004. p. 366. 
1013
 Ibid. 
1014
 Ibid. 
227 
 
 
It may be thought that mediation adds procedural settlement to the already mandatory 
consultation stage and would simply be an additional and unnecessary procedure that 
increases delays and prolongs the dispute settlement process. However, mediation can 
“encourage disputants to move from more costly dispute settlement mechanisms, like power-
based contests (consultations) and rights-based contests (panel litigation) to often more 
favorable and preferable interest-based systems (i.e., mediation)”1015. Furthermore, it can 
decrease the Secretariat’s duties at the panel stage. If, however, mediation fails or the parties 
to the dispute disagree, they can stop mediation and resort again to consultations or panel 
litigation while still saving any accumulated agreements or acknowledgements achieved 
during the mediation.  
       
I believe that if disputes are settled at the mediation, this will take less time and cost less than 
the adjudicatory procedures. If parties to disputes do not settle their case at the mediation 
stage, they could apply or continue for the adjudicatory proceedings. Indeed, mediation 
should not apply to developing countries only, but could be extended to all WTO Members. 
 
Under the DSU, the mediator is the WTO Director-General who is an impartial party for the 
WTO and both parties of the dispute. The benefit of the Director-General’s mediation is the 
Director-General’s being knowledgeable about the WTO and its law. Therefore, he may serve 
as a “mediator with muscle”1016. The role of the mediator is to assist the disputing parties 
independently and impartially to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute. The mediators 
have a duty to co-operate in good faith with the disputing parties. The WTO can appoint an 
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individual, an experienced, independent and impartial mediator whose nationality is different 
from the nationalities of the parties to the dispute
1017
. Consequently, the mediators should be 
characterised by independence and impartiality. The DSB has adopted provisions of conduct 
“designed to maintain the integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted 
under the DSU thereby enhancing confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism”1018. 
Therefore, mediators are to be “independent and impartial [...] avoid direct or indirect 
conflicts of interest and [...] respect the confidentiality of proceedings”1019. Accordingly, 
Mediators are expected to disclose “any interest, relationship or matter that person could 
reasonably be expected to know and that is likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to, that person’s independence or impartiality; and [avoid] any direct or indirect conflicts of 
interest in respect of the subject matters of the proceedings”1020. Besides, Mediators must not 
obtain any benefit that would “in any way interfere with, or which could give rise to, 
justifiable doubts as to the proper performance of that person’s dispute settlement duties”1021. 
Moreover, the person appointed as mediator has to disclose any circumstance that might give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence that should be 
maintained by the mediator throughout the whole mediation. The DSU rules cover in annex 
an illustrative list of information to be disclosed and a disclosure form which are to be 
completed by all panelists, mediators, and Appellate Body members
1022
. Any parties to the 
dispute who find a material violation of the obligations under the rules shall so notify the 
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DSB Chairman in writing
1023
. If any violation on the part of the mediator is discovered, this 
mediator will be disqualified
1024
. 
 
To sum up, compared to the adjudicatory procedures of DSU ‘panel litigation’, the use of 
mediation would have great benefits for developing countries, giving them more effective 
ways to discuss solutions to their disputes as well as giving them another chance to look for 
solutions not “only on existing law but also on considerations of equity”1025. Therefore, 
mediation might be a good method to resolve many obstacles which face developing 
countries in the DSU. 
 
5.1.7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter is to improve developing countries’ access to the DSU. Also, its aim 
is to improve the DSU rules and make them work for developing countries. Therefore, this 
chapter highlighted the possible solutions that consider tackling some of constraints that limit 
developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This chapter 
therefore evaluated the possible solutions that are more workable for developing countries in 
settlement dispute system, focusing on attempts to solve some of the obstacles which face 
developing countries as regards both consultations and DSU adjudications, in light of their 
lack of financial and legal resources.  
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First, it discusses funding developing and less developed countries. Second, covering 
attorneys’ fees could be a good approach for increasing developing countries’ ability to 
participate in the dispute settlement system. Third, reform to the operation of Article 27.2 
will improve developing countries’ access to the DSU and will assist developing countries to 
address the issue of the high cost of the DSU. Fourth, the proposal to reform the ACWL may 
address the high cost of WTO dispute settlement system litigation as well as tackle the 
limitations on the participation of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. In addition, this chapter highlights the reinforcement of consultations and 
mediation. Using more consultations and mediation would have greater benefits for 
developing countries and give them more effective ways to discuss solutions to their disputes. 
These methods give developing countries another chance to look for solutions. Therefore, 
consultations and mediation might be considered as a good method for resolving many 
obstacles that limit developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
5.2 Collective Retaliation   
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
The current ‘bilateral retaliation’ of the DSU has been argued against by several developing 
countries. The current DSU’s ‘bilateral retaliation’ rule does not have enough authority to 
force developed countries to comply with the rulings of the DSB
1026
. Developing countries 
may not use current retaliation remedies because they may fear generating hostility between 
them and developed countries and because there are different trading sizes between 
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developing countries and developed countries
1027
. It has been observed that the current 
‘bilateral retaliation’ of the DSU allows the compliant developing country to retaliate1028. 
However, the trade size of only one developing country is not enough to create any hurt to a 
large sized developed country. Therefore, it has been stated that bilateral retaliation is 
unsuccessful and inequitable for developing countries
1029
. Hence, instead of bilateral 
retaliation, collective retaliation would create a stronger and greater impact on a violating 
country
1030
. Therefore, some developing countries have proposed
1031
 that when any 
developing countries win a case against a developed country and the developed countries 
have not complied with the DSU rulings, all developing countries must take collective 
retaliation against developed countries.  
 
5.2.2 The Collective Retaliation rules  
 
The nature and object of WTO obligations are collective, in light of the main objective of the 
WTO: protecting collective expectations about the trade related behaviour of 
governments
1032
. Therefore, WTO obligations are not an individual interest, but a common 
interest for all WTO Members. Indeed, the WTO obligations must be indivisible. Therefore, 
they are unitary fundamentally in nature
1033
 of the WTO. This idea has been supported by the 
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Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation of the GATT,
1034
which is a cornerstone of the world 
trading system. WTO obligations require a Member to “immediately and unconditionally”1035 
expand its most favorable trade-related “advantage, favor, privilege or immunity”1036 to all 
other members. The DSU also permits any member to take a dispute against other member 
when it considers that a measure is in violation of the WTO agreements
1037
. The DSU allows 
any member to claim any dispute, not just “directly conflict with the WTO agreements”1038 
but also it might have “some indirect effect on negotiated concessions”1039, and any other 
situation in which a member “may be nullifying or impairing a benefit or impeding the 
attainment of any objective under the WTO agreements”1040. 
 
The WTO obligations can be understood to be “obligations undertaken in the collective 
interest and owed to all members”1041. Therefore, concessions in the WTO may be bilaterally 
negotiated, but they are collectively applied. For example, in the EC-Poultry dispute
1042, “the 
Appellate body agreed with the panel that countries usually negotiate trade concessions 
bilaterally, but subsequently the application is multilaterally”1043 because “the results of the 
negotiations are extended on a multilateral basis”1044. 
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Moreover, the ‘Theory of WTO Law’, as provided by Carmody, describes the WTO 
agreements in three levels. First of all, the WTO agreements may form a law of expectations. 
Second, the WTO agreements may be considered part of a law of realities. Third, the WTO 
agreements might be regarded as a law of interdependence. The purpose and principle of the 
WTO agreements as law of expectations is the protection of expectations. Therefore, it has 
been recognized that one of the purposes of the WTO agreements is protection of 
expectations in international trade
1045
. Under the DSU, the bilaterally negotiated trade 
concessions are always extended on a multilateral basis and collectively applied, which leads 
to an integrally multilateral system. For example, WTO obligations violated by any member 
could affect all the WTO Members. Thus, it has been stated that “the operation of the WTO 
regime was designed to go beyond the boundaries of any single country or pair of countries in 
promoting the protection of collective expectations”1046. Indeed, the WTO agreements are 
considered as collective and an example of expectations law. 
 
Considering the WTO agreements as the law of realities may provide some merits to the 
WTO obligations
1047
. The method of the law of realities gives the WTO Members some 
flexibility in their approach “to respond to specific situations encountered in trade”1048. These 
situations are reinforcing role of the collective. For example, WTO Members may create an 
obligation in advance such as in the safeguard and anti-dumping agreements. The rules of 
these agreements always provide “a single injury and bipolar dispute settlement”1049. Indeed, 
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the realities negotiated progress in advance that would be binding upon all members when 
accepted
1050
. Therefore, the negotiations in advance are authorization and confirmation that 
“the core structure of WTO obligations is collective”1051. All dispute settlements have to be 
consistent with the covered agreements. Therefore, it has been observed that the WTO 
agreements as a law of realities are “supplementary and assistive to the dominant task of 
protecting expectations”1052. 
 
It has thought that the WTO agreements on both methods as law of expectations and law of 
realities can be integration in the law of interdependence
1053
. It is observed that the WTO 
promotes economic relations not just for the interest of WTO Members individually, but 
beyond to focus on the common interest of all members
1054
. Indeed, the WTO obligations are 
predominantly collective
1055
. Also, it identifies WTO obligations that should “be most 
appropriately thought of as collective”1056. Therefore, the following part will provide some of 
the developing countries’ proposals for applying collective retaliation in the DSU.    
 
5.2.3 Collective Retaliation Proposals 
 
In general, the idea of collective retaliation, which has been supported by several of the WTO 
Members and specifically by developing countries, is aiding complainant country against the 
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non-complying country
1057
. Indeed, the nature of current DSU’s retaliation is unsuccessful 
and weak to deter and punish a developed country to comply with the DSU rulings that when 
used by only one developing country. Therefore, there are some developing countries that 
have provided a proposal for the DSU remedy
1058
. The developing countries argument was 
about collective retaliation remedies. They have agreed that collective retaliation remedies 
will be a useful and significant method to create harm or risk to the economy of very large 
markets, such as United States or the European Communities. If just one developing country 
sanctions imports from large countries, that will not create any significant harm or risk to the 
large countries’ economies. To inflict a larger economic harm on developed countries, many 
developing countries will have to undertake collective retaliation. 
 
Thus, the African Group has proposed that “all WTO Members shall be authorized to 
collectively suspend concessions to a developed Member that adopts measures in breach of 
WTO obligations against a developing Member”1059. Regarding the African Group proposal, 
it thought that the collective retaliation has to be adopted in the WTO agreements
1060
.  WTO 
law would give all WTO Members the right to adopt collective retaliation against a non-
complying country to enforce any ruling and recommendation of the DSB
1061
. Indeed, it has 
been provided by African Group that collective retaliation must be available particularly 
when developing countries have successful complaints
1062
. 
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Many members support the idea of collective retaliation. The African Group has argued that 
the existing retaliation system of the DSU is not “practical for individual developing country 
Members against developed country members” 1063 . The proposal concerns the right and 
responsibility to enforce the recommendations and rulings of the DSB
1064
. It suggests that the 
collective retaliation has to be an automatic remedy, under the special and differential 
treatment principle, when the developing or a LDC member is successful in a dispute against 
developed countries. Collective retaliation may be one method which addresses limitations 
for developing countries on participation in dispute settlement system.  
 
Moreover, Mexico
1065
 proposed that the collective retaliation system has to be available to all 
WTO Members instead of cross-retaliation
1066
. The proposal is that collective retaliation has 
to continue in force “until its level becomes equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment”1067 . Also, Mexico proposed that “the right to suspend concessions or other 
obligations to become transferable to one or more members” 1068 . The Mexico proposal 
supports the idea of including collective retaliation under the DSU.   
 
In 1999, Canada also provided a proposal
1069
. The proposal suggested adding a new article 
that deals with the issue of “Determination of Compliance”1070. The proposal provides that all 
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WTO Members must co-operate on the suspension of concessions for developing country 
Members retaliating against developed countries
1071
 as a result of economic inequality 
between developing and developed countries
1072
. It thought that the economy of all collective 
retaliation of developing countries, or all collective retaliation of WTO Members, against one 
developed country will be better than just one country.  
 
India has proposed
1073
 that all the WTO Members have to jointly act on the suspension of a 
concession against any Member violating the WTO Agreements or not complying with the 
DSB’s recommendation or ruling. Thus, the effect of this method is the withdrawal of market 
access commitments via all other Members of the WTO. The former Indian ambassador Lal 
Das recommended that collective retaliation by all Members has to be against any country 
failing to comply with a dispute settlement decision, “particularly if the complaining country 
is a developing country and the erring country is a developed country”1074. 
 
This method may favour developing countries. Collective retaliation is considered as an 
excellent method to ensuring a good sufficient pressure to induce compliance by respondent 
members. For example, if the US, which has a large economy, is not complying with the 
DSU’s recommendations or rulings, such as in the US Gambling case1075, all other WTO 
Members, including large economic countries like the EC, China and Japan, would join the 
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collective retaliation process
1076
. Hence, this method and the industries in the US will induce 
the US government to comply with the DSU recommendations and rulings. It has been 
thought that such an inducement will not come if the country alone does the retaliation for 
example, if “Antigua and Barbuda threatens the US with retaliation”1077. Indeed, retaliation 
by Antigua and Barbuda will not harm the US economy
1078
.  
 
The LDCs group proposed that when a developed country failed to implement the DSU 
ruling, a developing country should have a right to collective retaliation by several members 
when a developing country had brought a successful dispute against a developed country. 
Therefore, the collective retaliation will be taken by all WTO Members not just by only the 
winning developing country
1079
.  
 
Also, the benefit of collective retaliation has been mentioned. Collective retaliation can 
improve the DSU system and make it move from “one of bilateral action to providing a 
multilateral solution”1080. It is observed that using the “retaliation by an individual developing 
country Member is not a successful penalty or disincentive to a developed country 
member”1081. The African Group has supported this method1082. It has also been thought that 
such a method could be a significant means of encouraging compliance and advantageous to 
all the WTO Members. 
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The collective retaliation remedy has also been proposed by Kenya
1083
. The proposal states 
clearly that the multiple countries have to collectively retaliate “when at least one developing 
country wins a case against a developed country”1084. Therefore, ‘all WTO Members shall be 
authorized to collectively suspend concessions to a developed Member that adopt measures in 
breach of WTO obligations against a developing Member’1085. Indeed, such proposals could 
“provide genuine leverage to inducing compliance, a move beneficial to all WTO Members, 
and not just ‘compensation’ to the one or few that brought the case”1086. Therefore, the next 
part will analyse collective retaliation.   
 
5.2.4 Analysis of Collective Retaliation   
 
It is observed
1087
 that, by the perspective of developed countries, developed countries may be 
comfortable with membership in the DSU when they are defendants because they can hurt 
others member but other members cannot hurt them. This result is from the power of 
developed countries. Indeed, they have strong economic and politic power which may lead to 
nullification and impairment of the DSU rules.  
 
Collective retaliation method may create powerful coalitions of developing countries
1088
. It is 
suggested that collective retaliation has to be available to weak economic members of the 
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WTO. Also, it is suggested that collective retaliation should be a preferential treatment for 
developing countries, as well as “a remedial treatment to make retaliation substantively equal 
to developed countries”1089. Thus, the introduction of the substantive equality theory to the 
DSU can touch upon the basics of the Dispute Settlement System. It can also go beyond the 
special and differential treatment
1090
 for developing countries. Developed countries have not 
experienced obstacles with the current DSU retaliation since they have diversified and large 
markets, which permit them to successfully retaliate. Therefore, the proposal of collective 
retaliation is mostly for the weaker of the WTO Members to ensure the weaker members are 
at the same trade level as the large members. The proposal of collective retaliation may seek 
to change the existing unilateral retaliation system “which might seem to generate some 
conflict to a certain extent with the bilateral elements of the WTO agreements”1091. Hence, 
the collective retaliation proposal has to be examined in light of the DSU fundamentals and 
taking into the nature of WTO obligations to recognize its “compatibility with the current 
system”1092. Indeed, that will occur by including the collective retaliation method under the 
DSU rules.  
 
Under the DSU, it has been suggested that any member that has measures inconsistent with 
the WTO obligations will not be permitted to bring forward any complaint unless it first 
complies with its obligations
1093
. Thus, it thought that this method will reduce measures 
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inconsistent with the WTO rules. Therefore, it is suggested that the collective retaliation must 
be included in the WTO regime.  
 
Regarding India’s proposal, which provides that all the WTO Members have to take joint 
action on the suspension of concession
1094
, it has been observed that this proposal 
“perpetuates retaliation”1095. While the current retaliation is a trade restriction, “collective 
retaliation is even more trade restrictive”1096. Indeed, the collective retaliation method is 
intended to create member compliance with the DSU rulings. It is suggested that the first 
stage of the collective retaliation is the threat of retaliation against a non-complying country. 
However, if the non-complying country is still not complying with the DSU rulings, 
developing country Members have to act collectively to create trade pressure to make a 
member comply with the DSU rulings. Hence, collective retaliation could be a significant 
method for enforcing the DSU rules. 
 
It is thought that it may be difficult for a small or developing countries to ask a stronger, 
large, member to join collective retaliation
1097
. Also, it has been thought that the collective 
retaliation remedy may not be efficient if it is used by a few WTO Members with a small 
market, since they might not have “any possibility to use or benefit from this remedy at 
all”1098. Therefore, this may deter developing countries from using the dispute settlement 
system. However, the solution of these issues is by including collective retaliation rules under 
                                                 
 
1094
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the DSU. These rules have to oblige all the WTO Members, especially the large economic 
powers, to collectively retaliate with small or developing countries. 
 
The WTO should require all the members to take action against a non-compliant member if 
the WTO wants the DSU to work. Also, the WTO should provide for this method of 
enforcing DSU obligations even though some members will not have suffered from the 
particular violation of the WTO obligations by another member.  
 
This is because any member could suffer from the problem of non-enforcement of a WTO 
ruling in the future. To encourage use of the collective retaliation process, any member that 
refuses to be part of the collective retaliation, to enforce the DSU ruling regarding any 
dispute between WTO Members, would not have the option to request collective retaliation 
from other WTO Members when it has a dispute with larger countries and is trying to enforce 
a DSB ruling. So, when there is a case between two members and the loser does not comply 
with the DSU ruling, all the WTO Members have to invoke collective retaliation to enforce 
the DSU ruling. However, if any of the WTO Members does not participate in collective 
retaliation, they will not be able to request collective retaliation from the WTO Members 
when they win a case and need collective retaliation from the WTO Members to enforce the 
WTO ruling. 
 
The mere existence of this possibility of collective retaliation would at least create a threat of 
a more effective sanction for violation of WTO rules, even for large developed countries. It is 
thought that collective retaliation would create a greater impact on a violating country.  
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In addition, the method of collective retaliation may be considered as a perfect method to put 
powerful pressure on the opponent to implement the recommendation or ruling of the 
DSU
1099
. The LDCs have presented a “principle of collective responsibility”1100 which has to 
be adopted under the DSU
1101
. Thus, by this approach all WTO Members have a right to 
implement the recommendations or rulings of the DSB by collective retaliation. It is argued 
that “collective retaliation should be available automatically as a matter of special and 
differential treatment” 1102  …“in the case where a developing or least-developed country 
member has been a successful complainant” 1103 . Therefore, “in determining whether to 
authorize collective retaliation or not, the DSB should not be constrained by quantification on 
the basis of the rule on nullification and impairment”1104. 
 
Indeed, the collective retaliation proposal is not likely to succeed
1105
 as some of the industrial, 
developed countries, have “strongly resisted this proposal”1106. There are some developed 
countries creating some pressure on the WTO to not accept the developing countries’ 
proposals
1107
. Developed countries were not supporting the developing countries’ proposals 
for collective retaliation to be included in the DSU, because they are comfortable with the 
current DSU, also because they “can hurt developing countries, but where others cannot 
really hurt them”1108.  
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The collective retaliation remedies “require the willingness of WTO Members to adopt and 
implement such proposals in reality, whereas in this case, especially, the readiness of 
developed countries to support developing countries in enforcing a favourable decision 
appears to be absent”1109. Therefore, the proposal was unsuccessful due to a lack of support 
by developed countries
1110
. Whereas developing countries have asked the WTO to accept the 
collective retaliation proposal, for reaching an equality of pain when legal violations have 
been taken by large countries against developing countries, the WTO was not adopted and 
rejected the proposal. It observed that the WTO has not even considered or discussed the 
proposals of developing countries for collective retaliation remedies. However, it is strongly 
believed that the proposal should be requested by the WTO Members, especially by 
developing countries, since this system would create the essential pressure to induce 
compliance by developed countries’ with dispute settlement rulings in cases where only one 
developing country, with a small domestic market, cannot inflict enough economic or 
political losses in economy of the larger WTO Members to comply with those rulings.  
 
It has been stated
1111
 that if developing countries never use the existing retaliation remedy 
that may be because of that the existing retaliation is ineffective. Also, the LDCs Group
1112
 
indicated that lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and the potential negative impact 
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of current DSU retaliatory measures for poor economies
1113
 are reasons for not using the 
DSU. Finally, developing countries might fear angering developed countries
1114
. Therefore, it 
observed that many proposals of collective retaliation have been made by developing 
countries, and it is considered that the collective retaliation method is attractive for 
developing countries. Therefore, it is considered that the better method for making the 
members comply with the DSU is using collective retaliation. This method will remove the 
fear that developing countries have of developed countries and also create an incentive for 
developing countries to use the DSU process. 
 
5.2.5 Conclusion   
 
Collective retaliation addresses the problem of enforcing rulings of the DSB, which is 
considered a factor limiting participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The 
collective retaliation method is a good method for developing countries to make developed 
countries comply with DSB rulings. Also, it would enhance the DSU process since it would 
bring benefits all members of the WTO. 
 
The collective retaliation method has the strongest effect for creating member compliance 
with the DSU rulings because it includes and permits “the formation of coalitions of 
members”1115 to create and “constitute a valid threat to the non-complying members to end 
their unlawful” 1116  behaviour. Also, it provides “a collective character to the existing 
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retaliation remedy” 1117 . However, the proposal concerning collective retaliation was 
rejected
1118
. Indeed, any violation of the agreements impairs the interest of all other members. 
Therefore, there is a reason to include collective retaliation in the DSU. Also, it is considered 
that the collective retaliation might be the better resort to remedy to induce compliance. It is 
thought that this method will give equal protection for all the WTO Members particularly 
smaller states
1119
. It is considered that the WTO obligations are consistent with the proposal 
of the collective retaliation. Therefore, it will be great to include such as this development of 
international law under the DSU
1120
.  
 
This chapter tries to highlight some factors that may be considered possible solutions to 
constraints limiting developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
Also, this chapter tries to evaluate the possible solutions that are important in making the 
WTO Dispute Settlement system work better for developing countries in settling disputes 
between themselves and developed countries. The retaliation and cross-retaliation are key 
constraints causing a lack of developing countries entering into the WTO dispute settlement 
system. However, collective retaliation is considered to be a process that tackles the practical 
impact of developing countries entering into the WTO dispute settlement system and using 
only the current retaliation and cross retaliation rules of the DSU. Therefore, this part 
provides collective retaliation in some subparts. First of all, it provides the retaliation rules 
                                                 
 
1117
 Ibid. 
1118
 Persson, K.,(2007), The Current and Future WTO Dispute Settlement System; Practical problems discussing 
Article 21.5 and Article 22 of the DSU. 
1119
 Korotana, M. S., (2009). Collective Retaliation and the WTO Dispute Settlement System.10(1) The Estey 
Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy,pp 196-208. 
1120
 Vazquez, R. A., (2013), ‘Improving Remedies at the WTO Dispute Settlement for Developing Countries-A 
Compatibility Study of Three Main Proposals with the Current System’. 
247 
 
 
(Evaluation of Collective Retaliation). Second, it presents collective retaliation proposals. 
Third, it analyses collective retaliation. Finally it offers a conclusion and recommendations.   
 
5.3 Reinforcing the Dispute Resolution Process and Financial 
Compensation 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to improve developing countries’ access to the DSU and to improve 
the DSU rules and make them work for developing countries. Therefore, this chapter will 
highlight the possible solutions to tackle some of constraints that limit developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This chapter will also focus on some of 
the WTO Members attempts to solve the obstacles which face developing countries in both 
consultations and the DSU adjudication. Moreover, it will examine some of the WTO 
Members’ proposals to smoothen the WTO dispute settlement system and make that system 
more effective and successful. 
 
5.3.2 The WTO DSU and improving the participation of developing 
countries 
 
Indeed, making the WTO system more able to protect developing countries interests’ and 
extend their participation in dispute settlement proceedings are the most important issues for 
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developing countries. Indeed, since the WTO dispute settlement process was established, it 
has been improved in many ways
1121
. The DSU has two methods for settlements of any 
dispute; non-adjudicative and adjudicative. Both methods could be improved, for example as 
regards the appeal provisions, the rules of implementation, the compulsory nature of DSB 
decisions, the requirement for a reasoned decision and the well-established interpretation of 
rules
1122
. In addition, the WTO dispute settlement process has been improved as regards the 
non-adjudicative procedures
1123
. The biggest success as regards improvement of the WTO’s 
non-adjudicative procedures is considered to be the conciliation mechanism, “due to a closer 
link between conciliation and adjudication”1124. Indeed, the non-adjudicatory procedures of 
the WTO are tinged with an adjudicative character. In the WTO’s non-adjudicatory 
proceedings, “if their [the parties’] negotiations reach an impasse, the judicial process would 
automatically take over” 1125  which makes “a catalyst in promoting successful 
negotiations”1126. 
 
5.3.3 Proposals for DSU Reforms 
 
This section evaluates many proposals and recommends those proposals that might be 
beneficial for developing countries. These proposals seek to improve compliance with DSB 
rulings, enhance the timeframe of the DSU and improve financial compensation in the WTO 
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dispute settlement system. Therefore, it will argue for reforms in both the adjudicatory and 
non-adjudicatory stage of the DSU. 
5.3.4 Reinforcement consultations 
 
Consultations might avoid many constraints which limit developing country participation in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The DSU has mentioned the consultations stage as an 
excellent method that may be a favourable option for some WTO Members for settling 
disputes that may arise between WTO Members, especially between developing and 
developed countries
1127
. Indeed, the DSB supports disputing parties using the conciliation 
method to solve disputes amicably
1128
. Therefore, the consultations stage, the old diplomatic 
means of resolving trade disputes
1129
, has improved under the DSU. The DSU rules 
encourage a consultation stage before entering into the panel and appeal stages. Therefore, all 
the disputing parties must enter into the consultations stage before entering into the 
adjudicatory phase process of the DSU. Indeed, the purpose of a consultation stage is to settle 
disputes by satisfactory settlement for all parties of the dispute which conform to DSU 
provisions. Therefore, Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that ‘the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute’1130. It also provides that ‘a solution 
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is 
clearly to be preferred’1131.  
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It is also observed that the DSU provisions may be in favour of developing countries
1132
. 
DSU Articles 4 and 12 set out special rules for developing countries during the consultation 
stage. Article 4.10 provides that ‘during consultations Members should give special attention 
to the particular problems and interests of developing country Members’1133. Indeed, this 
article has been used by Chile in the case of ‘European Communities-Trade Description of 
Scallops (EC-Scallops)’1134. During DSB meeting consultations, Chile requested this article 
be stated because the article “had been disregarded by the Communities thus discriminating 
against and impairing Chile’s interests in deviation from the provisions of Article 4.10 of the 
DSU”1135.  
 
The further timeframes for the consultations stage can be created by the disputing party’s 
agreement. Indeed, the timeframes for the consultations stage is provided for by Articles 4.7 
and 4.8 of the DSU, which state that the stages are normally set at ‘60 days after the date of 
receipt of the request for consultations’1136 or containing shortened timeframes for ‘perishable 
goods’1137. Article 12 of the DSU gives the Chairman of the DSB authority to “discuss with 
parties the creation of further time extensions and durations” 1138 . In 1995, for instance, 
Pakistan had a dispute with the United States. In this dispute, according to consultations stage, 
                                                 
 
1132
 Alotaibi 2011.p.45. 
1133
 DSU Article 4.10. 
1134
 European Communitie -Trade Description of Scallops, order by Canada WTO Document (WT/DS7), Chile 
WTO Document (WT/DS14) and Peru WTO Document (WT/DS12). The request was by Chile to join in 
consultations, ordered by Canada with the European Communities, which is included in WTO Document 
WT/DS7/2. 
1135
 Footer 2001; see also, Minutes of Meeting of the DSB, 27 September 1995, WTO Document WT/DSB/M/7 
(27 October 1995). 
1136
 DSU Article 4.7. 
1137
 DSU Article 4.8. 
1138
 Alotaibi 2011.p.45. 
251 
 
 
Pakistan applied Article 12.10 of the DSU
1139 . In the DSB meeting, “the United States 
applied for the panel process but this action was challenged by Pakistan”1140. Pakistan has 
stated that the disputing parties were still “engaged in the process of Consultations”1141. 
Therefore, the United States complied with Pakistan’s complaint1142.  
 
Moreover, the consultation might avoid concerns of developing countries about “the 
diplomatic style of international trade processes in dispute settlement” 1143 . In the DSB 
processes, it is true that developing countries often face the political power of developed 
countries. Therefore, the consultation stage is considered as a method which may avoid the 
political power as result of that the consultation stage is enforced originally by the DSU. 
Also, Article 4 of the DSU states that ‘[Parties to the dispute] shall enter into consultations in 
good faith’ 1144  and ‘Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the 
matter’ 1145 . Also, ‘during consultations Members should give special attention to the 
particular problems and interests of developing country Members’1146. So, the consultation 
stage may avoid some constraints that limit developing country participation in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings in some respects. Furthermore, the consultation stage may avoid the 
“need to enforce DSB rulings against larger developed countries as well as avoiding the use 
of ineffective retaliation rules”1147.  
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Also, it will avoid the high cost of the DSU process. Therefore, it will avoid developing 
countries wasting money and time in the dispute settlement procedures against developed 
countries
1148
. Panel and appeal litigations are expensive and inflexible, so the consultation 
stage is a good method for avoiding these problems. In the consultation stage, developing 
countries will “attain more equal footing with developed countries in the consultation 
stage”1149. It is observed that the strength of the current DSU system for settling disputes is 
based on a consultation procedure
1150
. Thus, the consultation stage has been developed in 
order to reduce the costs and time of dispute resolution process and increase “the likelihood 
of a mutually satisfactory outcome”1151. Thus, it will avoid significant constraints in the 
utility of the WTO dispute settlement system for developing countries. 
 
The consultation stage will avoid the delay of time in the ligation process of the DSB. So, the 
consultation stage should be extended more than 60 days if the case needs more time. In 
addition, it will avoid the time period that the DSU process normally takes to settle dispute, a 
period of about fifteen months as fifteen months is the time limit for dispute under the DSU. 
Also, it includes ten months for the ‘reasonable period of time’ for the implementation of 
recommendations
1152
. Moreover, the complainants will wait at least two more years for the 
achievement of a satisfaction against a WTO inconsistent measure
1153
. In addition, more than 
this time would be required for compliance under Article 21.5, which adds a couple of years 
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for action to enforce the DSU decision
1154
. Therefore, the consultation stage will avoid many 
cases that take up time in the adjudication stages. Consultations will avoid using the panel 
and Appellate Body to delay the adjudicatory phase. It will also avoid the delays in the 
dispute resolution process through Article 21.5 for the compliance stage.  
 
It is important to encourage the consultation stage for dispute resolution in order to continue 
its work. Indeed, some developing countries make proposals to increase the use of 
consultation processes in dispute settlement. For instance, “Jamaica has encouraged WTO 
Members to respect their obligation”1155 to “strengthen the consultation stage”1156. Jamaica’s 
proposal to improve the consultation stage has been highlighted from time to time by other 
members because of the significance of consultation for developing countries in practice.
1157
 
 
So, stronger rules have to be introduced in the consultation process of the DSU, such as 
reform of the strict timeframe, to include more time for dispute settlement in the consultation 
stage. That will help avoid the “deliberate delaying of the proceedings by respondents”1158 in 
the adjudication stages. To conclude, the consultation stage may be considered one of many 
methods that might alleviate a number of constraints that limit developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
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5.3.5 Reinforcement of the adjudicatory phase process of the DSU 
5.3.5.1 Introduction 
 
There are several cases demonstrating the effect of delay in the DSU adjudication while 
parties may suffer injury during the dispute settlement process. Indeed, there are some WTO 
Members that have learned how to delay the adjudicatory phase of the DSU, as the remedy 
provided under WTO procedures is only prospective. Therefore, the disputing party may 
cause injury during the DSU procedures, as it is not possible to order the payment of 
indemnification or compensation for the injury even the party won the case
1159
. Therefore, 
this part analyses the possible enforcement of financial compensation under the DSU. 
 
In practice, WTO Members choose the current remedy, trade compensation, when a 
respondent member “failed to withdraw or make corrections a WTO inconsistent 
measure”1160. However, the trade compensation is not obtained until both the complainant 
and respondent agree to the compensation, but this is usually difficult to achieve as it takes a 
long time, so this method might be lead to punishment of industries in both complainant and 
respondent Members.  
 
Regarding the DSU practice, academic literature has discussed the possibility of providing 
for a less lengthy process and retrospective damages under the DSU
1161
. Indeed, the DSU is 
only concerned with prospective remedies. The DSU focuses on “a balance of rights and 
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obligations with WTO remedies to preserve future trading opportunities rather than to redress 
past injury”1162. It has recommended that the DSU provide both prospective and retrospective 
remedies
1163
. Therefore, any member’s violation of WTO law carries an obligation to both 
“stop the illegal act and to provide reparation for the damage suffered by the injured 
party”1164. It has been stated that “reparations must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that had not been committed” 1165 . Thus, as long as the Member is not 
complying, the more financial compensation it will pay. This will create an incentive for the 
offending country to comply early on with the DSU process as well as to comply with the 
rulings and recommendations of the DSB. The retrospective damage through financial 
compensation will “remove all the present incentives for delay in the dispute settlement 
process especially on the implementation and enforcement”1166. Also, it will be a deterrent 
against probable violations by members and allow “more appropriate compensation for 
nullification and impairment suffered by the offended WTO Member”1167. 
 
5.3.5.2 Proposals for Financial Compensation 
 
Financial compensation and reparation of the injury have been recommended to be 
introduced into the DSU. This idea has been supported by many proposals in the on-going 
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DSU negotiations. Some developing countries have made several proposals directly dealing 
with tackling the obstacles of developing countries trying to enforce DSB decisions and 
reparations of injury during the delay process of the DSB. Some developing countries have 
considered that financial compensation is one of the main factors in enforcing panel and 
appellate body decisions, repairing injury and lessening delay in the process of the DSB. 
Therefore, they have indicated many proposals that financial compensation might be used as 
a remedy to overcome obstacles to enforcing DSB decisions and the reparation of injury 
during the DSU process. Indeed, the aim of developing country proposals for financial 
compensation is to address the economic harm which those countries suffer from WTO 
violations. Therefore, when the developing countries suffer economic harm, they would be 
able to invoke a remedy of financial compensation
1168
. Thus, many developing countries have 
made proposals
1169
 that if a panel ruling finds that in a dispute between developed countries 
and developing countries, a developed country has breached the WTO obligations, 
developing countries should receive financial compensation and the financial compensation 
should be “continually paid pending and until the withdrawal of the felonious measures”1170.  
 
It has been argued that financial compensation should be paid when any dispute arises 
between a developing and developed country. In cases where a developing country is 
successful in the dispute, the developed country should have to pay the financial 
compensation
1171. The sum of the financial compensation “should be equal to the loss or 
                                                 
 
1168
 Ibid. 
1169
 Such a Proposal was made by the African Group Proposal, TN/DS/W/15, at 2 (Sept. 25 2002); 
Communication from Ecuador, TN/DS/W/9, at 3 (July 8, 2002); China Proposal, TN/DS/W/29, at 1 (Jan. 22, 
2003). and Kenya Proposal, TN/DS/W/42, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2003). 
1170
 Pham 2004.pp.333-388. 
1171
 See Cuba proposal, TN/DS/W/19, at 2 (Oct. 9, 2002); Jamaica proposal TN/DS/W/21, at 2 (Oct. 10, 2002); 
and Communication from India TN/DS/W/47, at 2 (Feb. 11, 2003). 
257 
 
 
injury suffered and directly arising from the offending measure”1172, and continue until the 
refusing developed country complies with a DSB panel ruling. However, the sum should not 
be continued after the nonconforming measure is removed
1173
.   
 
5.3.5.3 Proposals to establish clauses on Financial Compensation under the 
DSU 
 
Regarding the present compensation method of the WTO, which is considered not in favour 
of developing countries, the Sutherland Report
1174
 provides that in the current practice, 
compensation is just applying for extra market access, rather financial payments
1175
. The 
Report states that “[t]o allow governments to ‘buy out’ of their obligations by providing 
‘compensation’ or enduring ‘suspension of obligation’ also creates major asymmetries of 
treatment in the system. It favours the rich and powerful countries which can afford such 
buyouts while retaining measures that harm and distort trade in a manner inconsistent with 
the rule of the system”1176. The report highlighted that the financial compensation “must be 
exercised to be sure that monetary compensation is only a temporary fallback approach 
pending full compliance, otherwise ‘buyout’ problems will occur”1177. It provides that this 
method will be helpful for poorer and developing countries “to allow monetary compensation 
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from the party required to comply with a dispute settlement report, to substitute for 
compensatory market access measures by the winning aggrieved disputant”1178. 
 
In addition, the present compensation of the DSU has been classified by Mexico
1179
, which 
stated that the current compensation may not be enforced legally and used by members 
prospectively. Therefore, it has to apply the principle of retroactivity under the DSU
1180
. 
Therefore, if a dispute arises between developing countries and developed countries, the 
payment of retrospective financial damages, has to be required. Also, it has been suggested 
that the retrospective financial damages can be decided by the WTO panel and/or the DSU 
can include a clause that creates guidelines for the award of such damages
1181
. 
 
It has been argued that the DSU should be modified to provide that the developed country 
should have to pay prospective damages “in the form of monetary fines as of the end of the 
implementation period”1182.  There are some developing countries that support this method 
such as Pakistan, which has supported such an adaptation of WTO remedies
1183
. A proposal 
from Chile suggested that this remedy has to be included in the WTO context
1184
. In addition, 
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 Mexico Proposal, TN/DS/W/23 at 5 (4 Nov. 2002). See Shaffer, G., (2003), ‘How to Make the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies’; 
Also, see Bronkers, M. &Van den Brock, N.,(2005), 'Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving Remedies 
of WTO Dispute Settlement' at 122. 
1180
Mexico Proposal, TN/DS/W/23 (4 Nov. 2002). 
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financial compensation has been supported by the Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
proposal
1185
. Also, it argues that the quantification for compensated loss or injury should 
“commence from the date the member in breach adopted the offending measure” 1186 . 
Moreover, Ecuador made a proposal
1187
 for full or partial financial compensation. 
Furthermore, the African group proposal
1188
 suggested that compensation has to “prominently 
reflect the need for monetary compensation”1189 and be continually paid “until the withdrawal 
of the measures in breach of WTO obligations”1190. 
 
Indeed, the United States has supported this remedy for U.S. bilateral trade agreements with 
Chile and Singapore
1191
. Also, in this proposal, the notion of financial compensation has been 
supported by EC
1192
. Consequently, the financial compensation method will address the loss 
suffered as a result of the measures in breach of WTO obligations as well as the loss suffered 
during of the DSU process
1193
. However, it has been thought that the financial compensation 
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Agreement, at 9 (Dec. 11, 2002), USTR Trade Facts, Free Trade with Chile, and Trade Facts, Free Trade with 
Singapore, America’s First Free Trade Agreement in Asia, at 9 (Dec. 16, 2002), available at 
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(Article 22.15(5) and 22.16) and Singapore-US FTA, (Article. 20.6(5) and Article. 20.7) came into force in 
2004. 
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 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, at 2 (Mar. 13, 2002). 
1193
 See, Malaysia proposal, in Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/15, (4 June 2004), pp.2-3. Malaysia has expressed 
and concerns that the DSU settlement of disputes process is a lengthy process and make the measures 
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must not replace the withdrawal of measures. Therefore, the withdrawal of measures should 
not be affected by any provision for financial compensation
1194
. 
 
It has been observed that unpaid monetary compensation can be increased by a particular 
procedure when a developed country refused to bring its inconsistent measures under a DSB 
decision within a specific time
1195
. So, the time limit of executions can be also fixed by 
classified in the clause
1196
. Also, the punitive rate of the financial compensation may reduce 
developed countries’ non-compliance with WTO rules. Indeed, it can be simply provided that 
the developed country could avoid payment of a punitive rate by acting in full with the DSU 
ruling
1197
.  
 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the financial compensation fines have to increase over time 
and it will be as long as the member suffers during the delay process. Therefore, with this 
method the balance among WTO Members would be restored and it would encourage 
compliance in the DSU
1198
. It has been thought that to eliminate violating measures by any 
member, payment of financial compensation has to be independent of the DSU obligation. 
Also, the punitive rate has to be classified regarding some aspects, such as an amount has to 
be decided with regard to “the effect of that measure on the trade of the developing 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
inconsistent remain until the adoption of the AB report. The lengthy process would be causing severe damage to 
the interests of the complainant, especially a developing country.   
1194
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country”1199 and the punitive time duration of violating measures will continue until recovery 
through the elimination of the inconsistent measure
1200
. When a developed country is not 
complying with a ruling, the payment of retrospective fines as financial compensation would 
improve the ability of the developing countries to bring pressure to bear in settlement 
negotiations as well as improve their capacity to pay for the legal protection “of their interests 
under the covered agreements”1201. 
 
However, in the WTO, there is a huge imbalance in power and economic standing between 
the WTO Members
1202
. The larger members, who have greater economic power, may easily 
avoid their obligations by paying financial compensation fines while there are many 
developing countries have not enough money for paying financial compensation fines. So, it 
thought that the financial compensation has to be “according to the economic strength of the 
offending member”1203, so the fine will be minimized for poorer members1204. Also, it has 
been thought that the payment of fines may simply be an alternative for developing countries, 
so they can accept or reject the financial compensation depending on their interest
1205
. 
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The rules on financial compensation can be set out in a clause in the DSU binding for all 
members.  Indeed, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
has been using the same method to ensure that the “the monetary award given by ICSID 
tribunals will be awarded”1206. Therefore, if the same method is used by the DSU that would 
limit many conflicts between a developing and a developed country specifically when the 
developed countries are the offending party
1207
. In practice, this method of financial 
compensation can be applied, for example in the US Copyright case. In that case, the US and 
EC finally appeared to reach a mutually acceptable temporary agreement. The US “made a 
payment to a specific private body in the EC as a temporary arrangement during 
implementation” 1208 . Regarding the US Copyright case, there is commentary that the 
financial compensation was acceptable in principle
1209
. In the United States-Section 110(5) of 
the US Copyright Act
1210
, financial compensation is, in fact, possible under the WTO
1211
. The 
case presented that the DSU recognized that the remedy of financial compensation can be 
recognize under the covered agreements
1212
. Also, the case showed that the financial 
compensation can be calculated. It had classified the level of nullification and impairment, 
which was suffered by the European Communities due to the United States’ inconsistent 
legislation implemented
1213
. Therefore, the amount identified which has to be paid by the 
United States
1214
. Therefore, it has been advanced that the DSU has to make changes and 
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accept financial compensation under the DSU, particularly for lengthy processes causing 
damage during the DSU process. Indeed, the African Group’s proposal supports the 
retrospective financial compensation method: in cases brought by developing countries 
against developed countries, the date of retrospective financial compensation is computed 
“from the date of the adoption of the measure found to be inconsistent until the date of its 
withdrawal”1215. So, the DSU shall permit the least-developed or developing country Member 
and any other Members to request financial compensation
1216
 and retrospective computation 
of nullification or impairment
1217
. Indeed, it has been suggested that the retrospective 
calculation of the financial compensation may be from the date which damages occurred. 
Therefore, the starting date could be the date of imposition of the illegal trade measure
1218
 
and as a result of the amount of damages accrued could be huge before parties even enter into 
settlement consultations process
1219
. Therefore, such a starting date might eliminate the 
incentive for developed countries not to violate WTO law and to manipulate a delay in the 
DSU procedures and instead give developed countries an incentive to settle the dispute in an 
amicable negotiate as they notice that they will pay retrospective damages if the matter is not 
settled. Thus, it might be favourable for developing countries. 
 
Indeed, the determination of the correct level of financial compensation for damages may be 
controversial and opposed by developed countries
1220
. It could easily become a highly 
contentious matter. Therefore, a more practical and less controversial approach to the 
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problem would be to delegate some of the DSU enforcement task to an independent ‘special 
prosecutor’ 1221 , strengthen surveillance and outsource which has to “defend developing 
country interests, identifying potential violations rapidly” 1222  and “allowing these to be 
addressed in a timely fashion” 1223 . Also, regarding how to quantify the amount of 
compensation, “economic experts would have to work in close co-operation with panels”1224 
to address the amount of compensation. It can be determined that the amount of damages by 
the initial WTO panel, as Mexico has proposed, and can be addressed early in the dispute 
settlement process
1225
.
 
 The DSU could “define the modalities for a panel’s determination of 
the amount of retrospective damages”1226. Also, the amount of the harm and any consequent 
compensation involved in the case should be made as early as possible on in the dispute 
settlement process
1227
. 
 
The financial compensation method reduces the effects of the violating measure. Also, it 
induces compliance to WTO obligations
1228. Article 22:4 of the DSU provides that “[t]he 
level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be 
equivalent to the level of the nullification of impairment”. This Article can be applied in 
calculating the value of financial compensation. Using this method would “fully compensate 
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the complainant for the loss suffered as a result of the violation of WTO obligations by the 
respondent and to act as a retrospective remedy”1229. This method has the advantage of being 
useful in implementing rulings and recommendations of the DSU, and inducing compliance 
in the current WTO practice. 
 
Under the DSU, it is the WTO Member that is the receiver of the financial compensation 
while the specific industry or company that was harmed by the WTO-inconsistent measures 
is the recipient of the financial compensation. Therefore, the DSB panel ruling for financial 
compensating has to mention to companies or private traders that benefit from repairing the 
damage of the measure. Further, the distribution of the financial compensation by the 
Member government should be monitored by a WTO organisation (e.g. the panel) to avoid 
the failure of distribution mechanisms
 1230
. Therefore, the WTO can ensure the distribution of 
the financial compensation to the recipient that was affected by the WTO inconsistent 
measures
1231
.  
 
Academic literature has discussed the possibility of providing for retrospective damages 
under the DSU. For example, Bronckers and Broek have argued in favour of retroactive 
financial compensation that “[r]etroactivity in financial compensation would introduce a 
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significant disincentive against foot-dragging, which is now perceived to be a major problem 
in the dispute settlement mechanism. As the DSU proceedings can take a long time, some 
Members are seen to exploit this to maintain WTO illegal measures
1232
. Retroactivity more 
accurately remedies the injury suffered by private traders by providing reparation for the 
period when the injury actually occurred
1233
. They also have supported the proposal of 
financial compensation. First of all, they revealed that this method is not trade restrictive. 
Second, it assists to redress injury. Third, it encourages efforts to induce compliance. Fourth, 
“it can be a disincentive to foot dragging in the implementation and enforcement process”1234. 
Fifth, “it can add an element of fairness”1235 and finally “it is in line with general public 
international law” 1236 . Authors have discussed the reform of the DSU system and have 
provided suggestion for financial compensation
1237
. Firstly, the DSU has to improve the 
compensation remedy and create a particular provision for financial compensation as a 
remedy. Secondly, a financial compensation provision has to contain compensation for the 
damages caused. Thirdly, the financial damage remedy has to be “retroactive to the time of 
violation”1238. Fourthly, it has to be financial compensation for each type of violation. Fifthly, 
the victim has the right to accept the new financial damage remedy or choose trade 
compensation. So, the financial compensation will be within the sovereign discretion of each 
Member
1239
.  
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Moreover, financial compensation is compatible with the objective of the WTO system which 
is the rebalancing between WTO Members’ negotiated rights. Another WTO objective is 
inducing compliance with WTO obligations. Financial compensation offsets the damage 
suffered as a result of the unlawful measure
1240
, and can contribute to achieving WTO 
objectives by inducing compliance and ensuring “compensation to defendants regardless of 
their size – thereby correcting the current asymmetry between large and small countries”1241. 
Therefore, the financial compensation structure could be complimentary to the DSU rules
1242
. 
One prerequisite for a successful system is that the amount of the financial compensation has 
to be strict enough to make the violating Member comply with the DSB recommendations 
and rulings. 
 
In addition, it is thought that developing countries and LDCs ought to be “allowed to claim 
financial compensation for an initial period of time” 1243 . It has been observed that the 
financial compensation should be included in all covered agreements of the WTO. Therefore, 
it has been stated that the financial compensation has to be preferential treatment for 
developing countries
1244
. Hence, if the dispute involves the developed as the offending party, 
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the financial compensation has to be applied
1245
 that would deter developed countries from 
adopting inconsistent trade measures against their developing country counterparts
1246
. This 
method of financial compensation will also help the smaller and poor countries who suffered 
from the delays and limited compensation. The delay and suffering continues during the 
period in which measures violating the WTO remain in force. In addition, fewer disputes will 
reach the DSB
1247
. Also, financial compensation can be a method for helping developing 
countries trying to enforce DSU decisions, which is considered as a matter limiting their 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
While the idea of financial compensation has been agreed and supported by many countries, 
it has been observed that it “will not take place in the immediate future, because of the great 
hostility of developed nations”1248. Therefore, as a result of the opposition from developed 
countries
1249, there are some scholar’s judging that such a reform may not come about in the 
near future. However, one of the most significant changes in the DSU has to be to include 
financial compensation
1250
. Developing countries also have to create more support for 
retrospective damages and financial compensation. That will help reduce the incentive of the 
disputing parties to delay the implementation of the DSU process and make “parties reaching 
an agreed solution as early as possible”1251.  
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Ecuador’s paper “offers to strengthen compensation mechanism instead of using retaliation as 
a last resort, provided that compensation does not become a way of paying in order to 
maintain a situation of non-compliance”1252. The other recommendation is that the financial 
compensation has to work with the existing remedies of the DSU, not replace them. So, it 
will seek to extend the framework of the DSU remedies. Therefore, the financial 
compensation would be commendable and acceptable, especially for developing countries 
that they may like to obtain “a tangible cure in the event of any violation against them”1253. 
The DSB should provide for some specific rules for financial compensation in the DSU
 1254
. 
Finally, the financial compensation ought to not be the only method considered by the 
contracting parties for enforcing panel recommendations
1255
. 
 
5.3.6 Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the aim of this chapter is to improve developing countries accessing to the DSU 
as well as improve the DSU rules and make them work for developing countries. Therefore, 
this chapter highlighted the possible solutions, which are considered to be tackling some of 
constraints that limiting developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. This chapter, therefore, examines and evaluates the possible resolutions, which 
are considered the main factors and more significant methods in the DSU to be more 
workable for developing countries in settlement dispute system. Also, this chapter focuses on 
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some of the WTO Members’ attempts to solve some of the obstacles facing developing 
countries in the both consultations and the DSU adjudicatory. It discusses the time and 
compensation of DSB. These proposals can be sought to improve compliance with DSB 
rulings, enhance the timeframe of the DSU, and seek to augment the improvement of the 
financial compensation in the WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, it argues for 
reforms in both adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory stage of the DSU. First of all, it has 
discussed the reinforcement of consultations that might avoid many constraints, which limits 
developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Second, the 
retrospective damages for financial compensation may remove all the present incentives for 
delay in the dispute settlement process, especially on the implementation and enforcement of 
the DSU rulings.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendation 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate the most vital concerns which limit 
developing country participation in the WTO’s dispute settlement proceedings. In addition, 
some specific points have been suggested as possible solutions, which could tackle those 
constraints. This thesis has included various chapters. The first chapter provided the 
introduction. The second chapter has three parts. The first part demonstrates the environment 
that produced the international trade organisation. The second part reviews the GATT and 
gave details of the GATT principles as well as the GATT tariff negotiating rounds. Also, it 
brief provided information about the development of the GATT and its member accession. It 
also offered basic information about the progress of increasing international free trade, which 
was encouraged by multinational negotiations and agreements. The third part presented a 
brief review about the WTO and the environment, which produced the WTO as well as 
presenting brief information about the development of the WTO. It also included a number of 
the WTO articles that created a participating role in WTO proceedings and possibly leads to 
accession under the WTO. Therefore, it highlighted and evaluated articles that indeed are key 
factors for countries entering into the WTO.  
 
Chapter three defined the term ‘developing countries’ and the definitions of that term as 
classified under the GATT and WTO. This chapter also has provided the classification of the 
term ‘developing countries’ in the World Bank, the United Nation and the United Nation 
Statistics, and in the International Monetary Fund. Also, chapter three has obvious analysis 
and classifies the concept of ‘developing countries’ in order to make clear principles for 
defining the notion of developing countries.  
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In chapter Four, a number of significant constraints which limit developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings have been analysed and discussed. The 
first part of chapter 4 highlights the most significant factors regarding the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. The lack of financial and legal 
resources was illustrated and considered among the most significant constraints that limit the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. Thus, the part 
analysed the internal resources of developing countries, which cannot afford the cost of 
pursuing legitimate claims under the DSB, which also makes litigating their dispute under the 
DSB less enjoyed by developing countries. Furthermore, the internal expertise of developing 
countries was analysed and evaluated. Some developing countries do not have the ability to 
recognize their rights and properly defend themselves under the WTO because of the lack of 
legal expertise who can deal with WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The WTO law and 
the DSU provisions demand legal and financial resources, which makes the high cost of the 
different stages of WTO dispute settlement proceedings a dilemma for developing countries 
considering participating in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed, DSU Article 27.2 
and the ACWL tackled the lack of financial and legal resources of developing countries in the 
dispute settlement proceedings. However, it is observed that neither Article 27.2 nor the 
ACWL tackle the high cost of litigation and the lack of legal expertise. It is worth mentioning 
that none of the solutions of assistance from a WTO Secretariat consultant, outside legal 
counsel, the ACWL attorneys or Article 27.2 has addressed one of the most significant goals 
of a developing country: to train its own lawyers to a level of expertise and self-sufficiency, 
and to be able to represent itself in DSU proceedings.  
 
The second part has also discussed and highlighted significant factors regarding the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. The retaliation 
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was illustrated and considered a significant constraint, which limited the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. Therefore, the part analysed the 
retaliation and cross retaliation rule, which meant developing countries could not afford to 
pursue legitimate claims under the DSB. This also makes developing countries less likely to 
litigate their dispute under the DSB. Therefore, that part tried to analysis whether there is an 
ability to effectively retaliate, which may be considered as a key determinant for WTO 
Members complying with dispute settlement rulings. Consequently, the part examines the 
operation of the developing country with the WTO retaliation, which may include limitations 
placed on them via the lack of retaliatory force in taking recourse to these procedures against 
developed countries on the one hand and the threat of developing countries from disputes on 
the other. It also evaluates and analyses the retaliation rules undermining the utility of WTO 
dispute settlement for developing countries. It reveals the statistics of WTO Members using 
the dispute settlement system, particularly for developing countries involved.  
 
The chapter also evaluated the experience of developing countries with retaliation and cross-
retaliation. Also, this part evaluated the constraint affecting developing countries’ decisions 
to operate with the WTO dispute settlement system. The analysis of the constraint is based on 
three arguments. First, developing countries, with small domestic markets, cannot impose 
sufficient economic or political losses within the larger WTO Members to generate vital 
pressure to induce compliance. Secondly, the retaliation, ‘suspension of concessions’, might 
be more detrimental to a developing country rather than a developed country WTO Member. 
Thirdly, the WTO rulings cannot be enforced by developing countries, therefore developing 
countries have little incentive in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
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The third part of chapter 4 casts light on and highlights the significant factors regarding the 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement body. The duration of 
the DSB process and compensation were illustrated and considered among the most 
significant constraints limiting the participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement body. Thus, this part analysed the lengthy process of the DSU, which limits the 
participation of countries in the DSB, particularly developing countries. This makes it less 
likely for developing countries to resolve their disputes under the DSB. First, the duration of 
the dispute resolution process has been highlighted, and an evaluation of the constraint has 
been emphasized. The DSU’s dispute resolution process has been described. It appears that 
the DSU process creates a dilemma for developing countries in participating in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. In addition, compensation under the DSU was analysed and 
evaluated, as was the constraint this offers. The section considered current dissatisfaction 
with the compensation scheme. Thus, the reasons considered for rarely using the remedy of 
compensation were highlighted. First of all, the voluntary of compensation when disputing 
parties have to agree on the solution. Second, compensation has to be regular with the 
covered agreements. Third, compensation is not providing efficient reparation of damages.  
 
6.2 Recommendation 
 
Chapter 5 mentioned the most significant potential solutions for tackling the constraints on 
developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Those solutions try 
to make the WTO system more workable for developing countries in settling disputes. In 
addition, the chapter tried to demonstrate the significance of reforming the DSU. Therefore, it 
recommends that the proposals appearing in chapter 5 should use in actual practice in the 
DSB. Indeed, while the dispute settlement system has been considered successful for 
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developing countries, but there are still a number of significant procedural needs reforms that 
the DSU dispute settlement system must consider. Those reforms have been included in part 
1, 2 and 3 of chapter 5. Part 1 discusses the solution for a lack of financial and legal 
resources. Part 2 illustrates the notion of collective retaliation. Part 3 discusses the time and 
compensation of the DSB. Those are considered to be processes that tackle the key practical 
constraints on the ability of developing countries to enter into the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Increasing the use of those methods could be understood as the main way of 
achieving a system that works for and to benefit of developing country interests. If the WTO 
takes measures that are included in chapter 5 that would improve the DSU effectively as well 
as improve developing country use of the WTO DSB. It is recommended that developing 
countries work towards establishing those methods in practice by making agreements 
between all the developing countries. This will make them more powerful in supporting their 
proposals in the WTO.  
 
In addition, some constraints on developing country participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings remain, and developing countries need to face this weakness in the 
WTO. All developing countries should push for the development of the WTO dispute 
settlement system to make it more adjudicative and enforceable when dealing with their 
concerns. The possible solutions presented in this thesis for tackling the constraints on 
developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings should be taken 
into consideration.  
 
Part 1 of chapter 5 shows that the aim of these recommendations is to improve the DSU rules 
and make them work for developing countries. Therefore, this part highlighted the possible 
solutions that are intended to tackle some of constraints that limit developing country 
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participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This part, therefore, illuminates and 
evaluates the possible resolutions that consider the main factors and more significant methods 
in the DSU to be more workable for developing countries. This part also focused on some of 
the WTO Member attempts at solving some of the obstacles facing developing countries in 
both the consultations and the DSU adjudication. Moreover, it indicates some of the WTO 
Member proposals to smoothing out the WTO dispute settlement system to create an 
effective and successful system since the establishment of the DSU until to date. Therefore, 
this part discusses the solution for a lack of financial and legal resources. First of all, it 
suggests a fund for developing and less developed countries. Second, paying attorneys’ fees, 
when developing countries are successful complainants under the DSU, could be a good 
approach for developing countries’ ability to participate in the dispute settlement system. 
Third, it is believed that reform to the operation of Article 27.2 will improve developing 
countries’ use of the DSU as well as assisting developing countries to address the issue of the 
high cost of the DSU. Fourth, it considers that the proposal to reform the ACWL may address 
the high cost of WTO dispute settlement system litigation as well as tackle limits on the 
participation of developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In addition, 
this part highlights the significant reinforcement for consultations and mediations. It believes 
that using more consultations and mediation would have great benefits for developing 
countries and give them more effective ways to discuss solutions to their disputes. Also, these 
methods give developing countries another chance to look for solutions. Therefore, 
consultations and mediation might be considered as good methods to resolve many obstacles 
which limit developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
Part 2 illustrates the notion of collective retaliation, which undertakes the problem of 
enforcing rulings of the DSB that are considered a factor limiting participation in WTO 
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dispute settlement proceedings. The collective retaliation method is considered a good 
method for developing countries to make developed countries comply with the DSB rulings. 
Also, it provides real pressure to encourage the DSU process as well as provides benefits to 
all members of the WTO. The collective retaliation method has the strongest effect in 
encouraging members to comply with the DSU rulings because it includes and permits the 
formation of cooperation between members to create and represent a true threat to the non-
complying members to end their illegal behaviour. Indeed, the collective retaliation method 
induces compliance to restoring the legal status. Also, it provides a cooperative character to 
the existing retaliation remedy. In addition, it is thought that the collective retaliation is based 
on a multilateral agreement that, indeed, any violation on the agreements impairs the interest 
of all other members. Therefore, there is a reason to include collective retaliation in the DSU. 
Also, it is considered that the collective retaliation might be the last resort to remedy the 
violation and to induce compliance. It is thought that this method gives equal protection to all 
the WTO Members, particularly to smaller states. Therefore, it will be great to include 
developments such as this in the DSU. Indeed, this part tries to highlight some factors that 
may be considered possible solutions to constraints limiting developing country participation 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This part tries to evaluate the possible solutions that 
are important in making the WTO DSU work better for developing countries in settling 
disputes between themselves and developed countries. The retaliation and cross-retaliation 
are key constraints causing a lack of developing countries entering into the WTO dispute 
settlement system. However, collective retaliation is considered to be a process that can 
tackle the practical concerns of developing countries entering into the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Therefore, this part provides collective retaliation in some subparts. First, 
it provides the retaliation rules and an evaluation of collective retaliation. Second, it presents 
collective retaliation proposals. Third, it provides an analysis of collective retaliation.  
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The aim of Part 3 is to improve developing countries access to the DSU as well as to improve 
the DSU rules and make them work for developing countries. Therefore, this part highlighted 
possible solutions that consider tackling some of constraints that limit developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This part, therefore, evaluates the 
possible resolutions that consider the main factors and more significant methods in the DSU 
to be more workable for developing countries in the dispute settlement system. This part also 
focuses on some of the WTO Members’ attempts to solve some of the obstacles that face 
developing countries in both consultations and the DSU adjudicatory. Moreover, it reveals 
some of the WTO Members’ proposals to smooth the WTO dispute settlement system and 
create it effective and successful system. It discusses the time and compensation of the DSB. 
These proposals can be sought to improve compliance with DSB rulings, enhance the 
timeframe of the DSU and to seek the improvement of the financial compensation in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, it argues for reforms in both the adjudicatory and 
non-adjudicatory stage of the DSU. First of all, it discusses the reinforcement of consultations 
that might avoid many constraints that limit developing country participation in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. Second, the retrospective damages by financial compensation may 
remove all the present incentives for delay in the dispute settlement process, especially on the 
implementation and enforcement of the DSU rulings. The purpose of this thesis is to make 
developing countries have more participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
Therefore, the aim of reforming the DSU is tackling the constraints on developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Those solutions try to make the WTO 
system more workable for developing countries in settling disputes. Moreover, they will 
make developing countries effectively operate the same way as developed countries. 
Therefore, it recommends that those proposals appearing in this thesis should be used in 
actual practice by establishing them in the DSB. 
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Appendix 1: WTO Membership under Article XIV 
 
Country   WTO Membership 
Angola     1 December 1996 
Benin        22 February 1996 
Bolivia      13 September 1995 
Botswana       31 May 1995 
Burkina Faso   3 June 1995 
Burundi            23 July 1995 
Cameroon          13 December 1995 
Central African Republic  31 May 1995 
Chad     19 October 1996 
Colombia        30 April 1995 
Congo       27 March 1997 
Cuba        20 April 1995 
Cyprus      30 July 1995 
Democratic Republic of the Congo      1 January 1997 
Djibouti           31 May 1995 
Dominican Republic      9 March 1995 
Egypt               30 June 1995 
El Salvador          7 May 1995 
Fiji                14 January 1996 
Gambia              23 October 1996 
Grenada           22 February 1996 
Guatemala         21 July 1995 
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Guinea       25 October 1995 
Guinea Bissau             31 May 1995 
Haiti               30 January 1996 
Jamaica           9 March 1995 
Lesotho           31 May 1995 
Liechtenstein        1 September 1995 
Madagascar        17 November 1995 
Malawi            31 May 1995 
Maldives            31 may 1995 
Mali                 31 May 1995 
Mauritania            31 May 1995 
Mozambique          26 August 1995 
Myanmar           1 January 1995 
Nicaragua                3 September 1995 
Niger                   13 December 1996 
Papua New Guinea        9 June 1996 
Poland                      1 July 1995 
Qatar                      13 January 1996 
Rwanda                     22 May 1996 
Sierra Leone   3 July 1995 
Slovenia 30 July 1995 
Solomon Islands 26 July 1996 
St Kitts& Nevis 21 February 1996 
Switzerland  1 July 1995 
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Togo  31 May 1995 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 March 1995 
Tunisia 29 March 1995 
Turkey  26 March 1995 
United Arab Emirates  10 April 1996 
Zimbabwe  3 March 1995 
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Appendix 2: How long to settle a dispute?
1256
 
 
These approximate periods for each stage of a dispute settlement procedure are 
target figures-the agreement is flexible. In addition, the countries can settle their 
dispute themselves at any stage. Totals are also approximate. 
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc. 
45 days Panel set up and panellists appointed 
6 months Final panel report to parties 
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members 
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) 
Total = 1 year (without appeal) 
60-90 days Appeals report 
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report 
Total = 1y 3m (with appeal) 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
1256
 The World Trade Organization (2011), The World Trade Organization. ‘How long to settle a dispute?’ 
Available from: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [Accessed: November 12, 
2013]. 
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